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The Young European Union Private International Law Research Network was established in
2019 in order to promote academic cooperation within the young generation of private
international lawyers in the European Union. The activity of the Network centres around
projects and the project theme for 2020 was the application of overriding mandatory norms. 
Overriding mandatory norms are beloved subjects for private international lawyers. Most
often, however, they are analysed in the context of EU private international law, and principally
in contract law, without due regard to other situations where overriding mandatory provisions
may equally claim application. Therefore, the primary goal of the project was to reveal
whether and to what extent overring mandatory provisions are applied in the autonomous
private international law of the Member States, i.e. outside the scope of application of the 
EU private international law regulations. Some findings have been made in the general report
prepared in the framework of the project, based on the contributions of national reporters
from seventeen Member States. The report, however, clearly demonstrates that the application
or consideration of overriding mandatory rules is also admitted in the autonomous private
international law of the Member States, and most notably they involve rules on personal
status and family law, property law and company law.
This enquiry on the application of overriding mandatory provisions in autonomous
private international law is supplemented by the discussion of topics related to the application
of overriding mandatory rules in private international law and arbitration. Martina Melcher
examines which substantive law rules of EU law may qualify as overriding mandatory
provisions under the Rome I and Rome II Regulations. Katažyna Bogdzevič puts the application
of overriding mandatory provisions in family law and regarding names under scrutiny. Markus
Petsche addresses the application of mandatory rules in international commercial arbitration.
Uglješa Grušić discusses the implications of some recent English conflict-of-laws cases
concerning the application of overriding mandatory provisions, such as Lilly Icos LLC v 8PM
Chemists Ltd and Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc. Finally, the approach of the new
Hungarian Private International Law Act towards overriding mandatory norms is presented
by Csenge Merkel and Tamás Szabados. 
The recent COVID-19 pandemic sadly enlightens a further category of overriding
mandatory norms: public health measures. Measures related to the prevention of the spread
of the coronavirus, introduced by many states around the world, can be considered as
Overriding Mandatory Provisions in Private
International Law and Arbitration
Introduction by the Guest Editor 
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overriding mandatory norms.1 They include closing borders, cities and workplaces, ordering
the cancellation of large-scale events, such as theatre and cinema shows or concerts,
a mandatory ban on flights or road transport and the expropriation of local face masks
production and stocks. 
It was planned to hold a conference at ELTE Eötvös Loránd University with the participation
of the project participants in March 2020 to discuss the research outcomes. The coronavirus
epidemic interfered with this plan. However, academic cooperation continued without
interruption. The conference has been scheduled for a later date and moved to the online space.
Moreover, the written versions of the planned conference lectures can now be published in
the ELTE Law Journal. The disease could reimpose borders across Europe, but this cannot
prevent scholarly exchange. This is proved in this issue of the ELTE Law Journal. 
Tamás Szabados
Guest editor
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • INTRODUCTION
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1 See in particular Ennio Piovesani, ‘Italian Self-Proclaimed Overriding Mandatory Provisions to Fight Coronavirus’
conflictoflaws.net <https://conflictoflaws.net/2020/italian-self-proclaimed-overriding-mandatory-provisions-to-
fight-coronavirus/> accessed 7 June 2020.
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Introduction
This comparative study focuses on a special group of norms, namely overriding mandatory
provisions and their application outside the reach of the EU private international law
regulations. Terminologically, such norms have been given various names in different
jurisdictions, such as lois de police, lois d’application immédiate, international zwingende
Normen, Eingriffsnormen and norme di applicazione necessaria. The Greek-French private
international lawyer Phocion Francescakis described such norms in his famous definition as
those necessary to protect the political, social and economic order of a  country.1 This
definition was confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its Arblade
judgment2 and was followed by the legal literature in several EU Member States.
Although the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations had
already allowed the application of norms that we call now overriding mandatory provisions
as mandatory rules,3 it was the Rome I Regulation that first gave a legislative definition at EU
level.4 According to Article 9 (1) of the Rome I Regulation, overriding mandatory provisions
are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its
public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that
they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise
applicable to the contract under the Rome I Regulation. The Rome I Regulation authorises
courts to apply the overriding mandatory provisions of the lex fori. In addition, effect may be
Tamás Szabados*
Overriding Mandatory Provisions in the
Autonomous Private International Law 
of the EU Member States — General Report
9 n
* Tamás Szabados (PhD, LLM, Dr. habil) is associate professor at ELTE Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest), Faculty
of Law, Department of Private International Law and European Economic Law. This general report was produced
in the framework of the ‘Overriding mandatory provisions’ project of the Young EU Private International Law
Research Network.
1 Phocion Francescakis, ‘Quelques précisions sur les ‘lois d’application immédiate’ et leurs rapports avec les règles
sur les conflits de lois’ (1966) 55 Revue critique de droit international privé 1–18.
2 Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Arblade and Arblade & Fils SARL
and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL [1999] ECR I-8453, para 30.
3 80/934/EEC: Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations opened for signature in Rome on 19 June
1980 [1980] OJ L266/1, art 7.
4 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable
to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6.
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given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country where the obligations
arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed, insofar as those overriding
mandatory provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful. The Rome II
Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations,5 as well as the regulations on
matrimonial property regimes6 and on the property consequences of registered partnerships7
allow the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the forum without providing
for the consideration of those of any other country.
The CJEU addressed overriding mandatory provisions in Ingmar,8 and interpreted Article
9 of the Rome I Regulation (and its predecessor from the Rome Convention) in the Unamar9
and Nikiforidis10 judgments, while Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation was interpreted in the
da Silva Martins case.11 The application of these Articles also arose in national judicial
practice. The relevant Articles of the Rome I and II Regulations and the related case law
received considerable attention from commentators, too.
The EU legal instruments and the case law of the CJEU on overriding mandatory norms
were subject to a lively scholarly enquiry. However, less attention has been devoted to the
treatment of overriding mandatory provisions in the law of the Member States outside the
scope of application of the EU private international law regulations. This is notwithstanding
the fact that the application of overriding mandatory norms may also arise in the autonomous
private international law of the EU Member States, particularly in the areas of personal status
and family law, property law and company law. Since comparative studies are missing in this
field, it might seem useful to make an attempt to give an overview of the application of
overriding mandatory rules in these fields.
The main quest of this study centres around how national legislation, judicial practice
and legal scholarship treat overriding mandatory norms outside the realm of EU private
international law, whether there is any practical relevance of the application of overriding
mandatory norms in the autonomous private international law of the jurisdictions examined;
and whether it is possible to reveal common patterns in national laws and a convergence
between the approach of EU private international law and the autonomous private
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • TAMÁS SZABADOS
n 10
5 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L199/40, art 16.
6 Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property
regimes [2016] OJ L183/1, art 30.
7 Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1104 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of the property
consequences of registered partnerships [2016] OJ L183/30, art 30.
8 Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc. [2000] ECR I-9305.
9 Case C-184/12 United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v Navigation Maritime Bulgare, ECLI:EU:
C:2013:663.
10 Case C-135/15 Republik Griechenland v Grigorios Nikiforidis, ECLI:EU:C:2016:774.
11 Case C-149/18 Agostinho da Silva Martins v Dekra Claims Services Portugal SA, ECLI:EU:C:2019:84.
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international law of the Member States towards overriding mandatory rules.
This study was prepared on the basis of national reports submitted by the members of the
Young EU Private International Law Network, concentrating on national legislation and court
practice outside the scope of application of the EU private international law regulations. As
such, the research gives an overview on the application of overriding mandatory norms in
seventeen jurisdictions, namely Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, England,
Estonia, Germany, France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovenia
and Spain.12
The national reports were able to support a comparative analysis and for some more
general conclusions to be drawn. It must be acknowledged, however, that the research
outcomes inevitably have their own limits. Although the legislation, judicial practice and
the legal literature in seventeen EU Member States could be examined with the help of the
project participants, and this suffices to draw certain comparative conclusions, a  fully
comprehensive comparison could not be undertaken, as the law of not all Member States was
examined. This general report necessarily relies on the contributions of the national reporters
and the information contained in their reports and can give a  static picture. We think,
however, the findings of this general report would not significantly change even by the
extension of the research to the remaining Member States. Research outcomes can certainly
be refined in light of the shifts in court practice over time. Notwithstanding, we hope that this
report gives a useful overview of the jurisdictions examined and can set the stage for further
research in this area.
I Defining Overriding Mandatory Provisions
When we attempt to give an overview of the application of overriding mandatory provisions
in the autonomous private international law of the EU Member States, the first two questions
to be posed are whether there is any specific statutory rule on overriding mandatory norms
at all in the jurisdictions concerned and, if there is such a provision, whether a legislative
definition is also provided.
To answer the first question, it can be established that only a relatively small number of
autonomous private international law codifications in the Member States examined provide
OVERRIDING MANDATORY PROVISIONS IN THE AUTONOMOUS PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE EU MEMBER STATES n
11 n
12 The list of the jurisdictions covered and the reporters is as follows: Austria: Martina Melcher; Belgium: Eduardo
Álvarez-Armas and Michiel Poesen; Bulgaria: Eva Kaseva; Croatia: Dora Zgrabljić Rotar; Denmark: Johan Tufte-
Kristensen; England: Yu Jian Woon; Estonia: Katažyna Bogdzevič; France: Marion Ho-Dac; Germany: Holger
Jacobs; Hungary: Csenge Merkel and Tamás Szabados; Italy: Stefano Dominelli and Ennio Piovesani; Latvia:
Katažyna Bogdzevič; Lithuania: Katažyna Bogdzevič; Luxembourg: Marlene Brosch; Poland: Ewa Kamarad and
Anna Wysocka-Bar; Slovenia: Neža Pogorelčnik Vogrinc; Spain: María Asunción Cebrián. The author of the
general report is grateful to all national reporters who undertook to take part in this research project. Although
the report relies on the materials and information given by the reporters and footnotes indicate the relevant
jurisdiction, the statements and conclusions of the general report represent the opinion of the author only.
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specific rules, let alone a definition for overriding mandatory provisions. Some private inter -
national law codes (Belgian Private International Law Act Article 20; Bulgarian Private
International Law Act Article 46; English Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act Section 14 (4); Hungarian Private International Law Act Article 13; Lithuanian Civil Code
Article 1.11 (2); Polish Private International Law Act Article 8) contain rules on overriding
mandatory provisions without defining this concept. Without providing a full definition, the
legislation usually hints at certain features of overriding mandatory norms. In other countries,
there is no specific provision on the application of overriding mandatory norms at all (Austria,
Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Slovenia).
Article 3 (1) of the French Civil Code provides that laws protecting public policy as well
as safety bind everybody living on the territory. In some legal systems influenced by French
law, such as Luxembourg13 and Spain,14 this rule has been typically taken over. Article 3 (1) 
of the French Civil Code was not originally intended to express a rule on the application of
overriding mandatory provisions as we understand them today. However, in these legal
systems, based on this legislative provision, overriding mandatory norms are seen as
provisions of territorial application that claim direct application in cases connected to the
state territory.15 These rules also acknowledge that domestic public law is only applicable in
the national territory of the issuing state.16
As to the definition of this peculiar group of rules, the single state where a fully-fledged
legislative definition was created is Croatia. The definition in Article 13 of the Croatian Private
International Law Act follows to a  large extent Article 9 (1) of the Rome I Regulation.
Accordingly, a court can apply a provision of Croatian law that is regarded as crucial for
safeguarding Croatian public interests, such as political, social or economic organisation, to
such an extent that it is applicable to any situation falling within their scope irrespective of the
law otherwise applicable. In none of the other jurisdictions examined do we find a comprehen -
sive legislative definition of overriding mandatory norms. This implies that the task of defining
overriding mandatory norms is left to courts and legal scholars. In the legal literature, it is
often asserted that no exact definition for overriding mandatory provisions may be made,17
or that it is not even possible to provide a definition of overriding mandatory rules.18 The
view also appears that, in the absence of a legislative definition, a definition in positive law is
undesirable; a functional approach should be followed instead.19
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • TAMÁS SZABADOS
n 12
13 Luxembourg Civil Code, art 3 (1).
14 Spanish Civil Code, art 8.
15 Luxembourg: Jean-Claude Wiwinius, Le droit international privé au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg (3rd edn, Bauler
2011, Luxembourg) para 213.
16 Spain: Alfonso Luis Calvo Caravaca and Javier Carrascosa González, Derecho Internacional Privado, vol 1 (10th
edn, Comares 2009, Granada) 223.
17 Hungary: Raffai Katalin, ‘Az imperatív normák jelentőségéről az európai uniós nemzetközi magánjogban’ Pázmány
Law Working Papers 2014/24, 3 <http://plwp.eu/docs/wp/2014/2014-24_Raffai.pdf> accessed 21 February 2020.
18 Germany: Klaus Schurig, ‘Zwingendes Recht, «Eingriffsnormen» und neues IPR’ (1990) 54 Rabels Zeitschrift,
217–250, 247.
19 Belgium: François Rigaux and Marc Fallon, Droit International Privé (Larcier 2005, Brussels) 139.
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Overriding mandatory norms were circumscribed by both courts and legal scholars,
taking their characteristics into account. In doing this, courts often relied on scholarly views,
while the literature also referred to the evolving case law in this field. It is illustrative that, in
Austria, in the absence of legislative definition courts defined the concept of overriding
mandatory provisions by taking scholarly views into account. In this way, a joint literary-
judicial definition has evolved. It is interesting to note that Austrian courts have also drawn
from German legal scholarship.20 Moreover, without providing for a  comprehensive
definition, statutory provisions specified some characteristics of overriding mandatory
provisions that can be taken as a point of departure by courts and legal scholars.
In the jurisdictions examined, the scientific and judicial definitions circumscribe over -
riding mandatory norms, in particular with the following – often overlapping – characteristics:
– norms imperatively or directly regulating legal relationships;21
– norms applicable irrespective of the governing law;22
– norms applicable irrespective of the operation of conflicts of laws, i.e. they switch off the
operation of conflict of laws;23
– norms that cannot be avoided by choice of law;24
– norms that state explicitly that they require application to all sorts of legal relationships,
including domestic and international situations, irrespective of the law designated by conflict-
of-laws rules (self-limiting norms).25 The characteristic of these norms that they claim
OVERRIDING MANDATORY PROVISIONS IN THE AUTONOMOUS PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE EU MEMBER STATES n
13 n
20 See, for example, the decision of the Austrian Supreme Court of Justice OGH 5 Ob 125/05a.
21 Slovenia: Miroslava Geč Korošec, Mednarodno zasebno pravo, druga knjiga – posebni del (Uradni list RS, 2002,
Ljubljana) 165; Spain: Calvo Caravaca and Carrascosa González (n 16) 227.
22 Bulgaria: Nikolay Natov, Komentar na Kodeksa na mejdunarodnoto chastno pravo, kniga purva, chlen 1–47 (Siela
2006, Sofia) 390; Todor Todorov, Mejdunarodno chastno pravo. Evropeiskiat sujuz i Republika Bulgaria (3rd edn,
Sibi 2010, Sofia) 147; Vessela Stancheva-Mincheva, Komentar na Kodeksa na mejdunarodnoto chastno pravo (Sibi
2010, Sofia) 95; England: Cox v Ergo Versicherung AG (formerly known as Victoria) [2014] UKSC 22, para 28;
Master Harry Roberts (a child and protected party by his mother and litigation friend Mrs Lauren Roberts) v The
Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Families Association – Forces Help, The Ministry of Defence, Allgemeines
Krankenhaus Viersen GmbH [2019] EWHC 1104 (QB), para 83; Hungary: Private International Law Act art 13;
Poland: Maria Anna Zachariasiewicz, ‘Art. 8. Przepisy wymuszające swoje zastosowanie’ in Maksymilian Pazdan (ed),
Prawo prywatne międzynarodowe. Komentarz (Beck 2018, Warsaw) 156; Slovenia: Geč Korošec (n 21) 16; Stojan
Cigoj, Mednarodno zasebno pravo, 1. knjiga, Splošni nauki (ČZ Uradni list SRS 1977, Ljubljana) 76; Stojan Cigoj,
Mednarodno pravo osebnih in premoženjskih razmerij, Mednarodno zasebno pravo: pravo razmerij z inozemskimi
sestavinami, Prva knjiga, Splošni nauki (Uradni list SRS 1984, Ljubljana) 154.
23 Slovenia: Geč Korošec (n 21) 16; Martina Repas and others (eds), Mednarodno zasebno pravo Evropske unije
(Uradni list RS 2018, Ljubljana) 40; Jerca Kramberger Škerl, ‘Kolizijskopravno varstvo potrošnikov pri sklepanju
klasičnih in elektronskih pogodb (Consumer Protection in Choice-of-Law in Classic and Electronic Contracts) –
2017’ 17 <https://www.academia.edu/34423097/Kolizijskopravno_varstvo_potro%C5%A1nikov_pri_sklepanju_
klasi%C4%8Dnih_in_elektronskih_pogodb_Consumer_Protection_in_Choice-of-Law_in_Classic_and_ Electronic_
Contracts_-_2017?auto=download> accessed 21 February 2020.
24 Slovenia: Repas and others (n 23) 40.
25 Belgium: Johan Meeusen, ‘Onrechtmatige daad, wetten van politie en voorrangsregels in het Belgische
internationaal privaatrecht’ (case note) (1996–97) 60 Rechtskundig Weekblad 813–817, para 8; Rigaux and Fallon
(n 19) 129–130; Italy: Rodolfo De Nova, ‘I conflitti di leggi e le norme con apposita delimitazione della sfera di 
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application to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the otherwise applicable
law, is also described by the notion of internationaler Geltungsanspruch in German-language
literature;26
– norms having extraterritorial application;27
– norms having a pivotal importance for the enacting state;28
– norms intruding on private relationships to serve public interests or the interests of the
enacting state.29
The above criteria by which overriding mandatory norms have been circumscribed are
fairly flexible, which makes it difficult in practice to decide whether a rule can qualify as an
overriding mandatory norm. It may happen that legislation refers explicitly to the overriding
nature of a  rule. Impediments to the conclusion of registered partnerships,30 as well as
provisions stipulating the ‘uniqueness of the status of the child’31 are explicitly labelled by the
Italian Private International Law Act as overriding mandatory provisions (norme di applicazione
necessaria). Legislation may attribute an overriding mandatory character to a norm, indicating
that the provision applies irrespective of the applicable law or a choice of law by the parties.
In the majority of the cases, however, such a clear indication is lacking and the overriding
mandatory nature of a norm is established by the courts or legal literature.
English case law makes a distinction between express and implied mandatory provisions.
In the view of the UK Supreme Court, a provision may qualify as overriding mandatory in an
implied manner if ‘(i) the terms of the legislation cannot effectually be applied or its purpose
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • TAMÁS SZABADOS
n 14
efficacia’ (1959) Diritto internazionale 13ff; Rodolfo de Nova, ‘Conflict of Laws and Functionally Restricted
Substantive Rules’ (1966) 54 California Law Review 1569–1574.
26 Germany: Jette Beulker, Die Eingriffsnormenproblematik in internationalen Schiedsverfahren (Mohr Siebeck 2005,
Tübingen) 27; Stephan Lorenz, ‘Einleitung zum Internationalen Privatrecht‘ in Heinz Georg Bamberger, Herbert
Roth, Wolfgang Hau and Roman Poseck (eds), Beck’sche Online-Kommentare – BGB (51st edn, C.H. Beck 2019,
Munich), para 49; Martin Schäfer, ‘Eingriffsnormen im deutschen IPR – eine neverending story?’ in Ernst C. Stiefel
and others (eds), Iusto Iure: Festgabe für Otto Sandrock zum 65. Geburtstag (Recht und Wirtschaft 1995, Heidelberg,
37–53) 39; Michael Becker, ‘Zwingendes Eingriffsrecht in der Urteilsanerkennung’ (1996) 60 Rabels Zeitschrift
691–737, 693f; Marc-Philippe Weller, Charlotte Harms, Bettina Rentsch and Chris Thomale, ‘Der internationale
Anwendungsbereich der Geschlechterquote für Großunternehmen’ (2015) Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und
Gesellschaftsrecht 361–395, 370.
27 England: Cox v Ergo Versicherung AG (formerly known as Victoria) [2014] UKSC 22, para 28.
28 Italy: Sperduti, ‘Norme di applicazione necessaria e ordine pubblico’ (1976) Rivista di diritto internazionale privato
e processuale 469ff.
29 Germany: Jan Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht (6th edn, Mohr Siebeck 2006, Tübingen) 18 and 498; Bernd
von Hoffmann and Karsten Thorn, Internationales Privatrecht (9th edn, C.H. Beck 2007, Munich), para 93;
Christian von Bar and Peter Mankowski, Internationales Privatrecht, vol 1 (2nd edn, C.H.  Beck 2003, Munich)
262–264; Ingo Ludwig, ‘Art. 3, 3a, 4 EGBGB’ in Maximilian Herberger, Michael Martinek, Helmut Rüßmann,
Stephan Weth and Markus Würdinger (eds), jurisPK-BGB (8th edn, C.H. Beck 2017, Munich) para 128; Beulker
(n 26) 29; Boris Handorn, Das Sonderkollisionsrecht der deutschen internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (Mohr
Siebeck 2005, Tübingen) 181; Hans-Jürgen Sonnenberger, ‘Eingriffsrecht – Das trojanische Pferd des IPR oder
notwendige Ergänzung?’ (2003) Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 104–116 and 105f; Becker
(n 26) 694; Schäfer (n 26) 39; Weller, Harms, Rentsch and Thomale (n 26) 370.
30 Italy: Private International Law Act, art 32-ter.
31 Italy: Private International Law Act, art 33 (4).
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cannot effectually be achieved unless it has extra-territorial effect; or (ii) the legislation gives
effect to a policy so significant in the law of the forum that Parliament must be assumed to
have intended that policy to apply to any one resorting to an English court regardless of the
law that would otherwise apply.’32
Nevertheless, courts often categorise certain rules as overriding mandatory norms
without justifying this. In most jurisdictions, no coherent foreseeable criteria are provided in
the case law, which renders it difficult to identify overriding mandatory norms.
When ascertaining whether a rule qualifies as an overriding mandatory norm, usually its
purpose and nature, as well as the intention of the legislature and legislative history33 are
examined. The context and the systemic relationship with other provisions of the legal system
are also factors that may be taken into consideration.34 Furthermore, the overriding mandatory
nature of the norm is inferred from the ratio of the norm, the object of protection and the legal
consequences attached to the norm (e.g. a criminal sanction). It is widely suggested that the
interests and values represented by the norm are examined and it is also often stressed that
its claim to be applied even in international situations must clearly follow from the norm
(internationaler Anwendungswille).35 It may be also stated that substantive law norms with
a specific content are more likely to qualify as overriding mandatory norms36 than those 
with a more nebulous content. It is also found that private law rules that can be derogated by
the parties by agreement may not qualify as overriding mandatory norms.37 The characteristic
of a norm, that it cannot be derogated by the parties’ agreement, however, is rather the
consequence of qualifying a norm as being overridingly mandatory, and not the converse.
Overriding mandatory norms are delimited from simple mandatory rules in most
jurisdictions, and it is generally accepted that overriding mandatory provisions constitute
a narrower category than the latter. At the same time, the mandatory nature of a norm is a pre -
requisite for classifying a norm as overriding mandatory.38 The Luxembourgish Court of
Appeal found a prescription deadline to be non-mandatory and pointed out that if it is not
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32 England: Cox v Ergo Versicherung AG (formerly known as Victoria) [2014] UKSC 22, para 29.
33 Austria: see, for example, the Austrian Supreme Court of Justice, OGH 2 Ob 40/15v regarding section 9 VOEG
(Bundesgesetz über die Entschädigung von Verkehrsopfern of 29 June 2007, BGBl I No 37/2007).
34 Lithuania: Decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 9 November 2010, Civil case No 3K-3-
446/2010. See also the Bulgarian report.
35 Austria: Bea Verschraegen, Internationales Privatrecht (Manz 2012, Vienna) 1321f; Brigitta Lurger and Martina
Melcher, Handbuch Internationales Privatrecht (Verlag Österreich 2017, Vienna) 49; Michael Schwimann,
Internationales Privatrecht (Manz 2001, Vienna) 21 and 68; see also the decision of the Austrian Supreme Court
of Justice OGH 14 Ob 180/86.
36 Italy: Milan Court of Appeal, judgment of 6.2.1998 (1998) Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale
582.
37 Spain: Alfonso Luis Calvo Caravaca and Javier Carrascosa González, Litigación Internacional en la Unión Europea
II. La Ley aplicable a los contratos internacionales. Comentarios al Reglamento Roma I  (Thomson Reuters
Aranzadi 2017, Navarra) 218; Lithuania: decision of the Kaunas Regional Court of 26 September 2016, Civil case
No 2-457-173/2016.
38 Croatia: Dora Zgrabljić Rotar and Tena Hoško, ‘Zaštita cedentovih stečajnih vjerovnika kod cesije s međunarodnim
obilježjem’ 69 (2019) Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu 89–116, 108.
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mandatory, it cannot be qualified as an internationally mandatory norm, either.39 Simple
mandatory norms may usually be avoided in the case of the application of foreign law
designated based on choice of law or an objective connecting factor, while overriding
mandatory norms apply irrespective of the otherwise governing law.40
As a remarkable attempt to distinguish overriding mandatory norms from other rules of
the legal system, in the course of the recodification of the Hungarian Civil Code,41 a proposal
was put forward according to which a special act should have been adopted with a non-
exhaustive list of those rules of the Hungarian Civil Code that are considered as overriding
mandatory provisions.42 Although the proposed legislative solution could have facilitated the
identification of the overriding mandatory norms contained in the Civil Code, both for
domestic and foreign courts, the proposal was not taken over by legislature.
The autonomous definitions worked out in the national case law and legal literature and the
characteristics attributed to overriding mandatory norms largely correspond to the definition
provided by the Rome I Regulation. The definition in Article 9 (1) of the Rome I Regulation
directly inspired, for instance, the relevant provision of the Croatian Private International Law
Act. In Germany, the Federal Court of Justice had recourse to the definition of Article 9 (1) of
the Rome I Regulation in a case ratione temporis falling outside the scope of application of the
Rome I Regulation.43 Scholarly opinions also confirm that the definition of the Rome I Regulation
can also be used outside the scope of the EU private international law regulations.44 Some
deviations may be noticed, though. First, while the definition given in the Rome I Regulation
requires that the norms serve the public interest, it is not always considered a necessary element.
In Belgian legal literature, the definition given by Article 9 (1) of the Rome I Regulation was
criticised as being too restrictive, because overriding mandatory norms are linked to the
organisation of state (‘…provisions, the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for
safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation…’). It is
stressed that, in deviation from the Rome I Regulation, certain private interests may be equally
protected under the Belgian autonomous private international law rules.45
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • TAMÁS SZABADOS
n 16
39 Luxembourg: Cour d’appel (commercial), 13 October 2010, Pasicrisie luxembourgeoise, vol 35, 2011–2012, 270f.
40 See Hungary: Explanatory memorandum of the Hungarian Private International Law Act to Section 13.
41 Hungary: 2013. évi V. törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről (Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code).
42 Hungary: Palásti Gábor, ‘Javaslat az új Ptk. imperatív szabályainak alkalmazásáról szóló jogszabály alkotására’
<https://ptk2013.hu/szakcikkek/palasti-gabor-javaslat-az-uj-ptk-imperativ-szabalyainak-alkalmazasarol-szolo-
jogszabaly-alkotasara/2165> accessed 21 February 2020.
43 Germany: Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], decision of 20 November 2014 – IX ZR 13/14,
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift Rechtsprechungs-Report Zivilrecht (NJW-RR) 2015, 305.
44 See Germany: Weller, Harms, Rentsch and Thomale (n 26) 370; Peter Kindler, ‘Teil 10. Internationales Handels-
und Gesellschaftsrecht’ in Franz Jürgen Säcker, Roland Rixecker, Hartmut Oetker and Bettina Limperg (eds),
Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol 12 (7th edn, C.H. Beck 2018, Munich), paras 568 and
575; Italy: Franco Mosconi and Cristina Campiglio, Diritto internazionale privato e processuale, Parte generale 
e obbligazioni, vol 1 (Utet 2015, Torino) 280; Hungary: Mádl Ferenc and Vékás Lajos, Nemzetközi magánjog és
a nemzetközi gazdasági kapcsolatok joga (Eötvös 2018, Budapest) 175.
45 Belgium: Rigaux and Fallon (n 19) 139; Stéphanie Francq ‘Loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles (Matières
civile et commerciale)’ (2013) 7 Répertoire Dalloz de droit communautaire 56–57.
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II Overriding Mandatory Norms and the Public Law 
— Private Law Divide
This leads us to the question whether both public and private law rules may qualify as
overriding mandatory norms, or whether rules protecting private interests are excluded from
this group of norms. In the jurisdictions examined, there is a distinction between public law
and private law. The delimitation of the two takes place along various criteria, including the
interests protected, the relationship between the parties (subordination or a hierarchically
equal position), the involvement of public power or whether the rules concerned aim at
regulating the structure of the state.
In some Member States, such as Spain, it seems that only public law norms can be
categorised as overriding mandatory norms, as they contribute to safeguarding the public
interest, unlike private law norms. In this approach, the protection of private interests is, at
the most, collateral to the protection of public interests. Although most often overriding
mandatory rules aim at protecting public interests, overriding mandatory provisions may
embrace both public and private law norms and they may serve the protection of public as
well as private interests (Croatia, Denmark, Poland, Slovenia). Moreover, in practice, it is
difficult to distinguish whether a norm serves public interests, private interests or both. Very
often public and private interests are simultaneously protected by overriding mandatory
provisions. Protecting of private interests may contribute to the protection of broader societal
interests.46 Consequently, private law rules may not be a priori excluded from the concept of
overriding mandatory provisions.
At the same time, private law norms predominantly or exclusively providing protection
for private interests may be excluded from overriding mandatory norms (Germany).47 In
this sense, it may be required that the provision concerned must safeguard a public interest
going beyond the accommodation of private interests.48 To address the differentiation
between public and private law norms, French legal scholarship proposed, a distinction
between classical overriding mandatory provisions aiming at protecting public interest,
following Francescakis’ definition, and a second generation of overriding mandatory norms
OVERRIDING MANDATORY PROVISIONS IN THE AUTONOMOUS PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE EU MEMBER STATES n
17 n
46 Belgium: Rigaux and Fallon (n 19) 139; Francq (n 45) 56–57; France: Among other authors, see Pierre Mayer, ‘Lois
de police’ in Dominique Carreau and others (eds), Répertoire de droit international (Dalloz 1998, Paris), para 20.
47 Germany: Bundesarbeitsgericht [German Federal Labour Court], decision of 21 March 2017 – 7 AZR 207/15,
beck-online.Rechtsprechung (BeckRS) 2017, 119476; Ansgar Staudinger, ‘VO (EG) 593/2008 Art. 9’ in Franco
Ferrari and others, Internationales Vertragsrecht (3rd edn, C.H. Beck 2018, Munich), para 8; Andreas Spickhoff,
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Weller, Harms, Rentsch and Thomale (n 26) 370; Markus Rehberg, ‘Teil 2 § 6’ in Horst Eidenmüller (ed),
Ausländische Kapitalgesellschaften im deutschen Recht (C.H. Beck 2004, Munich), para 112.
48 Germany: von Bar and Mankowski (n 29) 262f; Marc-Philippe Weller, ‘Einleitung’ in Holger Fleischer and Wulf
Goette (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum GmbHG, (3rd edn, C.H. Beck 2018, Munich), para 467.
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safeguarding private law interests.49 In that sense, the latter could be called half-mandatory
provisions.50
III Illustrations for Overriding Mandatory Norms Applicable 
Outside the Scope of Application of EU Private International 
Law Regulations
Undoubtedly, the application of overriding mandatory norms arises most often in the area of
contract law, but they may also influence, among others, matrimonial property regimes or
the property relationship of registered partners and succession cases. These issues are largely
covered by EU private international law regulations. Nonetheless, based on the national
reports referring to domestic court decisions and opinions of representatives of the legal
literature, it is possible to identify several overriding mandatory norms that may be applicable
outside the scope of application of EU private international law regulations. The relevant
fields include personal status and family law, property law, company law and certain contracts.
It must be stated that the summary below is only illustrative; it does not intend to be
exhaustive. Nevertheless, the ubiquity of overriding mandatory provisions can be clearly
demonstrated by the following examples, even without a  deeper analysis of the rules
concerned.
1 Personal Status and Family Law
In the realm of the autonomous private international law of EU Member States, perhaps the
fields of personal status and family law provide the most fertile soil for overriding mandatory
norms. Overriding mandatory rules have appeared in particular in the following areas:
– impediments to marriage. Section 26 (4) of the Hungarian Private International Law Act
states that the marriage may not be celebrated in Hungary if there is an unavoidable
impediment to the celebration of the marriage under Hungarian law and the rules on
unavoidable impediments to the celebration of a marriage are thereby qualified as overriding
mandatory norms. Unavoidable impediments to the celebration of a marriage in Hungarian
law include an already existing marriage or certain close family relationships between the
parties.51 The fact that the parties are of the same sex is also considered as an unavoidable
obstacle, because under the Hungarian Fundamental Law only a man and a woman may enter
into a  marriage.52 Certain impediments to marriage are also considered as overriding
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49 France: Dominique Bureau and Horatia Muir Watt, Droit international privé, vol 1, (4th edn, PUF 2017 Paris), para
554.
50 France: Bureau and Muir Watt (n 49) 556.
51 Hungary: Mádl and Vékás (n 44) 300.
52 Hungary: Nagy Csongor István: Nemzetközi magánjog (HVG-ORAC 2017, Budapest) 50.
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mandatory norms under Italian law.53 In a recent judgment of the Milan Court of Appeal,54 the
nullity of a marriage concluded between two U.S. nationals in the State of New York was
established because one of the parties had been already married to an Italian national. Article
86 of the Italian Civil Code, which excludes parties with an existing marriage to conclude
another marriage, was considered as a directly applicable overriding mandatory norm, even
though the validity of the marriage was governed by the law of New York. The impediments
to the conclusion of marriage, including an already existing marriage, kinship and mental
incapacity, also qualify as overriding mandatory provisions in Croatian legal literature, even in
the absence of an express provision to this end in the Croatian Private International Law Act.55
It is to be noted here that the former private international law legislation, from 1982, expressly
provided that, in the case of these obstacles to marriage, a marriage may not be celebrated
even if a foreign law had been applied. On the contrary, in Germany, the similar prohibition of
a pre-existing marriage56 was not seen as an overriding mandatory provision; instead, in the
case of an already existing marriage, the conclusion of a further marriage by either of the parties
before a German registrar would be contrary to the general ordre public clause, even if this
would be permitted under the domestic law of both parties that were to be married.57
– minimum age for marriage. Pursuant to Article 13 (3) of the German EGBGB, if the
capacity to marry is subject to foreign law, the marriage is invalid if the party concerned had
not reached the age of 16 at the time of the marriage and the marriage may be annulled if the
party concerned had reached the age of 16 but not 18 at the time of the marriage. This
provision is considered in the legal literature as a reflection of Article 1303 of the BGB on the
minimum age for concluding marriage, so the EGBGB provision aims to give an overriding
mandatory status to Article 1303 of the BGB.58 Article 13 (3) is, however, seen by the Federal
Court of Justice as a special ordre public clause that precedes the application of the general
ordre public clause in Article 6 EGBGB;59
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54 Italy: Milan Court of Appeal, Minors Division, judgment of 24.4.2019 – T.J.F. c. S.M. and S.M.
55 Croatia: Hrvoje Sikirić, ‘Zakon o međunarodnom privatnom pravu’ Tradicionalno XXXIII. Savjetovanje –
Aktualnosti Hrvatskog zakonodavstva i pravne prakse, Godišnjak 25 (2018) Organizator 61–140, 89.
56 Germany: BGB § 1306.
57 Germany: Bundesfinanzhof [German Federal Fiscal Court], decision of 6 December 1985 – VI R 56/82, Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1986, 2210; Michael Coester, ‘EGBGB Art. 13’ in Franz Jürgen Säcker, Roland
Rixecker, Hartmut Oetker and Bettina Limperg (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol 12
(7th edn, C.H. Beck 2018, Munich), para 68; Gerald Mäsch, ‘Art. 13 EGBGB’ in Maximilian Herberger, Michael
Martinek, Helmut Rüßmann, Stephan Weth and Markus Würdinger (eds), jurisPK-BGB (8th edn, C.H. Beck 2017,
Munich), para 40; Gerhard Kegel and Klaus Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht (9th edn, C.H. Beck 2004, Munich) 801.
58 Germany: Mäsch (n 57), para 38.1; Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, ‘Kinderehen – Neue Sonderanknüpfungen im
EGBGB’ (2017) Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 429–436, 432.
59 Germany: Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], decision of 14 November 2018 – XII ZB 292/16, NZFam
2019, 69; see also Marina Wellenhofer, ‘BGB § 1303’ in Franz Jürgen Säcker, Roland Rixecker, Hartmut Oetker
and Bettina Limperg (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol 12 (7th edn, C.H. Beck
2018, Munich), para 17; Juliana Mörsdorf, ‘EGBGB Art. 13’ in Heinz Georg Bamberger, Herbert Roth, Wolfgang
Hau and Roman Poseck (eds), Beck’sche Online-Kommentare – BGB (51st edn, C.H. Beck 2019, Munich), para 26.
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– obligations of the spouses. The French Court of cassation qualified the spouses’ core
obligations related to the marriage (régime primaire impératif ),60 including their mutual
assistance obligation or their duty of fidelity, as overriding mandatory provisions;61
– certain rules on names (Belgium);62
– the minimum age difference between the person to be adopted and the adoptive parents
as a validity requirement for adoption as laid down by Article 291 (1) of the Italian Civil Code
was seen as an overriding mandatory provision.63
– obligations of the parents. The Italian Private International Law Act makes it clear that
the provisions of Italian law on the imposition of parental responsibility and duty of maintenance
on both parents and on the possibility of Italian courts to adopt exceptional measures
concerning parental responsibility apply irrespective of the otherwise applicable law;64
– rules protecting the child. Section 25 of the Hungarian Private International Law Act
establishes that Hungarian law must apply regarding family law relationships concerning
a child, provided that it is more favourable to the child. A previous version of this rule with
identical content was considered as an overriding mandatory provision in the legal literature.65
A decision of the French Court of cassation established that the provisions on assistance for
children in danger are applicable within French territory to every minor living there,
regardless of their nationality or the nationality of their parents and the operation of conflict-
of-laws rules was excluded;66
– provisions on medically assisted reproduction were held by the Austrian Constitutional
Court as overriding mandatory provisions that apply irrespective of the personal law of the
persons concerned.67
Interestingly, in Belgian law, the overriding mandatory nature of certain rules is
established in light of obtaining or exercising some public law rights. Thus, the rule on the
nullity of a  fraudulent declaration of parentage has been interpreted as an overriding
mandatory norm insofar as the declaration of parentage has an impact on the right of at least
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63 Italy: Milan Tribunal, 9th Division, judgment of 16.4.2009.
64 Italian Private International Law Act, art 36-bis.
65 Hungary: Réczei László, Nemzetközi magánjog (Tankönyvkiadó 1961, Budapest) 81 with regard to 1952. évi 23.
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concerning the entry into force and the execution of Act IV of 1952 on the marriage, family and guardianship, 
and concerning the regulation of certain issues of personal law), art 17 (3).
66 France: Cass. Civ. 1re, 27 October 1964, bulletin n° 472.
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one of the parties involved to reside in Belgium.68 Similarly, the rule banning fraudulent
marriages when they have been exclusively concluded with the aim of obtaining a right of
residence, has been qualified as overriding mandatory norm.69
2 Property Law
Legal literature opines that certain norms of cultural property protection legislation belong to
the group of overriding mandatory provisions.70 Moreover, in the context of organ trafficking,
national transplant laws may also be regarded as overriding mandatory provisions.71
3 Company Law
Overriding mandatory provisions related to company law include:
– certain requirements and legal consequences concerning the acquisition of a company.
Article 15 (3) of the German Foreign Trade and Payments Act,72 according to which a legal
transaction which serves the acquisition of a domestic company is provisionally invalid where
a reporting requirement exists that is linked to an authorisation by the Federal Government
to prohibit the acquisition within a certain deadline (e.g. if the acquisition concerns a company
which manufactures military equipment), is seen as an overriding mandatory provision;73
– requirements concerning the establishment of a branch. The formalities of establishing
branches by foreign companies in Belgium were seen as overriding mandatory norms;74
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Berlin), paras 910ff; Amalie Weidner, Kulturgüter als res extra commercium im internationalen Sachenrecht
(De Gruyter 2001, Berlin) 159ff; Handorn (n 29) 181; Christiane Wendehorst, ‘EGBGB Art. 43’ in Franz Jürgen
Säcker, Roland Rixecker, Hartmut Oetker and Bettina Limperg (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen
Gesetzbuch, vol 12 (7th edn, C.H. Beck 2018, Munich), para 193; von Bar and Peter Mankowski (n 29) 257.
71 Wendehorst (n 70), para 18.
72 Germany: Außenwirtschaftsgesetz vom 6. Juni 2013 (BGBl. I S. 1482), das zuletzt durch Artikel 4 des Gesetzes vom
20. Juli 2017 (BGBl. I S. 2789) geändert worden ist.
73 Germany: Weller, Harms, Rentsch and Thomale (n 26) 371f; Marc-Philippe Weller, Nina Benz and Chris Thomale,
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74 Belgium: 1999 Code of Corporations (Code des sociétés / Wetboek van Vennootschappen), arts 81–89 (and
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– power of representation of corporate bodies. In Belgium, the Court of Appeals of Liège
held that the rules on the power of representation of the governing bodies of a corporation
were overriding mandatory provisions;75
– accounting obligations and the related liability of managers under Luxembourg law were
qualified as overriding mandatory provisions and apply to all foreign commercial companies
whose corporate or subsidiary seat is located in Luxembourg;76
– employee representation. A decision of the French State Council, called by a foundational
case book of French private international law, as the leading case related to overriding
mandatory provisions,77 stated that under article 1 of the 22 February 1945 legislation,
a company that employs more than 50 employees in France must establish an employee
representative committee, even if the lex societatis of the company was Belgian law;78
– keeping documents. Courts in Luxembourg have qualified the obligation to keep certain
documents and information for ten years laid down in Article 16 (2) of the Code of Commerce
as an overriding mandatory provision.79
Regarding several company law provisions, the question arose whether they constitute
over-riding mandatory norms. The qualification of several other provisions as overriding
mandatory norms related to company law is debated in German legal literature. These pro -
visions include the application of the gender quota in Article 96 (2) of the German Stock
Corporation Act80 to companies incorporated abroad, but having their central administration
in Germany,81 as well as the rules on Existenzvernichtungshaftung on the liability of the share -
holder against the company when the shareholder contributed to the insolvency of the
company by depriving the company of its assets.82 In Belgian scholarship, the question arose
whether the provisions of the 2019 Code of Corporations and Associations on the liability of
a  manager of a  Belgian branch of a  foreign company83 and on the liability of directors 
of a company vis-à-vis third parties84 may qualify as overriding mandatory norms.
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4 Contract Law
Although most contracts are covered by the Rome I Regulation, there are some contractual
relationships for which the governing law remains designated on the basis of autonomous
conflict-of-laws rules. The Rome I Regulation excludes from its scope of application questions
involving the status or legal capacity of natural persons.85 The rule of Hungarian law on the
nullity of contracts or unilateral declarations limiting legal capacity is considered as an
overriding mandatory norm in Hungarian private international law.86
Agreements on surrogacy qualify as contractual relationships. However, they fall outside
the scope of application of the Rome I Regulation because contractual obligations involving
the status or legal capacity of natural persons, as well as contractual obligations arising out of
family relationships, are excluded from its material scope of application.87 Consequently, the
validity of international surrogacy agreements are to be examined in light of autonomous
private international law. In this context, Spanish law makes clear that the prohibition of
surrogacy is an overriding mandatory norm: A contract on surrogate motherhood is void
under Spanish law regardless of the lex contractus.88 Similarly, in Germany, it was argued that
German law prohibits surrogacy agreements and this prohibition invalidates such agreements,
irrespective of the otherwise applicable law.89
IV The Range of the Application or Consideration of Overriding 
Mandatory Provisions
After having addressed the definition of overriding mandatory norms and giving some
examples of overriding mandatory rules, it must be analysed which overriding mandatory
norms of which countries may be applied or given otherwise effect. Overriding mandatory
norms may be found in the lex fori, in the lex causae or in the law of a third state other than
the lex fori and the lex causae. It is to be examined to what extent national legislation and court
practice give room to the overriding mandatory rules of domestic law, the lex causae and the
law of a third country. Regarding foreign overriding mandatory provisions, which are often
public law norms, a preliminary issue is whether national law admits applying foreign public
law at all.
OVERRIDING MANDATORY PROVISIONS IN THE AUTONOMOUS PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE EU MEMBER STATES n
23 n
85 Rome I Regulation art 1 (2) a).
86 Hungary: Explanatory memorandum to Section 13 of the Hungarian Private International Law Act.
87 Laurence Brunet, Janeen Carruthers, Konstantina Davaki, Derek King, Claire Marzo, Julie McCandless,
A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States (European Union, Brussels, 2013) 148.
88 Spain: Ley 14/2006, de 26 de mayo, sobre técnicas de reproducción asistida BOE núm. 126, de 27 de mayo de
2016.
89 Germany: Chris Thomale, Mietmutterschaft: Eine international-privatrechtliche Kritik (Mohr Siebeck 2015,
Tübingen) 39f.; Konrad Duden, Leihmutterschaft im Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht (Mohr Siebeck
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ELJ-2020-1__press  2020.12.22.  11:17  Page 23
1 The Principle of the Non-application of Foreign Public Law
The principle of the non-application of foreign public law has often been considered
a significant hurdle to the application of foreign overriding mandatory norms of a public law
origin. This principle has generally been justified by the concept of territoriality:90 Public 
law provisions do not have any effect beyond the borders of the enacting state.91
A comparative overview demonstrates that such a  principle only prevails in a  few
Member States (Belgium, England, Germany). Several English court decisions stated the
principle that foreign tax, penal and other public law is not enforced by English courts.92
In Germany, the principle also evolved in court practice.93 According to the case law, foreign
public law is only given effect where the foreign state is in a position to actually enforce the
law.94 Additionally, it is recognised that foreign public law that exclusively or predominantly
serves private interests may, under certain conditions, have an impact on private legal
relationships.95 However, this exception has never been invoked by courts. Finally, there may
be treaty obligations to apply foreign public law.96 At the same time, it must be noted that, in
German legal literature, the principle of the non-application of foreign public law is a subject
of controversy,97 and some authors have called into question the reason for the existence of
such a principle.98
In most of the Member States, however, the obstacle of the principle of the non-
application of foreign public law does not exist. In some of these Member States, legislation
makes it even explicit that the law designated by the conflict-of-laws rules even includes public
law norms. Foreign public law may accordingly be applied as part of the governing law. This
may be well illustrated by Article 6 (1) of the Polish Private International Law Act, which was
inspired by the similar provision of Article 13 of the Swiss Private International Law Act.
In a third group of states, no clear position exists, as the legislation does not address this
issue and case law and legal literature have not taken a  firm position in this question
(Denmark, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Spain). This uncertainty may give rise to diametrically
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91 Ibid.
92 England: see Government of India v Taylor [1955] AC 491.
93 Germany: Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], decision of 17 December 1959 – VII ZR 198/58,
NJW 1960, 1102.
94 Ibid.
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sprechung’ (1996) 95 Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 386–418, 396f; Jette Beulker (n 26) 66.
96 Germany: Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], decision of 19 April 1962 – VII ZR 162/60,
BeckRS 1962, 31189874; Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], decision of 8 March 1979 – VII
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97 See Looschelders (n 96), paras 32ff.
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opposite approaches. For instance, in Spanish legal scholarship, it was argued that, in the
absence of legislative prohibition, the application of foreign public law should be allowed
through judicial development of law.99 On the contrary, the lack of regulation may equally
interpreted as the denial of the possibility of applying foreign public law. Domestic public law
rules can be applied as they protect the economic, social and political order of the forum
state, but courts are not in a position to protect the economic, political and social organisation
of a foreign state.100
2 Overriding Mandatory Provisions of the Lex Fori
There seems to exist a consensus among the EU Member States that the overriding mandatory
rules of the forum can be applied. This is also explicitly acknowledged in jurisdictions where
there is an express provision on the application of overriding mandatory provisions, but this
is also the case even if there is no legislative provision to this end in the jurisdiction concerned.
This uniformity may be traced back to the fact that courts are obliged to apply and enforce
those domestic rules that are crucial in terms of the public interest.101
The legislation in some countries explicitly allows only the application of domestic
overriding mandatory provisions. From this, it could be inferred that only domestic overriding
mandatory norms could be applied, but not foreign ones; however, as will be discussed below,
even in such states, courts sometimes acknowledge that foreign overriding mandatory
provisions can equally be applied or otherwise given effect.
In some Member States, such as Germany, the application of domestic overriding
mandatory rules is not seen as automatic. In German legal literature, we find opinions that
the application of German overriding mandatory provisions against the otherwise applicable
foreign law normally102 presupposes a certain connection between the case and the forum
(Inlandsbeziehung).103
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3 Overriding Mandatory Provisions of the Lex Causae
As a preliminary remark, it is to be noted that, terminologically, it is misleading to use the
adjective ‘overriding’ in this context, since norms labelled as overriding do not have to override
the otherwise applicable law, as opposed to other scenarios.104 Article 6 (1) of the Polish
Private International Law Act provides that the law designated by conflict-of-laws rules must
be applied, including public law rules. This suggests explicitly that the overriding mandatory
provisions of the lex causae may be applicable, even if they are norms of public law.
In some countries, legislation only provides for the application of domestic overriding
mandatory provisions without explicitly mentioning foreign overriding mandatory norms.
This is the case, for example, in Luxembourg and Italy.105 This does not exclude, however,
the application of foreign overriding mandatory norms as part of the lex causae. In Croatia,
the legislation addresses only the overriding mandatory provisions of the lex fori and the state
of the place of performance without any reference to the application of overriding mandatory
provisions of the lex causae. Notwithstanding this, there is a consensus that the overriding
mandatory norms of the lex causae should be applied.106
German case law shows certain inconsistencies. The principle of the non-application of
foreign public law was relied on in German court practice to refuse to apply the overriding
mandatory provisions of the lex causae.107 Notwithstanding the principle of the non-
application of foreign public law, sometimes the courts applied foreign overriding mandatory
provisions as part of the lex causae.108 In German private international law theory, the
Schuldstatutlehre (or Einheitsanknüpfung), according to which the reference to the lex causae
includes overriding mandatory provisions of the governing law,109 has been overcome, and
today the prevailing opinion follows the Sonderanknüpfungslehre. Under this approach, the
reference to the governing foreign law does not embrace overriding mandatory provisions.
Such provisions may only be applied subject to certain preconditions.110 Foreign overriding
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mandatory provisions should be applied if (1) the case falls in the scope of application of the
provision; (2) there is a close connection between the case and the norm; and (3) the foreign
overriding mandatory provision is acceptable from the perspective of German law.
In some jurisdictions, foreign overriding mandatory rules are treated in the same way,
regardless of whether they constitute part of the lex causae or they may be found in the law
of another foreign state. This may happen because neither of them is covered by a specific
legislative provision (Luxembourg), or because there is a more general rule allowing the
application or consideration of foreign overriding mandatory provisions without distinguishing
between the overriding mandatory provisions of the lex causae and those of third countries
(Belgium, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland). These legislations usually require, for the application
or consideration of foreign overriding mandatory norms, that they must be closely connected
to the case.
In some jurisdictions, there is some uncertainty as to the application of the overriding
mandatory provisions of the lex causae. This may often be traced back to the lack of a clear
rule on the applicability of the overriding mandatory provisions of the lex causae. However,
in some of such countries, the legal literature takes the view that the overriding mandatory
provisions of the governing law must or may be applied.111
It is generally accepted that, even if overriding mandatory provisions are applied as part
of the lex causae, they are subject to the ordre public clause as well as the application of the
overriding mandatory provisions of the forum.
4 Overriding Mandatory Provisions of the Law of Another Foreign
Country (Other than the Lex Causae)
In a number of jurisdictions, legislation follows the model of Article 7 of the Rome Convention
when determining the applicability of foreign overriding mandatory provisions. This is the
case in Belgium, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland and Hungary. The legislation of these countries
permits not only the application of the overriding mandatory norms of the forum, but also the
application or taking into account of overriding mandatory norms of any other country with
which the given legal relationship has a close connection. The reference to such rules may
embrace the overriding mandatory provisions of both the lex causae and any other third
country. The Lithuanian Civil Code allows, in addition to the application of Lithuanian
overriding mandatory provisions, the application of the overriding mandatory norms of any
other state most closely related to the dispute, irrespective of the law chosen by the parties.
Although the legislative text concerns only the disregard of choice of law made by the parties,
it seems that overriding mandatory provisions can also be applied if the governing law was
designated by an objective connecting factor.
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An interesting solution has been adopted in Croatia, where, in addition to the overriding
mandatory norms of the lex fori, the Private International Law Act also allows the application
of the overriding mandatory provisions of the place of performance of an obligation following
Article 9 (3) of the Rome I Regulation. Additionally, the Croatian Private International Law
Act extends the scope of application of the Rome I Regulation to those contracts that are
excluded from the scope of application of the Regulation.112 This solution may be open to
criticism, because the place of performance is a connecting factor for contracts but, outside
the scope of application of the Rome I Regulation, there is not much room left to apply this
provision, and thus to apply foreign overriding mandatory norms under Croatian autonomous
private international law. English common law also recognised that the law of the state of the
place of performance rendering performance illegal could be given effect that enabled courts
to take foreign overriding mandatory norms into consideration. However, the admissibility of
the overriding mandatory norms of the place of performance could be relied on in contract
law, but not in other fields.113 Moreover, it has been also debated whether this was a conflict-
of-laws rule or a rule of substantive law.
Even in Member States where no explicit provision exists on the application of overriding
mandatory provisions, the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of foreign
countries is not prima facie excluded (Slovenia).114 However, this is usually only a scholarly
position and no case law exists confirming this.
Similarly to the Rome I Regulation, some legislative provisions explicitly require that
courts examine the consequences of the application or non-application of the foreign over -
riding mandatory provisions (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia). Legislative provisions do not impose
an obligation on domestic courts to apply or take into consideration of foreign overriding
mandatory provisions; this is merely a possibility for them.
The application of the overriding mandatory norms of the lex causae and those of other
states is usually dependent on the existence of a connection between the law concerned and
the facts of the case. The close connection may arise from the nationality, domicile, habitual
residence of the parties or the place of performance of an act by the party or parties. Overriding
mandatory provisions of third countries are applied or considered to the extent that the law
of the issuing state attributes an overriding character to the norms and this is revealed in the
foreign legislation or court practice.115
In several jurisdictions, it is suggested by the legal literature that the interests or values
behind the overriding mandatory rules must be examined and it must be ascertained whether
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they are worthy of recognition by the forum.116 Such an interest worthy of protection may even
include the objective of international decisional harmony.117 For taking an overriding mandatory
provision of a third country into account, a coincidence between the interests and values of the
forum and those represented by the foreign overriding mandatory norms should be present.
In most Member States, a distinction exists between the application of or otherwise
taking foreign overriding mandatory provisions into consideration at the level of the governing
substantive law. Taking a foreign norm into consideration does not imply any obligation to
apply it.118 Moreover, a foreign overriding mandatory norm does not necessarily apply in its
entirety; for instance, its sanction may be modified and replaced by a sanction envisaged by
the law of the forum. The difference between applying and taking into consideration foreign
overriding mandatory norms is particularly relevant in those countries where the principle of
the non-application of foreign public law prevails119 or where the legislation only recognises
the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the forum. In such states (Germany,
Luxembourg), foreign overriding mandatory rules may, however, be taken into account at the
level of substantive law. In analysing the approach of the courts, German legal literature
differentiates between the consideration of the normative content of a foreign overriding
mandatory norm (e.g. on the basis of Article 138 BGB prohibiting contracts breaching good
morals) and the purely factual consequences of a foreign overriding mandatory provision (e.g.
within the meaning of Article 275 BGB on the impossibility of performance).120 In the former
case, a coincidence between the interests or values behind the overriding mandatory rule
concerned and German interests or values is required.121 In the Nigerian masks case, the
Federal Court of Justice relied more generally on the interests of the international community
(rather than on German interests) to justify the nullity of a contract under Article 138 BGB.122
In German private law, Article 313 BGB (change of circumstances),123 and Article 242 BGB
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(good faith)124 may provide further legal bases to take foreign overriding mandatory norms
at the level of substantive law into consideration.125 In other jurisdictions, rules on force
majeure are typically used to consider foreign overriding mandatory norms.126 On the
contrary, German judicial practice made it unequivocal that Article 134 BGB, (pursuant to
which legal transactions that violate a statutory prohibition are void), covers only domestic
prohibitions, and the Federal Court of Justice held in several cases that a violation of a foreign
statutory provision does not fall under the scope of application of Article 134 BGB.127
Nevertheless, in German legal literature, attempts have been made to define the requirements
for the application of foreign overriding mandatory rules in accordance with the
Sonderanknüpfungstheorie, instead of considering them at the level of substantive law.128
It must be noted that in the jurisdictions where it is a practice to take foreign overriding
mandatory norms into consideration at the level of substantive law, it is generally uncertain
whether a foreign overriding mandatory norm can be considered in a case where the governing
law is another foreign law. In German legal literature, several authors opine that foreign
overriding mandatory provisions would be taken into consideration if this is possible under
the lex causae.129
Finally, it seems that there is no difference between the treatment of overriding mandatory
provisions of EU Member States and third countries in terms of their application or
consideration in autonomous private international law. An occasional difference in the treatment
of foreign overriding mandatory provisions by the Federal Court of Justice was sometimes
explained in the legal literature by the global political situation or foreign policy interests. In
particular, this was the case concerning certain overriding mandatory provisions of the Soviet
Union.130 This is not to deny that there is a higher chance of giving effect to an overriding
mandatory norm enacted by an EU Member States by the courts of the Member States due to
the common interests of and values shared by the Member States within the EU.131
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V Overriding Mandatory Provisions and the Ordre Public Clause
In all the jurisdictions concerned, a  distinction is made between overriding mandatory
provisions and the ordre public clause. The two are often separated in many Member States by
the legal literature so that overriding mandatory provisions have a  positive function in
protecting public policy, while the ordre public clause fulfils the negative protection of public
policy.132 Overriding mandatory provisions apply anyway, regardless of the otherwise governing
law switching off the operation of conflict-of-laws rules. On the contrary, the application of the
ordre public clause may result in setting aside the applicable foreign law designated according
to the conflict-of-laws rules of the forum. However, this distinction is blurred to a certain extent
by the fact that, instead of the foreign law disregarded by virtue of the ordre public clause,
national laws very often order the application of the law of the forum. In this way, even the ordre
public clause can fulfil a positive function.133 Views also appeared in the legal scholarship that
reject this distinction between the positive and the negative way of protecting public policy,
because overriding mandatory norms should be applied irrespective of the need for the protec -
tion of public policy, and they have to be applied even if the lex causae does not endanger the
public policy of the forum.134 Thus, in the event of applying overriding mandatory provisions
examining the protection of public policy is not necessary, because they apply irrespective of
the applicable law and the content of the disregarded law.135
Moreover, the functions of overriding mandatory norms and the ordre public clause have
sometimes been confused in judicial practice.136 It also happens that overriding mandatory
provisions are used through the ordre public clause: The otherwise applicable foreign law is
set aside and the domestic overriding mandatory rule is applied instead.137
VI Conflict of Overriding Mandatory Provisions
A conflict between two overriding mandatory provisions rarely emerges in practice and
private international law codifications do not address such situations. In addition to sporadic
court practice, it is the legal literature that deals with such a scenario.
In the case of a conflict between an overriding mandatory provision of the forum and
that of a foreign state, according to a more broadly accepted view, the former is given priority
as courts are obliged to apply the law of the forum and enforce the interests of the forum state
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over any foreign law.138 In the Member States, where a  specific provision exists for the
application of overriding mandatory provisions, courts are usually bound to apply the overriding
mandatory norms of the forum, but they only have a possibility, and not an obligation, to give
effect to the overriding mandatory norms of foreign countries. Consequently, if there is
a conflict between an overriding mandatory provision of the forum and a foreign overriding
mandatory rule, such courts will most probably apply the former.
Regarding the conflict between two foreign overriding mandatory norms, the conflict
may be solved in favour of the one that demonstrates the closest connection to the case, or
that corresponds to the values and interests of the forum state, or that can be enforced
effectively by the enacting state.139
VII Circumvention of the Application of Overriding Mandatory 
Provisions through an Agreement Conferring Jurisdiction 
to a Court of Another State or an Arbitral Tribunal
Legislation directly addressing the issue of whether the application of an overriding
mandatory rule may be avoided by a choice-of-court or an arbitration agreement is generally
missing. Legislation does not even state that the application of overriding mandatory
provisions would constitute an exclusive ground for jurisdiction. Instead of legislation,
domestic judicial practice gives some guidance on the admissibility of such clauses.
In France, the position of courts is that the application of overriding mandatory provisions
may be set aside by a valid agreement conferring jurisdiction to a foreign court. This was
confirmed by the Court of cassation in the Monster Cable case where, in relation to an
exclusive distribution agreement, the court recognised that an agreement conferring
jurisdiction in favour of a San Francisco court cannot be ignored purely because the choice of
forum results in the disregard of a French overriding mandatory norm.140 The same approach
was followed in other cases as well,141 and was similarly applied in the context of arbitration.142
At the same time, the opposite judicial approach appears in other Member States. German
courts have found choice-of-court and arbitration agreements void in cases where the foreign court
or the arbitral tribunal would have disregarded German overriding mandatory provisions.143
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138 Belgium: Meeusen, Nationalisme (n 62) 387–388, [734]; Germany: Kropholler (n 29) 21; Daniel Busse (n 95) 411f.
139 Germany: Busse (n 95), 412.
140 France: Cass. Civ. 1re, 22 octobre 2008, 07-15823, Monster Cable. On the ruling see Louis d’Avout, (2008) La
Semaine juridique Générale (JCP G) II. 10187.
141 France: Cass. Civ. 1re, 30 janvier 2013, n° 11-10.588.
142 France: Cass. Civ. 1re, 8 juillet 2010, n° 09-67.013 P. On the ruling, see (2010) 186 Recueil Dalloz 2884 commented
by Mathias Audit and Olivier Cuperlier; (2010) Revue critique de droit international privé 743 commented by
Dominique Bureau and Horatia Muir Watt.
143 Germany: Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], decision of 15 June 1987 – II ZR 124/86, NJW
1987, 3193; Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], decision of 2 March 1984 – II ZR 10/83, NJW
1984, 2037; see also Oberlandesgericht München [Higher Regional Court Munich], decision of 17 May 2006 – 
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This case law has received criticism by certain scholars.144 In Luxembourgish case law, we
find an illustration of denying a jurisdiction agreement if this results in the avoidance of
overriding mandatory provisions of Luxembourg law. The Luxembourgish Supreme Court
found that the jurisdiction of the Luxembourgish courts was mandatory regarding employees
working on Luxembourgish territory and the relevant labour law provisions could not be
derogated by a choice-of-court agreement.145
The approach of Italian courts seems to vary depending whether it concerns a choice-of-
court or an arbitration agreement. Article 4 (2) of the Italian Private International Law Act
states that the jurisdiction of any Italian court may be derogated by an agreement in favour
of a foreign court or arbitration, provided that such derogation is evidenced in writing and the
case concerns disposable rights (diritti disponibili). From this provision, some of the legal
literature inferred that a dispute involving overriding mandatory provisions concerns non-
disposable rights and, as a  consequence, the jurisdiction of Italian courts cannot be
derogated.146 Italian courts, however, seem to take a different position. The Court of Cassation
made clear that Article 4 (2) of the Private International Law Act does not apply to choice-
of-court clauses falling under Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation.147 Accordingly, the
parties could stipulate the jurisdiction of a Greek court in a dispute concerning the agent’s
right to indemnity, a right enshrined by the Commercial Agent Directive and implemented
by Article 1751 Italian Civil Code.148 In another case, the Court of cassation also found that
the potential applicability of an overriding mandatory rule to the case does not affect the
validity and enforceability of the jurisdiction clause.149 This was deduced from the principle
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Schiedsverfahren in Zeitschrift für Vertriebsrecht‘ (2016) Zeitschrift für Vertriebsrecht 139–143, 141ff.
144 Germany: David Quinke, ‘Schiedsvereinbarungen und Eingriffsnormen’ (2007) Zeitschrift für Schiedsverfahren
246–254; Haimo Schack, Internationales Zivilverfahrensrecht (7th edn, C.H. Beck 2017, Munich), para 516.
145 Luxembourg: Cour de Cassation, 2 July 1959, Pasicrisie luxembourgeoise, vol 16, 1959, 443f; Dietrich Bernecker,
‘Internationales Privat- und Prozessrecht im Großherzogtum Luxemburg’ (1962–1963) 27 Rabels Zeitschrift,
263–346, 317.
146 Italy: See Luigi Paolo Comoglio, ‘Art. 2’ in Luigi Paolo Comoglio, Claudio Consolo, Bruno Sassani and Romano
Vaccarella (eds), Commentario al codice di procedura civile, vol 1, Articoli 1-98 (Utet 2012, Milano) 58ff; Luca G.
Radicati di Brozolo, ‘Deroga alla giurisdizione e deroga alle norme imperative: un conflitto fra conflitti di leggi e
conflitti di giurisdizioni?’ in Vittorio Colesanti, Claudio Consolo, Giorgio Gaja and Ferruccio Tommaseo (eds),
Il diritto processuale civile nell’avvicinamento giuridico internazionale (CLEUP 2009, Padova) 279ff.
147 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on juris -
diction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2012] OJ L 351/1.
148 Italy: Court of Cassation, Full Court, judgment of 10.5.2019 – No. 12585, Nobel Maritime Inc. v.  P.L. & C. S.r.l.
and Ventouris Ferries Company Limited, Blumare S.r.l, D.B.V.
149 Italy: Court of Cassation, Full Court, judgment of 20.2.2007 – No. 3841, JP Morgan Chase Bank National
Association v. Poste Italiane S.p.a. and D.S., M.G, in (2008) Rivista di diritto internazionale private e processuale 160ff.
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of separability, i.e. the validity of the choice-of-court agreement must be assessed separately
from the validity of the contracts, including the forum selection clause, and from the principle
that the determination of jurisdiction logically precedes the designation of the applicable law.
However, a different interpretation has been followed regarding arbitration agreements. The
Court of Cassation150 held that, in accordance with Article 4 (2) of the Private International
Law Act, Italian jurisdiction cannot be derogated by an arbitration agreement purporting to
derogate Italian jurisdiction over disputes concerning the right of the commercial agent to
indemnity upon the termination of the commercial agency contract by the principal under
Article 1751 of the Italian Civil Code.
In other Member States, we find only very indirect statements on the admissibility of
jurisdiction clauses resulting in the circumvention of the application of overriding mandatory
provisions. In Hungarian judicial practice, we find a more indirect statement in the absence
of explicit court decisions. In a case where the annulment of an arbitral award was requested
on the ground of public policy, the Budapest-Capital Regional Court stated that the state
protects the application of domestic laws having a public policy nature by a specific ground
for annulment, referring to the violation of public policy in order to prevent a foreign law
from being able to frustrate the purpose of overriding mandatory rules having a public policy
nature.151 This interpretation may suggest that an arbitral award ignoring the overriding
mandatory rules of Hungarian law may be annulled.    
Conclusions
There is a  sharp contrast between the interest in the legal literature in the overriding
mandatory rules and practice, which might be illustrative in a few Member States but is
virtually non-existent in others. As in many other fields of private international law, doctrine
very often precedes legislation and judicial practice by raising questions of interpretation and
trying to provide some theoretical foundation for practice.
Case law on the application of overriding mandatory provisions outside the scope of
application of the EU private international law regulations is scant. This is the case especially
in smaller jurisdictions. The reasons may be manifold. First, in several Member States,
a specific legislative provision on overriding mandatory provisions is missing. Although some
room is acknowledged in all Member States for applying or giving effect to overriding
mandatory norms, in the absence of explicit legislative guidance and a clear definition, courts
might be less willing to have recourse to this instrument that interferes with the normal
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150 Italy: Court of Cassation, Full Court, judgment of 28.12.2016 – No. 27072, Maureen Skelly Bonini S.r.l. v. The
Donna Karan Company (2018) Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale 114ff; Court of Cassation,
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151 Hungary: Budapest-Capital Regional Court G. 40.648/2014/7.
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operation of conflict-of-laws rules. This holds in particular for the overriding mandatory
provisions of the lex causae and those of third countries, because, contrary to the overriding
mandatory rules of the forum, their applicability is questionable in many jurisdictions. Second,
courts are more familiar with the mechanism of the ordre public clause, which, unlike
overriding mandatory provisions, is recognised in the private international law legislation of
all Member States examined. Courts sometimes have recourse to the ordre public clause
instead of classifying and applying certain rules as overriding mandatory provisions. Third,
outside the scope of application of the EU private international law regulations, and most
notably the Rome I Regulation, private autonomy plays less of a role. Therefore, there might
be less need to impose limits through the application of overriding mandatory norms.
Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions, legislation, courts and legal literature identified
several substantive law rules as overriding mandatory norms. Some of these provisions can
claim application under autonomous private international law. These rules pertain in
particular to the areas of personal status and family law, property law, company law and
contract law.  
The provisions of the EU private international law regulations on overriding mandatory
norms have some relevance even outside their scope of application, in particular from two
perspectives. First, there seems to be an identicality or at least a strong proximity between the
definition given by Article 9 (1) of the Rome I Regulation and national definitions on overriding
mandatory norms, regardless of whether a definition was elaborated by the legislature or courts
in autonomous private international law. Furthermore, legal literature in several Member States
also endorsed certain elements of the definition provided by the Rome I Regulation and certain
authors explicitly emphasised that the definition given by the Rome I Regulation should be
applied even outside its scope of application. Second, when determining the law of which
countries may be applied or taken into account, the legislature of several Member States
took Article 7 of the Rome Convention (Belgium, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland and Hungary)
or the Rome I Regulation (Croatia) as a point of departure. Although the definition of the
Rome I Regulation was criticised for taking only rules serving public interest into account,
it seems that, in the Member States examined, qualification as an overriding mandatory
norm requires that a rule protects some public interests, even if it concerns a private law rule.
In light of these impacts exercised by EU law on the evolution of autonomous private
international law, a remarkable convergence may be revealed within and outside the scope of
application of the EU private international law regulations as to the definition and application
of overriding mandatory norms.
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Introduction
The main research question as expressed in the title of this paper is primarily a question of
coordination. It addresses the peculiar relationship between directly applicable, uniform
substantive EU law and the EU Private International Law (PIL) regulations, i.e. the Rome
Regulations.
On the one hand, PIL rules indicate the applicable substantive law and should therefore
naturally be applied before any substantive law rule. On the other hand, certain substantive
EU regulations want to be applied irrespective of the (substantive) law indicated by PIL rules.
Moreover, PIL rules, such as are contained in the Rome I and Rome II Regulations, typically
refer to the substantive law of a state rather than to substantive EU law. The latter would thus
be applicable only as part of the law of a Member State, but could not be applied if the relevant
EU PIL Regulations referred to a third-state law.
This paper examines whether substantive EU regulations qualify as overriding mandatory
provisions pursuant to Article 9 Rome I Regulation and Article 16 Rome II Regulation to
ensure their application irrespective of the otherwise applicable third-state law. For this
purpose, this paper first confronts the idea that uniform substantive EU law enjoys
a ‘categorical precedence’ over uniform EU PIL rules (part II). The following part of the paper
explores whether and under what circumstances substantive EU regulations may materially
qualify as overriding mandatory provisions, pursuant to Article 9 Rome I and Article 16 Rome
II Regulation (part III). Finally, the paper discusses the possible application of such rules as
overriding mandatory provisions and the role of special conflict-of-law provisions in more
detail (part IV). The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),1 the Passengers’ Rights
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Regulation2 and the (abolished) draft Common European Sales Law (CESL)3 serve as
examples.
I Categorical Precedence of Uniform Substantive EU Law?
The question whether unified or non-unified substantive law (possibly of a third state) applies
is a typical conflict-of-law question, which has to be asked whenever there is no worldwide
unified law.4 Hence, a conflict-of-law rule is required to determine the coordination between
substantive EU regulations and the EU PIL regulations, such as the Rome I and II Regulations.
While it is true that substantive EU regulations would take precedence due to the principle
of primacy before any national law, substantive EU regulations and EU PIL regulations are on
the same step of the normative hierarchy.5 For this reason, the precedence of EU substantive
law cannot be based on the general principle of primacy.
Instead, EU substantive law regulations are often accorded a ‘categorical precedence’ in
the way international uniform law is often considered to take priority over (national) conflict-
of-law rules.6 The justification of such a categorical precedence, if one is provided, varies.
Zweigert and Drobnig suggest that (international) uniform substantive provisions generally
supersede conflict-of-law provisions in their territorial and material scope of application due
to their superiority in substance (sachliche Überlegenheit).7 In particular with regard to EU
uniform law, an assumed categorical precedence of substantive regulations is based on the
principle of efficiency, which demands a primacy in application of uniform substantive law
before uniform conflict-of-law rules in order to respect the special scope of application of such
substantive rules.8 Moreover, the categorical precedence is hardly ever explained or discussed
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2 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing
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methodologically. Often, uniform substantive law is simply applied without prior consultation
of the conflict-of-law rules by way of ‘principle’. Given that the ‘principle of categorical
precedence’ provides the resolution to a conflict between uniform substantive law and uniform
PIL rules, methodologically, it must be qualified as a conflict-of-law rule. Hence, in an EU
context, it does not give precedence to uniform substantive law over conflict-of-law rules as
such, but rather represents a conflict-of-law principle which gives priority to uniform EU
substantive law over the general EU conflict-of-law rules contained in the EU PIL regulations.
If one follows this approach, there would be no need for substantive EU regulations to qualify
as overriding mandatory provisions (or any other EU PIL rule to apply) as they would take
precedence in any case.
However, while such a precedence of uniform substantive law is indeed teleologically
convincing as a result, in an EU context, there is no need for a stand-alone conflict-of-law
principle of categorical precedence, which must in essence be based on a  lex specialis
reasoning. In fact, the general EU conflict-of-law rules contained in the EU PIL regulations
already contain several provisions which can possibly be used to resolve a conflict with
substantive EU regulations, namely the rules on overriding mandatory provisions (see part III)
and the lex specialis rules (see part IV).
II Material Qualification as an Overriding Mandatory Provision
According to Article 9 (1) Rome I, overriding mandatory provisions are ‘provisions the respect
for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its
political, social or economic organization, to such an extent that they are applicable to any
situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract
under this regulation’.9 In accordance with the EU PIL system, the applicable law is determined
in such situations by the general conflict-of-law rules, namely the rules of the Rome I or II
Regulation, but is then superseded by the respective overriding mandatory provision of the
law of the forum (or the lex causae) in its scope of application. With regard to EU regulations,
several issues deserve a more in-depth consideration.
1 Individual Private Law Rules of an Internationally Mandatory Character
First, it is always an individual rule, the overriding mandatory character of which needs to be
established rather than the character of the regulation as a whole. This follows already from
the wording (‘provisions’ rather than ‘law’) on the one hand and on the other hand from the
exceptional character of overriding mandatory provisions, which requires a  strict
SUBSTANTIVE EU REGULATIONS AS OVERRIDING MANDATORY RULES? n
39 n
9 This definition applies also to the notion used in Article 16 Rome II, see Case C-149/18 Agostinho da Silva Martins
ECLI:EU:C:2019:84, para 28.
ELJ-2020-1__press  2020.12.22.  11:17  Page 39
interpretation,10 and a case-by-case analysis. Thus, any suggestions that qualify whole EU
regulations, such as the GDPR,11 as overriding mandatory laws are (much) too sweeping.12
Second, Article 9 Rome I and Article 16 Rome II do not specify whether they refer to
private law and/or public law rules. In the literature, this issue is often sidestepped in so far
as it is argued that the public or private law nature of an overriding mandatory provision is
irrelevant and such a distinction is not to be drawn.13 This is particularly convincing with
regard to EU law, which does not formally know a public/private divide. In fact, EU regulations
often contain public and private law provisions side by side.
However, if one takes the material scope of application of the Rome Regulations into
consideration, it is evident that they apply only to (contractual and non-contractual)
obligations in civil and commercial matters [see Article 1 (1) respectively]. Hence, only
substantive rules that deal with or haven an effect on civil and commercial matters are at risk
of being disapplied due to the application of another substantive law. Public law rules that do
not have such an impact are not affected by a divergent choice of law; they are applied
pursuant to their own (public) conflict-of-law rules (e.g. principle of territoriality). Article 83
GDPR, regarding administrative fines imposed by a supervisory authority, might serve as an
example for such a (purely) public law provision.
Given the scope of application of the Rome Regulations, particular private law rules
(Sonderprivatrecht)14 may qualify as overriding mandatory rules as long as they do not serve
exclusively or predominantly to balance the interests between private persons (see below).15
What this means precisely, is still subject to much discussion (and will probably continue to be
so). National provisions that have been considered by the ECJ and/or national courts to have
an overriding mandatory character concern, for example, the termination of a commercial
agency contract by notice and related entitlements to indemnities (ECJ Unamar) and the
reduction of allowances and remuneration of officials and other employees of public
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • MARTINA MELCHER
n 40
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authorities (ECJ Nikiforidis). As regards, for example, the GDPR, this means that provisions
such as Article 6 and 7 or 82, which deal with the lawfulness of data processing based on
consent and the right to compensation and liability, address questions of a civil or commercial
nature and therefore risk being put aside if a non-EU Member State law were chosen to be
applicable. Similarly, the Passengers’ Rights Regulation contains only rules and obligations
regarding civil and commercial matters, which could thus possibly qualify as overriding
mandatory provisions due to their private law nature.
Apart from the above mentioned private law provisions and public law provisions dealing
with the exercise of public power,16 there is a huge grey area. In particular, ‘supporting’
provisions that do not grant a right themselves or cannot be used as a basis for a particular
claim are sometimes difficult to categorise as public or private and are often of particular
relevance to a private law issue despite their rather public law nature, e.g. public restrictions
regarding the purchase of land. To summarize, unfortunately, the public/private divide, which
is in itself quite ambiguous, can hardly be used to identify overriding mandatory rules in an
unequivocal way – notably, in an EU context where the public/private divide is particularly
blurred.
Third, irrespective of their private or public law character, a mandatory rule must be of
such importance that it justifies a departure from the (otherwise) applicable law.17 In other words,
the rule demands to be applied as an internationally mandatory rule.18 A strict interpretation
is required.19 The internationally mandatory character of a rule is to be determined not only
according to the wording of the rule but also by taking into account the general structure of
the law, its objectives and the circumstances under which it was adopted.20 In the Da Silva
case, which concerns a particular limitation rule, the ECJ emphasises that such rules are
principally governed by the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation pursuant to Article
15 (h) Rome II Regulation.21 Pursuant to this logic, convincing arguments are needed in order
to qualify substantive provisions as overriding mandatory provisions if they are expressly part
of the scope of the law applicable. If one considers EU rules to fall within the scope of Article
9 Rome I and Article 16 Rome II, it is particularly difficult to determine the internationally
mandatory character of such a rule. In essence, one has to ask whether the rule in question
requires supremacy also regarding third country law. In view of Article 3 (4) Rome I, it is
certainly clear that EU law is not per se of an internationally mandatory nature. However, EU
regulations often require a very broad territorial application. For example, Article 3 GDPR
envisages the application of the Regulation to the processing of personal data in the EU and,
in certain situations, also to their processing by a controller or processor not established in
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the EU. Such a  broad scope of application often hints at an internationally mandatory
character.22
A broad scope of application is not sufficient in itself, however. An overriding mandatory
provision must have an internationally mandatory character ‘to safeguard public interests’. In
other words, it must serve (primarily) a public interest purpose that goes beyond a mere
legislative interest. Both elements are closely linked, as a special public interest is often derived
from an express international scope of application and a broad scope of application is often
thought to suggest a particular public interest. In general, rules that are of an internationally
mandatory character due to public interest are also referred to as ‘public order legislation’.23
Given its arguments in the Unamar case, the ECJ would probably qualify Article 82 GDPR
(right to compensation and liability) as an overriding mandatory provision. It requires an
international application within the (rather broad) confines of Article 3 GDPR24 and there is
a particular public interest in the right to data protection, given that it even qualifies as a funda -
mental right.25 In contrast, Article 7 Passengers’ Rights Regulation also contains a right to
compensation in the event of denial of boarding or cancellation and an international scope 
of application, but it is doubtful whether respecting this provision is crucial for safeguarding
the EU’s public interests.
As can be seen, both, the public/private divide as well as the particular public interest
character of a provision, as ‘identifying features’ of an overriding mandatory rule are rather
ambiguous concepts. They give much scope of interpretation to courts and legislators, so
that (almost) any provision that shall be applied mandatorily also in cross-border situations
to provide an appropriate legal frame may be identified as such.26
2 Are Article 9 Rome I and Article 16 Rome II Applicable to EU Law?
Moreover, irrespective of their substance, it is still unclear whether mandatory rules in EU
regulations may even qualify as overriding mandatory provisions in the sense of Article 9
Rome I and Article 16 Rome II.27 Actually, the wording of these provisions seems to cover
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Tübingen) 171.
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BGB XIII (Sellier 2016, München) Article 9 Rom I-VO para 164; (rather) affirmative Bonomi (n 14) Article 9 Rome I 
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national law only, as they refer to ‘provisions of the law of the forum’ [Article 9 (2) Rome I],
and to ‘provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country’ [Article 9 (1)
Rome I]. Whereas EU law could be qualified as part of the ‘law of the forum’ in a Member
State, this was not necessarily intended by the legislator, given that the Rome Regulations
clearly distinguish between substantive national law of the forum and substantive EU law in
other places, such as Article 3 (3) and (4) Rome I. Furthermore, the EU is certainly no country
but a regional institution sui generis, so that – prima facie – it does not matter that the EU
regards the respect for a certain EU provision as crucial. However, one could argue that the
Member States are bound by the principle of loyalty and that therefore any EU regulation, 
the respect for which is regarded as crucial by the EU, is necessarily as essential to the Member
States as it is to the EU.
Furthermore, from a teleological and systematic point of view, there is no need for EU
legislation to be addressed by Article 9 Rome I and Article 16 Rome II. Especially with regard
to substantive EU regulations, the literature often regards the application of the exception for
overriding mandatory rules as pointless, because the substantive EU regulations ought to
supersede otherwise applicable national rules anyway, due to the EU principle of supremacy
of application.28 While this is certainly true for the national law of the Member States, which
is superseded by (substantive) EU law, a supremacy-based application of directly applicable
secondary EU law is less certain with regard to the law of third countries.29 The assumed
non-applicability of an automatic supremacy in these cases is also supported by Article 3 (4)
Rome I, which addresses EU law in all its forms including that of an EU regulation. Such a rule
would be superfluous if the principle of supremacy applied to directly applicable EU law also
in the above situations. Even if the general principle of supremacy is inapplicable, however,
there is no need for Article 9 Rome I or Article 16 Rome II to be applied to EU regulations
(and also direct transpositions of EU directives) if one agrees that Article 23 Rome I and
Article 27 Rome II cover such situations (see below part IV).
As regards national rules that implement EU directives, the ECJ case law ostensibly
clarified that such rules may qualify as overriding mandatory provisions.30 At a closer look,
however, the Unamar and Da Silva cases, in which the ECJ explicitly referred to Article 7
Rome Convention and Article 9 Rome I respectively, actually concerned national provisions
that had been drafted in the context of minimum harmonisation and were based on the
legislative autonomy of the Member States, i.e. they did not (precisely) reflect corresponding
EU stipulations. In Unamar, the ECJ stipulated that, with regard to national law transposing
the EU rules in question, ‘reference must be made to Article 7 of the Rome Convention’.31
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para 51; rejecting Wulf-Henning Roth, ‘Handelsvertretervertrag und Rom I-Verordnung – Eine Skizze’ in Jörn
Bernreuther and others (eds), Festschrift für Ulrich Spellenberg (Sellier 2010, München, 309–328) 320.
28 Staudinger (n 13) Article 9 para 12 f; Ulrich Magnus in Staudinger, BGB XIII (Sellier 2016, München) Article 9 Rom
I-VO para 35 und Einl IPR para 9.
29 Bonomi (n 14) Article 9 Rome I para 51.
30 Case C-381/98 Ingmar ECLI:EU:C:2000:605; Case C-184/12 Unamar, para 40.
31 Case C-184/12 Unamar, para 41.
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This is however a rather general instruction at the beginning of its analysis of the specific
situation and not an analysis of the situation at hand. In fact, the national provisions under
scrutiny for conformity with Article 7 Rome Convention did not only transpose EU law but
went beyond (‘goldplating’) the demands of the EU directive, which did not contain very
precise instructions to begin with, thereby constituting (genuine) national law rather than
EU law. In other words, the final assessment and ruling of the ECJ, which suggests a link to
Article 7 Rome Convention actually concerns national (overriding mandatory) provisions
rather than EU (overriding mandatory) provisions. Similarly, in Da Silva, the ECJ effectively
deals with a  national rule in a  minimum harmonisation context, which represents the
Member State’s reaction to a general allowance of the EU Directive in question to maintain
or bring into force provisions that are more favourable rather than a  simple prescribed
implementation of EU law. Hence, the Unamar and the Da Silva cases do not support the idea
that EU regulations may qualify as overriding mandatory law in accordance with Articles 9
Rome I and 16 Rome II.
It is only in the Ingmar case that the national rule in question actually reflects the EU
specification to a significant extent. Due to the temporal setting of the Ingmar case, however,
the ECJ32 did not (have to) refer to Article 9 Rome I or Article 7 Rome Convention, but merely
argued that the purpose of the rules in question requires that they be applied ‘irrespective of
the law by which the parties intended the contract to be governed’.33 Contrary to the prevailing
view in academic literature, this is certainly not an unequivocal qualification as overriding
mandatory law.34 Hence, although the ECJ case law links the Ingmar and Unamar cases
argumentatively (i.e. by citation), thus suggesting their coherence,35 (at least) some ambiguity
remains as to whether the ECJ would have relied on these rules if the case had fallen into
their scope rationae temporis.
III Application as Overriding Mandatory Provision
Irrespective of the material character of an EU provision as an overriding mandatory
provision, its application as such is a different question. If a special conflict-of-law rule takes
precedence and results in the application of the directly applicable, unified substantive EU law
instead of the (otherwise) applicable (national) law, there is no need for this law to be applied
on the basis of Article 9 Rome I or Article 16 Rome II – even if it would (also) qualify as
overriding mandatory provision.36 In this sense, Article 9 Rome I and Article 16 Rome II
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32 Interestingly, the Advocate General did refer to the content of said rules anyway, see Case C-381/98 Ingmar
ECLI:EU:C:2000:230, Opinion of AG Léger, para 88.
33 Case C-381/98 Ingmar, para 25.
34 See Hemler (n 26) 221 (also for further references).
35 Similarly, Jan Lüttringhaus, ‘Eingriffsnormen im internationalen Unionsprivat- und Prozessrecht: Von Ingmar zu
Unamar’ [2014] IPRax 146–152, 147.
36 See also Hemler (n 26) 162, who states that overriding mandatory rules are based on a lex specialis principle.
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represent only the ‘second exit’ for rules that cannot ‘leave’ the Rome Regulations through
the ‘first exit’, namely Article 23 Rome I or Article 27 Rome II.37
1 Overriding Mandatory Provisions and the Lex Specialis Principle
Article 23 Rome I and Article 27 Rome II contain a  lex specialis principle for rules on
contractual and non-contractual obligations respectively. According to these provisions, the
respective general PIL regulation (i.e. Rome I or Rome II) shall not prejudice the application
of provisions of [Union] law which, in relation to particular matters, lay down conflict-of-law
rules’ for contractual/non-contractual obligations.
As regards traditional reference rules (Anknüpfungsnormen), there is little doubt that they
qualify as conflict-of-law provisions in this sense. Examples include Article 3 Regulation
3921/9138 and Article 129 (2), 130 (2) EU trade mark Regulation39. However, it is disputed
whether Article 23 Rome I and Article 27 Rome II also apply regarding the coordination with
uniform substantive EU rules. For them to be applicable, the substantive EU regulations in
question have to contain (scope of ) application rules (also called Abgrenzungsnormen
[delimitation rules]40) and these application rules have to be encompassed by the autonomous
EU notion of ‘conflict-of-law rule’, which is used in Article 23 Rome I and Article 27 Rome II.41
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37 Peter Mankowski in Ulrich Magnus, Peter Mankowski (eds), European Commentaries on Private International
Law – ECPIL II (Otto Schmidt 2017, Köln) Article 23 Rome I  para 13. See also Felix Maultzsch in beck-
online.Grosskommentar (1.8.2018) Article 9 Rom I para 203.
38 Council Regulation No 3921/91 of December 1991 laying down conditions under which non-resident carriers
may transport goods or passengers by inland waterway within a Member State, OJ 1991 L 373, 1.
39 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union
trade mark, OJ 2017 L 154, 1.
40 Jan Kropholler, Internationales Einheitsrecht (Mohr Siebeck 1975, Tübingen) 190 ff [Abgrenzungsnormen
(delimitation rules)]; Ulrich Drobnig, ‘Anwendungsnormen in Übereinkommen zur Vereinheitlichung des
Privatrechts’ in Walter Stoffel and Paul Volken (eds), Mélanges en l’honneur d’Alfred von Overbeck (Editions
universitaires Fribourg Suisse 1990, Fribourg, 15–30) 15 [Anwendungsnormen (application rules)]. Generally, Jan
von Hein in Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (6th edn, C.H. Beck 2015, München) Einl IPR para 97. Another
commonly used notion for such rules is statutistic conflict-of-law rules (statutistische Kollisionsnormen), see Karl
Kreuzer, ‘Zu Stand und Perspektiven des Europäischen Internationalen Privatrechts’ (2006) 70 RabelsZ 1–88, 46;
Rolf Wagner, ‘Normenkonflikte zwischen den EG-Verordnungen Brüssel I, Rom I und Rom II und transportrecht -
lichen Rechtsinstrumenten’ [2009] TranspR 103–109, 107.
41 Affirmative Peter Mankowski, ‘Rechtswahlklauseln in Luftbeförderungs-AGB auf dem Prüfstand’ [2014] RRa
118–123, 123; Mankowski (n 37) Article 23 Rome I  para 11 (both with reference to the Passengers Rights
Regulation). See also Erik Jayme and Carl Nordmeier, ‘Multimodaler Transport: Zur Anknüpfung an den
hypothetischen Teilstreckenvertrag im Internationalen Transportrecht – Ist § 452a HGB Kollisions- oder
Sachnorm?’ [2008] IPRax 503–507, 507; von Hein (n 4) 375; Florian Eichel in Rainer Hüßtege, Heinz-Peter Mansel,
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch Rom-Verordnungen – HUP – EuErbVO VI (3rd edn, Nomos 2015, Baden-Baden) Article
27 Rom II-VO para 3; Maultzsch (n 37) Article 9 Rom I  para 205; Schulze in beck-online.Grosskommentar
(1.8.2018) Art 23 Rom I-VO Rz 18 und Art 27 Rz 13. Rejecting, Johannes Schilling, Das Internationale Privatrecht
der Transportverträge (Mohr Siebeck 2016, Tübingen) 87 ff; see also Wagner (n 40) 107 (regarding Article 25
Rome I-VO); Leible in Rainer Hüßtege, Heinz-Peter Mansel, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch Rom-Verordnungen – HUP
– EuErbVO VI (3rd edn, Nomos 2015, Baden-Baden) Article 23 Rom I-VO para 8; Eva-Maria Kieninger in Franco 
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2 Application Rules as Special Conflicts Rules
Scope of ) Application rules have a dual function:42 On the one hand, they (unilaterally)
determine the (international territorial) scope of application of uniform law. They are similar
to what is commonly understood as overriding mandatory law, insofar as the question posed
is not which law is applicable but rather whether the rule in question is applicable according
to its application rule. The applicable law is determined on the basis of the particular
substantive rule rather than on the basis of the situation, which is characteristic for traditional
conflict-of-law rules (i.e. reference rules) according to Savigny. On the other hand, application
rules contain a coordination mechanism regarding conflicting rules. In this sense, traditional
conflict-of-law rules and applicability criteria address exactly the same problem. Unlike
reference rules, however, the conflict-of-law character of rules that determine the (territorial)
scope of application of the instrument of which they are part is disputed.
First, the nature and character of the principal provisions of the Rome Regulations as
reference rules argue in favour of a strict understanding of the term ‘conflict-of-law rule’,
which does not cover application rules.43 However, the wording of Article 23 Rome I and
Article 27 Rome II is not limited to reference provisions and does not distinguish between
various types of conflict-of-law rules. Furthermore, EU law contains conflict-of-law rules that
deviate from the standard reference rules, such as Article 9 Rome I, which allows a national
provision to apply unilaterally.
Second, application rules are often only ancillary provisions.44 However, Article 23 Rome I
and Article 27 Rome II do not refer to instruments consisting solely of conflict-of-law rules, but
also encompass EU regulations that contain conflict-of-law rules, as they refer to (individual)
provisions rather than whole instruments.45 Thus, a single conflict-of-law rule could suffice,
e.g. older consumer law directives containing only a single conflict-of-law rule are often
referred to as examples.46
Third, the purpose of Article 23 Rome I and Article 27 Rome II is to allow an amendment
for substantive rules that require the application of a different law.47 Such a demand also
characterises substantive EU regulations (or of individual provisions therein) that determine
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Ferrari and others, Internationales Vertragsrecht (2nd edn, Beck 2011, München) Article 23 para 3 (regarding the
Passengers Rights Regulation); Magnus in Staudinger, BGB XIII (Sellier 2016, München) Article 23 Rom I-VO
para 17. Inconclusive Dieter Martiny in Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (7th edn, C.H. Beck 2018, München)
Article 23 Rom I-VO para 8.
42 See in detail Kropholler (n 40) 190.
43 Wagner (n 40) 107 ff; Schilling (n 5) 778 ff.
44 Wagner (n 40) 107 ff.
45 Similarly Jayme and Nordmeier (n 41) 507 (regarding Article 25 Rom I-VO).
46 Leible (n 41) Article 23 Rome I para 9. Regarding the possibly (exclusive) external competence of the EU also for
uniform substantive law due to such a broad understanding of conflict of laws (also) in the context of Article 25
Rome I and Article 28 Rome II see Wagner (n 40) 108 (footnote 61); Schilling (n 5) 779. See also Dieter Martiny
in Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (7th edn, C.H. Beck 2018, München) Article 25 Rom I-VO para 4.
47 Roth (n 27) 323.
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their territorial/international scope of application independent from the otherwise applicable
law.48 As a test, one could ask whether the substantive provisions in question want to be
applied without reference to the general conflict-of-law rules. In this regard, the ECJ pays
particular attention to the wording and objectives of the EU legislation in question, insofar as
it asks whether the legislation intends to lay down conflict-of-law rules.49 If this question is
answered in the affirmative, such application rules must be qualified as (accessory) unilateral
conflict-of-law rules (akzessorische Kollisionsnormen).50 Primacy of uniform law can be
justified, as application rules take precedence due to the lex specialis-principle.51 With this in
mind, Article 23 Rome I and Article 27 Rome II are not applicable if an EU legal instrument
does not display any conflict-of-law character but rather requires the national legislator to
devise protective measures in general.52 Therefore, Article 28 Directive 2009/103, which
allows the Member states to maintain or bring into force more favourable provisions, was
not regarded as a conflict-of-law rules by the ECJ.53
Besides express provisions regarding the scope of application, Article 23 Rome I and
Article 27 Rome II ought to encompass implicit application rules as well, in spite of referring
to ‘provisions’.54 To distinguish formally between express and implied application rules would
result in an artificial distinction that cannot be justified. Moreover, Article 23 Rome I and
Article 27 Rome II probably should not be limited to directly applicable EU rules, but should
be understood to encompass also national law that transposes EU law.55 Article 20 Rome
Convention, the predecessor of the Rome I Regulation, even mentioned harmonised law
explicitly; however, one must keep in mind that the legislator altered the wording of the
provision. Also, EU Directives (and national law implementing such EU Directives) pose
particular challenges, as they rarely contain unambiguous provisions and differing Member
State transpositions cause further divergences (e.g. Article 3 E-Commerce Directive). 56
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48 Similarly, as regards overriding mandatory provisions, Hemler (n 26) 180.
49 Case C-149/18 Agostinho da Silva Martins, para 38; Joined Cases C-359/14 and C-475/14 ERGO Insurance
ECLI:EU:C:2016:40, para 39.
50 Kreuzer (n 40) 46; Jan Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht (6th edn, Mohr Siebeck 2006, Tübingen) 97;
Maultzsch (n 37) Article 9 Rom I para 205.
51 Extensively, Kropholler (n 40) 189 ff. See also Kieninger (n 41) Article 23 para 3; von Hein (n 40) Einl IPR paras
96–98.
52 Thorn in Thomas Rauscher (ed), Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht III (4th edn, Otto Schmidt 2016,
Köln) Article 23 Rom I-VO para 6. Similarly Stefan Leible and Matthias Lehmann, ‘Die Verordnung über das auf
vertragliche Schuldverhältnisse anzuwendende Recht („Rom I“)’ [2008] RIW 528–543, 531.
53 Case C-149/18 Agostinho da Silva Martins.
54 Roth (n 27) 314.
55 See also Case C-149/18 Agostinho da Silva Martins, para 36 ff; Joined Cases C-359/14 and C-475/14 ERGO
Insurance, para 38 ff; Leible (n 41) Article 23 Rome I para 5; Eichel (n 41) Article 27 Rome II para 2.
56 Roth (n 27) 315.
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3 Some Examples
Contrary to – for example – Article 14b Directive 2009/103,57 which does not qualify as
a conflict-of-law provision for subrogation between insurers according to the ECJ,58 Article
3 GDPR expresses a request for the substantive rules of the GDPR to be applied despite the
otherwise applicable national law. It defines independently a particular international scope of
application for EU data protection law. Such a rule would be redundant if the general PIL
provisions were to be nonetheless applied, as data processors could choose a  foreign
substantive law to apply and thus deselect the (probably) more protective EU law. Actually, the
ECJ considers Article 4 (1) (a) Data Protection Directive 95/46, which precedes Article 3
GDPR, to be a conflict-of-law rule, as it refers to this rule in order to determine the applicable
law in the Verein für Konsumenteninformation/Amazon Case.59 Similarly, the Austrian
Supreme Court considers Article 4 (1) (a) Data Protection Directive to be ‘a special rule’ in
the context of Article 6 (1) Rome I.60 Although it is true that – contrary to Article 4 Data
Protection Directive – Article 3 GDPR does not indicate the applicable national law but rather
the applicable EU law, both rules determine the scope of application of the substantive rules
contained in the respective instrument. As such, they have a  conflict-of-law character
although they do not qualify as traditional all-sided reference rules and thus qualify as special
conflict rules according to Article 23 Rome I and Article 27 Rome II.61 To differentiate
between both rules on account of their wording would seem artificial.
Similarly, the Passengers’ Rights Regulation contains, in its Article 3, an application rule
that should be qualified as special conflict-of-law provision pursuant to Article 23 Rome I.62
It stipulates in Article 3 (1) a that it shall apply to ‘passengers departing from an airport located
in the territory of a Member State to which the Treaty applies’. It demands the application of
its rules, irrespective of a dissenting choice of law or the substantive law applicable to the
transportation contract. By qualifying Article 3 as a special conflict-of-law provision, one also
avoids the categorisation of all substantive rules of the Passengers’ Rights Regulation as
overriding mandatory provisions and an accompanying overextension of this notion.
As a final example, the – discarded – proposal for a Common European Sales Law (CESL)
can be named. It also contains a provision that determines its international and territorial
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57 Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance
against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against
such liability [2009] OJ L263/11.
58 Joined Cases C-359/14 and C-475/14 ERGO Insurance, paras 38–42; generally Case C-149/18 Agostinho da Silva
Martins, paras 36–42.
59 Case C-191/15 Verein für Konsumenteninformation ECLI:EU:C:2016:612, paras 72–81. In detail Müller (n 25)
215 passim.
60 OGH 2 Ob 155/16g, JBl 2018, 464 = jusIT 2018, 54 (Thiele; Mader) = ÖBl 2018, 249 (Handig).
61 See Martina Melcher, ‘Es lebe das Territorialitätsprinzip?’ in Susanne Gössl and others (eds), Politik und
Internationales Privatrecht (?) 129–147, 137 ff. See also Maultzsch (n 37) Article 9 Rom I para 271. Dissenting
Brkan (n 25) 341 (differentiating between Article 4 Data Protection Directive and Article 3 GDPR).
62 Similarly, Roth (n 27) 314.
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scope of application. However, according to its recitals 10 and 15, it was not intended that the
CESL should be applied before the determination of the applicable law, but was meant to be
subject to the applicable conflict-of-law rules. Notwithstanding the (convincing) critique
issued by some scholars regarding the intended link between the applicability of a Member
State’s law and the CESL as an optional 2nd regime63 and the likely competence-inspired nature
of this approach,64 this shows that application rules should not qualify as conflict-of-law rules
in a categorical manner, but subject to a case-by-case analysis only.
Conclusion
As this paper illustrates, a coordination of traditional PIL rules that determine the applicable
law ‘from the facts’ (vom Sachverhalt aus) and substantive provisions, which lay down their
own (international) scope of application (‘from the rule’; von der Norm aus) is challenging. In
this paper it is suggested that application rules should qualify as leges specialis, which
penetrate the general PIL connecting system (also) in EU law. This approach respects
normative hierarchies and avoids an overloading of Article 9 Rome I and Article 16 Rome II
and of the (ambiguous) notion of an ‘overriding mandatory provision’, which require a strict
interpretation.65 At the same time, it provides a way to deal with an increasing number of EU
legislative acts that determine their own scope of application.
Despite these advantages, this approach also provides some challenges, in particular as
regards questions of competence. If (scope of ) application provisions may be qualified as
conflict-of-law rules, one might argue in favour of Article 81 TFEU as an (additional?)
competence base. Given the ancillary nature of these provisions, the assumption of an
ancillary competence might however resolve this issue in a simple manner. It might prove
more complex, though, with regard to the external competence of the EU if one applies this
extended understanding of conflict-of-law provisions – as seems only reasonable – also to
Article 25 Rome I and Article 28 Rome II regarding uniform substantive law in international
conventions.
This research question therefore certainly merits further attention and a more in-depth
discussion. In the end, however, the question of whether uniform substantive law is to be
applied as overriding mandatory law, due to special conflict-of-law rules, or enjoys
a principled ‘categorical precedence’ remains primarily a methodological one – the result is
the same: substantive EU rules that demand to be applied, irrespective of the otherwise
applicable (national) law, take precedence.
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63 Eidenmüller and others (n 7) 21; von Hein (n 4) 375, 389.
64 See Jan von Hein in Thomas Rauscher (ed), Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht III (4th edn, Otto
Schmidt 2016, Köln) Article 25 para 8a.
65 See also Mankowski (n 37) Article 23 Rome I para 15. In this regard, also the case C-381/98 Ingmar (and C-184/12
Unamar) and its broad understanding of an overriding mandatory provisions should be challenged.
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Theses
1. A (principle of ) categorical precedence which gives priority to uniform substantive law
over uniform PIL laws must be qualified as a conflict-of-law rule. Although, a methodological
account is often missing, it must in essence be based on a lex specialis reasoning. References
to such a general principle are superfluous, if explicit EU conflict-of-law provisions already
ensure such a precedence.
2. The material qualification of a rule as an overriding mandatory provision should be
distinguished from its application as an overriding mandatory provision.
3. Whether a  provision is of an overriding mandatory nature has to be determined
individually for each provision and cannot be generalised for a legislative act as such.
4. Article 9 Rome I and Article 16 Rome II encompass only overriding mandatory provisions
that qualify as rules relating to civil and commercial matters. Other rules fall outside the scope
of application of the Rome Regulations, so there is no actual conflict of (different substantive)
laws as regards rules which do not relate to civil and commercial matters. However, the
dividing line is blurred and a distinct and precise categorisation of rules on this basis is hardly
possible.
5. Substantive rules that (primarily) address and regulate private interests cannot qualify as
overriding mandatory provisions according to Article 9 Rome I and Article 16 Rome II. Only
rules that are of an overriding mandatory nature due to the public interest they address are
covered; but, unfortunately, the term ‘public interest legislation’ leaves much discretion and
EU law generally seeks to advance particular social and economic interests.
6. Article 9 Rome I and Article 16 Rome II focus on the substance and intention of a rule
and address national provisions rather than EU provisions.
7. Even if a rule materially qualifies as an overriding mandatory provision, it is not necessarily
to be applied as such. Several coordination/conflict-of-law rules exist in the context of the
Rome Regulations, such as Article 9 Rome I and Article 16 Rome II regarding overriding
mandatory provisions and Article 23 Rome I and Article 27 Rome II regarding leges speciales.
8. Application rules that form part of EU substantive regulations (usually) qualify as leges
speciales according to Article 23 Rome I and Article 27 Rome II. A case-by-case analysis is
necessary.
9. If an overriding mandatory rule is backed up by a special conflict-of-law rule, Article 23
Rome I and Article 27 Rome II already stipulate their precedence, so there is no need to refer
to Article 9 Rome I or Article 16 Rome II (or to employ a general principle of categorical
precedence).
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Introduction
Overriding mandatory provisions have been within the interests of legal scholars for years.
However, in many cases, authors focused on the overriding mandatory rules in commercial
matters,1 whereas overriding mandatory provisions within international family law, and
particularly within international legal aspects of personal status, have not acquired sufficient
attention within legal doctrine. This therefore analyses selected issues related to overriding
mandatory provisions regarding the conclusion and dissolution of marriage, personal and
property relations between spouses, parental responsibility, protection of adults, and finally,
names of a natural person, in international private law.
This paper focuses on the relevant rules established within international conventions and
European Union regulations. The second part also highlights key differences and anomalies
between international and national laws, using Lithuania and Poland as examples, since both
legal systems include rules on the application of overriding mandatory provisions.
I Theoretical Background
1 The Distinction between the ‘Overriding Mandatory Norms’ 
and a General ‘Ordre Public’ Clause
Although both international and national legal acts contain rules related to overriding
mandatory norms, none provides their legal definition. Moreover, neither the legislature nor
the doctrine is unequivocal regarding the definition of these norms. In the broadest
understanding, overriding mandatory norms can be described as those norms that are
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1 See Michael Hellner, ‘Third Country Overriding Mandatory Rules in the Rome I Regulation: Old Wine in New
Bottles?’ (2009) 5 (3) Journal of Private International Law 447–470; Christopher Bisping, ‘The common European 
ELJ-2020-1__press  2020.12.22.  11:17  Page 51
applicable irrespective of the lex causae.2 It is being that these are substantive law norms,
which have consequences for private international law.3 These are the rules that reject the
application of the lex causae, even if it was chosen by the parties.
Although the application of overriding mandatory rules is a part of the protection of
public policy of the forum state (usually), these rules have to be distinguished from the
classical ordre public clause. They can be seen as two sides of the same coin. Ordre public is
usually conceived as a negative exception, which aims to exclude foreign rules if they are
incompatible with the public order of a forum state,4 whereas overriding mandatory rules,
since they apply irrespective of the applicable law, can be considered as positive exceptions.
This characteristic can be the main distinction between these rules and ordre public.
Moreover, it can be claimed that disregarding the overriding mandatory rules can constitute
a violation of the ordre public of the state of the forum.
Overriding mandatory provisions, similar to ordre public, limit the application of foreign
law. However, owing to their direct application, unlike the ordre public,5 they do not create
a gap that needs to be filled. Hence, at first glance, it would seem that their application is less
complicated than the application of the ordre public clause, and the concept of overriding
mandatory rules itself is less vague.6 Unfortunately, this is a misleading thought. The concept
of overriding mandatory rules proved to be one of the most difficult within the general part of
private international law. It is caused by its ambiguous nature. Therefore, a deeper consideration
of the possible notion of overriding mandatory norms is needed.
Both ordre public and overriding mandatory provisions give voice to fundamental legal
principles. Overriding mandatory norms usually favour the weaker party, who could be (inter
alia) children, women, employees or consumers.7 Together with the ordre public clause, they
serve as a ‘general correction mechanism’8. However, it has to be emphasised that not every
mandatory rule of the state of the forum will be considered an overriding mandatory provision
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sales law, consumer protection and overriding mandatory provisions in private international law’ (2013) 62 (2)
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 463–483.; Xandra E. Kramer, ‘EU Overriding Mandatory Law and
the Applicable Law on the Substance in International Commercial Arbitration’ in Franco Ferrari (ed), The Impact
of EU Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Juris 2017, New York, 285–316).
2 Michael Wilderspin, ‘Overriding mandatory provisions’ in Jurgen Basedow, Giesela Rühl, Franco Ferrari,Pedro de
Miguel Asensio (eds) Encyclopedia of Private International Law (Edward Elgar 2017, Cheltenham, 1330–1336)
1330.
3 Andrzej Mączyński, ‘Przepisy szczególne o dziedziczeniu gospodarstw rolnych a  prawo prywatne
międzynarodowe (1986)’ in Andrzej Mączyński (ed), Rozprawy i studia z prawa prywatnego międzynarodowego
(Wolters Kluwer 2017, Warszawa 852–871) 863.
4 Michael Bogdan, ‘Private International Law as Component of the Law of the Forum’ (Brill/Nijhoff 2011) Vol. 348;
Recueil des Cours: Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law 1–512, 182.
5 The term ordre public in this work is used to describe any general public policy clause.
6 Dalia Palombo, ‘Business and Human Rights: The Obligations of the European Home States’ (Hart Publishing
2020, Oxford) 69.
7 Bogdan (n 4) 183.
8 Laura Maria van Bochove, ‘Overriding Mandatory Rules as a Vehicle for Weaker Party Protection in European
Private International Law’ (2014) (3) Erasmus Law Review 148.
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of private international law. These should only be the rules of fundamental importance, referred
to in the doctrine as ‘internationally mandatory’9. They pursue the aim of protecting the public
interest, those that are of extreme importance for the interests of the state.10 At the European
Union level, these are also the rules protecting the fundamental principles of EU law11.
The overriding mandatory rules are more common in contractual relations; however,
they have recently become relevant in family law as well. Martiny explains that this is
a consequence of a growing ‘contractualisation’ of family law and growing recognition of party
autonomy therein12. Unlike ordre public, which protects more general legal principles (for
instance, some constitutional values as a principle of non-discrimination), overriding mandatory
norms are more specific. These are usually precise norms allowing or forbidding something;
for instance, particular rules protecting employees. Hence, ordre public is less flexible than
overriding mandatory provisions. The legislator can amend or suspend the overriding
mandatory norms at any time.
Aside from the national provisions of fundamental importance the rules to which the
state has to adhere due to its international obligations may also be considered as overridingly
mandatory, for instance, international treaties and the rules anchored therein. In terms of
family law and names, these could be provisions of the European Convention of Human
Rights,13 as well as the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union14 and finally
Articles 18 and 19 of the TFEU.15 However, protection of fundamental rights is usually
guaranteed by the general ordre public clause and not the overriding mandatory norms,16
although some of the literature links the protection of fundamental rights with overriding
mandatory provisions.17 This does not seem to be incorrect; however, it can also be regarded
as a positive function of the general ordre public clause.18 As such, the distinction between the
two concepts becomes even more blurry. Moreover, despite the lack of consensus regarding
the notion of overriding mandatory provisions, their belonging to the national legal system
is hardly questioned.
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9 Dieter Martiny, ‘Overriding mandatory provisions in EU family law regulations’ in Gillian Douglas, Mervyn
Murch, Victoria Stephens (eds), International and National Perspectives on Child and Family Law: Essays in
Honour of Nigel Lowe (Intersentia 2018, 297–312) 299; Bogdan (n 4).
10 Wilderspin (n 2) 1331.
11 Case C-381/98, Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc. [2000] ECR I-9305 para 21–22.
12 Martiny (n 9) 298.
13 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms opened for signature 4 November 1950,
213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953).
14 The Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/02.
15 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47.
16 Frank Vischer, ‘General Course on Private International Law’ vol. 232 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993, Alphen
aan de Rijn); Recueil des Cours: Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law 101; Bogdan 
(n 4) 166; Tim Corthaut, ‘EU Ordre Public’ (Kluwer Law International 2012, Alphen aan de Rijn) 299.
17 Dalia Palombo, ‘Business and Human Rights: The Obligations of the European Home States’ (Hart Publishing
2020, Oxford) 69.
18 Frank Vischer, ‘General Course on Private International Law’ Vol. 232. (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993, Alphen
aan de Rijn); Recueil des Cours: Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law 102.
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Therefore, in this work, overriding mandatory provisions are understood as substantive
norms of the state of the forum or another state that have to be applied in the case, irrespective
of the law applicable thereto. These are the substantive law rules that are internationally
mandatory. These should be only the most fundamental rules, protecting a particular state
interest within the legal system, disregarding which cannot be justified by applying the foreign
law. Although the above definition does not present all the particularities of the overriding
mandatory rules in different legal systems and does not reflect all the doctrinal discussion, 
it presents their core meaning.
2 Duty or Possibility to Apply the Overriding Mandatory Norms
The existence and legitimacy of overriding mandatory rules are confirmed by the provisions
of conventions, EU regulations, and national conflict-of-laws rules referring to ‘mandatory
rules’, ‘peremptory norms’19, ‘self-limiting rules’ or ‘rules of immediate application’20. For
instance, Article 1.11 of the Lithuanian PIL stipulates that: ‘[…] 2. Mandatory provisions of
laws of the Republic of Lithuania or those of any other state most closely related to a dispute
shall be applicable, although another foreign law has been agreed upon by the parties. In
deciding on these issues, the court shall take into consideration the nature of these provisions,
their purpose, and the consequences of application or non-application thereof […]’. Therefore,
the overriding mandatory provisions of the lex fori and the other, closely connected, state
apply.21 Similarly, Article 8 of the Polish PIL provides that the provisions of the national or the
foreign law that is closely connected with the case should apply if it follows that those
provisions should be applicable irrespective of the law governing the given relationships. In
deciding whether to apply such provisions, a relevant authority should consider their nature
and purposes, and the consequences of their application or non-application.
An important question is whether the courts are obliged to apply the overriding
mandatory rules or shall only consider their application. This is a particularly important issue
considering foreign overriding mandatory rules: to what extent shall they be considered?
Application of the national overriding mandatory provisions does not raise serious doubts,22
whereas application of foreign rules might be considered but there is no strict duty to apply
them.23
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20 Friedrich K. Juenger, ‘General Course on Private International Law (1983)’ Vol 193. (Martinus Nijhoff 1985);
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European private international law (Wolters Kluwer 2016, Alphen aan den Rijn 116–129) 122.
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Sometimes the answer to the question lies in the relevant provisions. For instance, the In
the Article 1.11 of the Civil Code Lithuanian legislator uses the expression ‘shall be applied’,
which implies mandatory application. However, further in the same article, the legislator gives
room for the considerations of the court. Following the case-law, it can be stated that the
second sentence refers to determining whether the rule is an overriding mandatory provision.
Subsequently, once the court determined that the rule is an overriding mandatory provision, it
shall be applied. Moreover, an expression ‘foreign law has been agreed upon by the parties’
needs to be further elaborated. A formulation of the given expression could suppose that the
rule applies only if the parties have chosen a foreign law. However, the established case-law
leads to the conclusion that this rule also applies if the applicable law is determined according
to a conflict-of-law rule. In other words, this rule applies whenever the court has to apply
foreign law.24 Similar conclusions can be drawn from the wording of Article 9 of the Rome I
Regulation,25 which provides that nothing precludes the application of national overriding
mandatory provisions, and the effect may be given for other countries’ overriding mandatory
provisions.
It seems, however, that even national overriding mandatory rules will not have an absolute
character. Whenever lex causae gives the same or greater protection than national overriding
mandatory norms, their application would not be justified.26
It remains an open question whether to apply the overriding mandatory rules if the case
falls within the scope of a regulation or convention that does not provide for overriding
mandatory provisions. There might be two ways to approach this question. First, it is possible
to assume that the international or the European legislator consciously omitted these
provisions. Therefore, nothing shall preclude the application of lex causae. Second, it still can
be argued that, given the particular significance of the interest that those provisions protect,
nothing shall preclude applying them. For instance, the latter approach was taken by
Lithuanian courts in maintenance cases; although neither the Hague Protocol of 200727 nor
the Hague Convention of 197328 provided for overriding mandatory provisions, the courts
applied them.29
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24 Judgment of the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Lithuania of 21 April 2011, Civil case No 2-703/2011.
25 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable
to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ [2008] L177/6.
26 Bogdan (n 4) 186.
27 Protocol on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations opened for signature 23 November 2007, 2956 UNTS
(entered into force 1 August 2013).
28 Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations opened for signature 2 October 1973, 1056 UNTS
199 (entered into force 1 October 1977).
29 This issue will be elaborated in the analysis of the following parts of the paper.
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II Overriding Mandatory Rules Related to Matrimonial Relations
1 Overriding Mandatory Provisions Related to the Conclusion of Marriage
Determination of the law applicable to the conclusion of marriage is left to national private
international laws. Neither international conventions30 nor the EU regulations address this
issue, and so it is necessary to refer to the national laws in this regard. Both Lithuanian31 and
Polish PIL32 provide special rules related to the conclusion of a marriage. Traditionally, these
are rules related to the capacity to marry and the form of marriage. Lithuanian law provides
that matrimonial capacity is governed by Lithuanian law (Article 1.25 of the Civil Code).
However, in respect of foreign citizens and stateless persons without Lithuanian domicile,
matrimonial capacity and other marriage conditions may be determined by the lex domicili
of both persons intending to marry, provided such marriage is recognised in the state of
domicile of either of them. Polish law provides that capacity to marry shall be governed by the
lex patriae of each person intending to marry (Article 48 of the Polish PIL). Both countries
have signed several bilateral agreements on cooperation in civil matters; however, conflict-of-
law rules related to marital conditions do not differ much from those established in national
laws.33
Both Lithuanian and Polish laws provide that the form of the marriage should be governed
by the law of the state where the marriage has been concluded. However, it is sufficient if the
form of marriage complies with the requirements of the law of the state of nationality or
habitual residence of both spouses according to Polish law, and either of the spouses according
to Lithuanian law.
The list of conditions for or impediments to marriage is similar across the world. They
relate to the minimum age of the future spouses, voluntariness, affinity, or consanguinity of
the persons intending to marry and not being married.34 Not long ago, the future spouses’
different gender was quite a common precondition for marriage. However, lately and increasingly
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • KATAŽYNA BOGDZEVIČ
n 56
30 The New York Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages
of 7 November 1962 does not provide any standards regarding marital conditions; however, it obliges its
signatories to provide a minimum marital age as well as to adopt provisions foreseeing entrance into marriage with
the full and free consent of both parties, and to regulate the registration of marriages. However, the Convention
leaves a broad margin of flexibility for the contracting states in this regard.
31 The main act regulating private international law in Lithuania (hereinafter Lithuanian PIL) is the Civil Code of
2000 Lietuvos Respublikos Civilinis kodeksas (The Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania), Valstybės žinios, 6
September 2000, Nr. 74-2262, VIII-1864.
32 The main act regulating private international law in Poland (hereinafter Polish PIL) is the Act on Private
International Law of 2011 Ustawa z 4.2.2011 r. Prawo prywatne międzynarodowe), Dz.U. Nr 80, poz. 43.
33 For instance, Article 25 of the Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Lithuania
regarding legal assistance and legal relationships in civil, family, employment and criminal cases from 23 January
1993 provides that capacity to marry is governed by the national law of each person intending to marry. The form
of the conclusion of marriage shall comply with the law of the state where the marriage is concluded.
34 For instance, Articles 3.12-3.17 of the Lithuanian Civil Code.
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often, gender-neutral marriages are allowed, and yet, since marriage is closely connected to
the traditions of a particular state or religion, it is impossible to provide a general list of
mandatory provisions related to the conclusion of a marriage. The understanding of marital
conditions could significantly vary from state to state, and only in some cases could conditions
for or impediments to marriage be considered as mandatory provisions. However, this
primarily requires an analysis of the national laws and the significance of particular rules
therein.
A particularly good example could be issues related to the minimum age of the future
spouses. It has been widely recognised that child marriages are harmful and discriminatory.35
Some countries have adopted strict measures prohibiting such marriages. For instance, Article
13 (3) of the EGBGB36 in Germany provides a prohibition to marry for a person under the age
of 16, irrespective of the applicable law. Therefore, the rules related to age can be considered
as mandatory provisions.
In other countries, like Poland and Lithuania, although an age limit exists it is not given
such importance as in Germany. In both countries, the minimum marital age is 18; however,
due to particular circumstances, the age can be lowered by the court. In Poland, the minimum
age upon the decision of the court can be 16 years, in Lithuania 15 years old.37 It is notable
that, in this case, other countries, as in Lithuania or Poland, could consider applying the
German rule if the case is closely connected to Germany.
Both in Lithuania and Poland, the gender aspect is of particular importance. Article 3.12
of the Lithuanian Civil Code provides that marriage can be concluded only by persons of the
opposite gender. This rule has to be interpreted in conjunction with Article 38 of the
Lithuanian Constitution,38 which stipulates that marriage shall be concluded upon the free
mutual consent of a man and a woman. The Constitutional Court of Lithuania holds that the
Lithuanian Civil Registry cannot register any different kind of marriage.39 The situation is
similar in Poland, where the gender of spouses is a question of particular sensitivity. The
Polish Constitution40 in Article 18 provides that ‘marriage, being a union of a man and
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35 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and Committee on the Rights of the Child.
2014 ‘Joint general recommendation/general comment No. 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women and No. 18 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on harmful practices’
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36 Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 21. September 1994
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37 See, accordingly: Article 10 of the Polish Family and Guardianship Code from 1964 and Article 3.14 of the
Lithuanian Civil Code.
38 Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucija įsigaliojo 1992 m. lapkričio 2 d. skelbta: Lietuvos Aidas, 1992, Nr. 220 (1992-11-
10); Valstybės Žinios, 1992, Nr. 33-1014 (1992-11-30) (the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania from 25
October 1992).
39 Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 11 January 2019.
40 Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 2.4.1997 r., Dz.U. z 1997 Nr 78, poz. 483 ze zm. (The Constitution of the
Republic of Poland from 2 April 1997).
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a woman, […] shall be placed under the protection and care of the Republic of Poland’. The
Polish Family and Guardianship Code remain in line with the Constitution, since Article 1§1
of the Code provides that ‘a marriage is concluded when a man and woman simultaneously
present make a  declaration to the civil registrar that they are entering into a  marriage
relationship’. Representatives of the Polish legal doctrine are strict in their considerations
regarding the meaning of Article 18 of the Constitution,41 explaining that marriage is possible
only between persons of different genders. Lately, the Polish Constitutional Court was asked
to assess the compatibility of the Article 1§1 of the Polish Family and Guardianship Code
with Article 47 in conjunction with Articles 31(3), 32 and 30 of the Constitution.42 The
question at stake relates to the impossibility of same-sex persons to conclude a marriage in
Poland. Therefore, both in Poland and Lithuania, irrespective of the law governing marital
conditions, the rules providing that marriage can be concluded only between persons of
a different gender could be regarded as mandatory provisions.
In conclusion, overriding mandatory provisions related to the conclusion of marriage
could stem either from well-established international standards, such as minimum age
requirements, or national standards. In the latter case, those standards should be of
fundamental importance for the national legal system.
2 Overriding Mandatory Provisions Related to the Dissolution of Marriage
Unlike in the conclusion of marriage, the variety of legal sources related to the law applicable
to the dissolution of marriage is wider. Along with national laws, there is a Rome III Regulation,43
which applies in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation. However, the
Regulation applies only in those Member States that agreed upon enhanced cooperation. The
other countries can join enhanced cooperation at any time. Lithuania, which did not initially
participate in enhanced cooperation, joined its application in 2012. Poland still does not apply
the Rome III Regulation.
The Rome III Regulation does not provide for the possibility to apply overriding mandatory
rules. Therefore, it remains unclear whether the state still can apply national mandatory rules
related to divorce if the main legal act in terms of determining the applicable law is the Rome
III Regulation. It can be argued that, in a situation where the regulation has to be applied, it
shall be applied in its entirety. This means that a lack of possibility to apply mandatory rules
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41 See, Andrzej Mączyński, ‘Konstytucyjne podstawy prawa rodzinnego’ in Włodzimierz Wróbel, Piotr Kardas,
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43 Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area
of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation, OJ [2010] L343/10.
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on the grounds of the Regulation does not imply a possibility to apply those rules based on
national law. If the EU legislator had wished to provide for a possibility to apply the mandatory
rule, the relevant provisions would have been added to the Regulation, as it was in the case
of other EU regulations.44 It has to be recognised that the possibility to apply overriding
mandatory rules would undermine the already narrow choice of law in divorce cases.45 In
conclusion, states that participate in enhanced cooperation in the area of applicable law in
divorce matters should not apply any mandatory rules, since the Regulation does not foresee
such a possibility.
In non-participating countries such as Poland, overriding mandatory rules can also be
applied in a divorce case if national laws provide so. In Poland, the main conflict-of-law rule
related to divorce is established in Article 54 of the Polish PIL. The law does not provide
separate provisions regarding the application of the overriding mandatory rules in family
cases, and the general rule of Article 8 of the Polish PIL therefore applies. However, neither
the doctrine nor the case-law gives an answer as to which national divorce rules are
mandatory. The Polish Supreme Court had an opportunity to elaborate on that issue when it
was considering whether Article 57 (decision on the party at fault) of the Polish Family and
Guardianship Code is a mandatory rule.46 The explanation of the court clarifies that this rule
belongs to the lex fori processualis, not substantive law. However, it applies only if the
applicable law entails substantive legal effects with the decision on fault. The Court stated
that the provision mentioned above is not an overriding mandatory one.
3 Property and Personal Relations between Spouses
International society faces difficulties in adopting uniform conflict-of-law rules in matrimonial
property matters. Nevertheless, states have been striving to accomplish this goal for over
a century. For instance, two conventions could be mentioned within the works of The Hague
Conference on Private International Law. The Convention of 17 July 1905 on the conflict of
law relating to the effects of marriage on the personal relations between spouses and their
matrimonial property relations was ratified by nine countries47 and later renounced by six of
them and Convention of 14 March 1978 on the law applicable to matrimonial property
regimes, which was ratified by only three countries.48 The latter does not provide for
overriding mandatory provisions. The EU Matrimonial Property Regulation49 was adopted
OVERRIDING MANDATORY PROVISIONS IN FAMILY LAW AND NAMES n
59 n
44 See, for instance, Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation.
45 Anna Sapota, Wybór prawa w międzynarodowym prawie rodzinnym (Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck 2016, Warszawa)
267.
46 Judgement of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland from 26 March 2016, Case No III CZP 112/15.
47 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, The United Kingdom, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Sweden.
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within the enhanced cooperation scheme, thus applicable only in participating member
states.50 Therefore, in other cases, the law governing matrimonial property regimes will be
determined according to national laws. Neither relevant international conventions51 nor EU
regulations regulate conflict-of-laws issues in matters of personal relations between spouses;
therefore it is left within the scope of application of national laws.
Article 30 of the EU Matrimonial Property Regulation allows the application of the
overriding mandatory provisions of the lex fori in exceptional cases. In the same article, it is
explained that mandatory provisions may be applied if the member state considers it as crucial
for safeguarding its public interest, such as its political, social, or economic organisation.
Those provisions can ‘are applicable to any situation falling within their scope irrespectively
of the law otherwise applicable to the matrimonial property regime’ pursuant the Regulation.
The preamble of the Regulation specifies that the concept of overriding mandatory provisions
shall cover the rules of an imperative nature, such as rules protecting the family home. Given
the exceptional nature of those rules, their application requires strict interpretation and the
implementation of the ‘compatibility’ test.52 For that reason, the authorities should verify
whether the rule is crucial for safeguarding the public interest and if its implementation is both
necessary and proportionate to the objective pursued. Significantly, and unlike the Rome I
Regulation, the Matrimonial Property Regulation does not allow the application of the over -
riding mandatory provisions of a state other than the state of the forum, which is considered
to be a weakness.53
The Regulation does not specify more precisely which rules could be overriding
mandatory provisions. The only guidance in this regard is recital 53 of the preamble, which
gives an example of rules protecting family homes. Clarification of which rules are crucial for
safeguarding the public interest is left for the member states. It can be argued whether the
member states participating in the application of the Regulation shall consider the well-
established case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding the overriding
mandatory provisions in contractual and non-contractual matters. Given that the wording
of Article 30 reiterates the wording of Article 9 (1)(2) of the Rome I Regulation, they should
be interpreted similarly. Furthermore, a similar interpretation, based on the case-law of the
CJEU, would allow coherence in the interpretation of overriding mandatory provisions within
European private international law to be maintained.
The CJEU elaborated on the overriding mandatory rules on several occasions. General
guidelines regarding the application of overriding mandatory provisions can be learned from
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50 On 25 March 2020 there were 18 EU countries: Sweden, Belgium, Greece, Croatia, Slovenia, Spain, France,
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52 Sandrine Clavel, Fabienne Jault, ‘Public Interest Considerations – Changes in Continuity’ (2017/2018) Vol. XIX
Yearbook of Private International Law 235, 241.
53 Ibid, 246.
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such cases as Ingmar,54 Unamar,55 Nikiforidis,56 and da Silva Martins57. For instance, in
Unamar, the CJEU held that mandatory rules are not exempt from compliance with EU law,
since the uniformity of application of the latter would otherwise be undermined.58 It is worth
recalling that, in Unamar, the CJEU does not distinguish a ‘public’ from a ‘private’ interest rule;
it requires an assessment of whether the national legislator ‘adopted it in order to protect an
interest judged to be essential by the Member State concerned’59. The CJEU presented the
same line of argumentation in da Silva Martins.60 This is particularly important in family cases,
since there will often be a significant interest at stake, although not necessarily a purely public
interest. In Nikiforidis, the CJEU stated that the courts are not permitted to apply overriding
mandatory provisions of the legal systems other than those that are expressly referred to in the
Regulation, since this could jeopardise the full achievement of its general goal, which is legal
certainty.61 The interpretation presented by the Court regarding the Rome I Regulation remains
equally relevant for the application of the EU Matrimonial Property Regulation: since one of
its objectives is ‘to provide married couples with legal certainty as to their property and offer
them a degree of predictability, all the rules applicable to matrimonial property regimes should
be covered in a single instrument’62.
In da Silva Martins, the Court emphasises that in order to assess whether the national rule
is an overriding mandatory rule, a national court is required to perform a ‘detailed analysis of
the wording, general scheme, objectives and the context in which that provision was adopted,
that it is of such importance in the national legal order that it justifies a departure from the
applicable law’63. In the same ruling, the Court also pointed out that a national court, while
determining if a national rule has to be applied irrespective of the law applicable otherwise,
also has to consider the scope of application of the generally applicable law.64 The application
of a national rule instead of the one belonging to a generally applicable law governing the
relationship, despite the scope of applicable law prescribed by the Regulation, requires particu -
larly important reasons. Article 27 of the EU Matrimonial Property Regulation enshrines the
scope of application of the applicable law determined according to the given Regulation.
However, the list of matters prescribed in Article 27 is not exhaustive. Notably, regardless of
whether the matter is listed in Article 27 or not, the national court is required to justify the
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55 C-184/12, United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v Navigation Maritime Bulgare, ECLI:EU:C:2013:663.
56 Case C-135/15, Hellenic Republic v Grigorios Nikiforidis, ECLI:EU:C:2016:774.
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58 Case C-184/12, United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v Navigation Maritime Bulgare, ECLI:EU:
C:2013:663, para 46.
59 Case C-184/12, United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v Navigation Maritime Bulgare, ECLI:EU:
C:2013:663, para 50.
60 Case C-149/18, Agostinho da Silva Martins v Dekra Claims Services Portugal SA, ECLI:EU:C:2019:84, Rec. 30.
61 Case C-135/15, Hellenic Republic v Grigorios Nikiforidis, ECLI:EU:C:2016:774, para 46.
62 The EU Matrimonial Property Regulation, Rec. 15.
63 Case C-149/18, Agostinho da Silva Martins v Dekra Claims Services Portugal SA, ECLI:EU:C:2019:84, para 31.
64 Ibid, para 33.
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application of national overriding mandatory rules; however, once the matter is listed, this
justification has to be substantive.
However, member states that do not participate in the EU Matrimonial Property
Regulation, as well as all states in cases related to personal matters between the spouses, may
be more flexible in the application of overriding mandatory provisions. Moreover, if the
national law allows, the authorities can also apply foreign overriding mandatory provisions
but, given the exceptional nature of the overriding mandatory rules, they should not be used
as a mere justification for the application of the lex fori, and the courts should provide
a thorough justification for the derogation from the application of the national law governing
personal or property relations between spouses.
It is for the national court to decide whether a particular provision pursues an aim of
fundamental importance to the state. Neither Lithuanian nor Polish case-law provides much
clarification as to which national rules related to matrimonial matters can be considered as
overriding mandatory provisions. However, some authors provide valuable examples in this
regard. For instance, these could be the provisions protecting the right of the surviving spouse
to live in the house used as the family home.65 According to Polish law, rules related to mutual
assistance and cooperation in ensuring the welfare of the family by spouses during the
marriage66 are applicable irrespective of the matrimonial property regime.67 During drafting
the EU Matrimonial Property Regulation, Italy presented comments on overriding mandatory
provisions and identified several examples of possible national provisions that could be
considered internationally mandatory. Those were the rules related to mutual assistance and
maintenance obligations of spouses during the marriage; moreover, obligations in the event
of divorce (or separation), where the other spouse has no means of subsistence and was not
at fault for the divorce.68 In conclusion, as overriding mandatory rules related to matrimonial
relations can be considered those not only of importance to the persons concerned but also
representing some fundamental values of society, which are important to general public order
and hence also constitute the public interest.
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65 Maria Anna Zachariasiewicz, ‘O potrzebie wskazania w nowej ustawie o prawie prywatnym międzynarodowym
podstawy stosowania przepisów wymuszających swoje zastosowanie’ (2010) 7 Problemy Prawa Prywatnego
Międzynarodowego 40. The same example is given in the para 53 of the preamble of the EU Matrimonial Property
Regulation.
66 Articles 23, 27–29 of the Polish Family and Guardianship Code.
67 Sylwia Jastrzemska, ‘Małżeńskie ustroje majątkowe’ in Hanna Bzdak (ed), Zbiór orzeczeń z zakresu prawa
rodzinnego i opiekuńczego wraz z komentarzami Wybrane zagadnienia (Krajowa Szkoła Sądownictwa i Prokuratury
2015, Krakow 103–202) 110.
68 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions
regarding the property consequences of registered partnerships – Comments from the Italian delegation on
overriding mandatory provisions, Brussels, 14 November 2012, 16188/12.
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III Parental Responsibility Issues, Maintenance, 
and Protection of Adults
1 Parental Responsibility
The protection of children is usually a core objective of family law; therefore, it is not
surprising that, in some instances, national laws contain provisions pursuing an objective of
protecting the interests of the child that are applicable regardless of lex causae. The ground
for the application of overriding mandatory provisions can mainly be found in national
private international laws. The concept of overriding mandatory rules is unknown to the
Hague conventions. Neither the Hague Abduction Convention69 nor the Hague Child
Protection Convention,70 nor the Hague Protocol71 provide for a possibility to derogate from
the applicable law on the basis of overriding mandatory provisions. Therefore, whether it is
possible to apply national general private international law rules (for instance, related to
overriding mandatory provisions) if the Convention does not provide for is an open question.
The Hague Child Protection Convention is a comprehensive72 legal act covering matters
related to the protection of children. Consequently, a national authority should consider its
application primarily due to the priority of international legal acts over national laws. The
Convention does not ignore the general part of private international rules entirely. It includes
the rules on ordre public (Article 22) and renvoi (Article 21). However, according to the
explanatory report to the Convention, the possibility of applying overriding mandatory
provisions is not entirely excluded.73 Although the Convention does not provide for rules
allowing the application of overriding mandatory rules, they could potentially be applied
under national provisions. Since a simultaneous application of the different legal acts in the
same matter can complicate more already complicated international cases, it has to be justified
by the best interest of the child. As an example of rules requiring their application irrespective
of the law otherwise applicable may be provisions prohibiting psychological or physical
violence against the child. For instance, the Lithuanian Framework Law on the protection of
the rights of the child74 provides that it has priority over any other Lithuanian law, except
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69 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction signed 25 October 1980, 1343 UNTS 89 (entered
into force 1 December 1983).
70 Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement, and Cooperation in Respect of Parental
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children signed 19 October 1996, UNTS I-31922 (entered into
force 1 January 2002).
71 Protocol on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations (n 27).
72 Comprehensive is understood as covering all main issues like jurisdiction, applicable law, and recognition of
judgments.
73 Paul Lagarde, ‘Explanatory Report on the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention’ provisional edition (The Hague,
Permanent Bureau of the Conference 1997) 575.
74 Lietuvos Respublikos vaiko teisių apsaugos pagrindų įstatymas (Framework Law on the protection of the right of
the child of the Republic of Lithuania), Valstybės žinios, 1996-04-12, Nr. 33-807.
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international conventions and relevant European Union law. In other words, this law provides
the basis of child protection in Lithuania. In many cases, the law reiterates the provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the rights of the child, which sets minimum standards in terms
of child protection.75
Nevertheless, some provisions of the national law are stricter than those of the Convention.
For instance, the law defines violence against the child and forbids any kind of violence or
physical punishment against the child, even those that can be considered mild. Since the
understanding of the acceptable means of raising a child differs in particular countries and
cultures, it can raise tensions in the case of migrant families.
Various parental responsibility matters are excluded from the application of international
conventions. These, include establishing or contesting a parent-child relationship and the
names of the children. Name-related issues are often omitted within the international legal
framework, or the instruments have very limited applicability and so these issues, irrespective
of whether they concern children or adults, will be addressed in the next part of this paper.
The best interest of the child is one of the main objectives of both the international and
national legal frameworks. This is reflected in both substantive law and private international
law. For instance, Article 1.31 of the Lithuanian Civil Code provides several alternative
connecting factors for the determination of the law governing the establishment of the origin
of the child; however, it obliges the court to apply the most beneficial for the child. With
regard to determining the origin of the child, recent issues regarding surrogacy arrangements
and the paternity and the maternity of the intending parents raise many discussions. In many
instances, rules prohibiting surrogacy arrangements could be considered as overriding
mandatory rules that apply irrespective of the law otherwise applicable.76 However, despite
the controversies surrounding surrogacy arrangements and their effects, their inclusion in
over riding mandatory provisions requires a  thorough assessment of their purpose and
function, and the effects of their application, particularly towards the interest of the child. It
has to be kept in mind that non-recognition of the paternity and maternity of the intending
parents can lead to the uncertain situation of the child, since it would affect the nationality and
responsibility for taking care of the child, and other legal and practical issues.
The other provisions within the parent-child relationships that could be considered
overriding mandatory provisions are those related to the duty of maintenance of the child
regarding both parents. On several occasions, the Lithuanian Supreme Court held in
international maintenance cases that Article 3.194 of the Lithuanian Civil code regarding
maintenance orders is an overriding mandatory provision.77 Article 3.194 § 3 provides that the
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75 Convention on the Rights of the Child opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force
2 September 1990).
76 Piotr Rodziewicz, ‘International surrogacy – conflict-of-laws and procedural issues of judicial cooperation in civil
matters’ in Piotr Mostowik (ed), Fundamental legal problems of surrogate motherhood. Global perspective
(Wydawnictwo Instytutu Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości 2019, Warsaw 899–934) 926.
77 The ruling of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 23 January 2007, Civil case No 3K-7-130/2007.
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court shall issue an order for maintenance until the child reaches the age of majority. Notably,
the amount of maintenance for the child must be proportionate to the parent’s financial
situation. Parental wealth must be assessed based on all the facts: parents’ income, movable
and immovable property, investments, health, dependency, and the willingness of parents to
earn and to maintain their children. Since the obligation of parents to provide maintenance
to their child is imperative; any failure to do so cannot be justified by the minimum income
they receive or by their careless or dishonest behaviour. The case-law of the Supreme Court
recognises that, in determining the financial situation of a parent, it is not only his or her
property and income that is to be assessed, but also the steps he or she has taken in order to
receive income.78
2 Adoption
International adoption is a problematic matter, often requiring the simultaneous application
of several applicable laws. The main reason for that is the protection of the best interest of the
child, since international adoption often means a change of the habitual residence and even
the nationality of the child. It is therefore crucial to ensure compliance with different laws that
are closely related to the case. For instance, Articles 57–58 of the Polish PIL provide that the
national law of the adoptive parent governs the adoption,79 however, the adoption cannot
take place without assessing the rules of the national law of the adoptee, concerning his and
his legal representative’s consent to the adoption, and the permission of the competent state
authority in this regard, as well as restrictions related to the change of residence of the adoptee.
Lithuanian conflict-of-law rules are constructed differently. The main connecting factor in
determining applicable law is the domicile of the adoptee. However, if it becomes evident that
the adoption performed according to legem domicili of the adoptee will not be recognised in the
state of the domicile or citizenship of the adopters, the adoption may be performed according
to the law of the state of domicile or citizenship of the adoptive parents. Nevertheless, the
latter should comply with the best interests of the child. If the recognition of adoption remains
uncertain, adoption shall not be allowed. The court therefore has to assess several laws in
order to ensure that the adoption is recognised. All of these laws could differ in terms of
adoption. However, only some provisions can be considered overriding mandatory provisions.
Polish authors argue whether provisions regarding the obligation to hear the child can be
considered overriding provisions.80 However, neither of the opinions is supported by the case-
law.
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78 The ruling of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 3 February 2016, Civil case No 3K-3-16-706/2016.
79 In the case of a joint adoption by the spouses, the law of their common nationality applies, if they do not have
common nationality then the law of the state where they are permanently resident or, failing that, the law of their
common habitual residence or, failing that, another law closely connected to the spouses.
80 Bernadetta Fuchs, ‘Przepisy wymuszające swoje zastosowanie w nowej ustawie – Prawo prywatne
międzynarodowe’ in Jerzy Poczobut (ed), Współczesne wyzwania prawa prywatnego międzynarodowego (Wolters
Kluwer Polska 2013, Warsaw 69–81) 77–78; Bogusława Gnela, ‘Przysposobienie’ in Jerzy Poczobut (ed), Prawo
prywatne międzynarodowe. Komentarz (Wolters Kluwer Polska 2017, Warszawa 879–914) 893.
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National substantive law rules can be considered as overridingly mandatory insofar as
they provide for specialised requirements concerning international adoption. For instance, the
Lithuanian Civil Code sets additional requirements for adoptive parents who are foreign
citizens. The most important condition, the one from which the court cannot derogate, is
that foreign citizens can only adopt a child in Lithuania if, for six months following the
registration of the child in the list of children offered for adoption, no application has been
received from Lithuanian citizens to adopt the child or place the child under guardianship.
The court can derogate from the other provisions, hence they are neither imperative in
domestic cases nor in those with an international dimension.
3 Protection of Adults
Finally, considerations regarding overriding mandatory provisions should not omit other
vulnerable groups. The newest Adult Protection Convention,81 unlike the earlier Hague conven -
tions, also introduces the possibility to apply overriding mandatory provisions. Article 20
stipulates that if the law of the state in which the adult is to be protected has provisions that are
mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable, the Convention does not prevent their
application. The Convention introduces even further protection of the state’s right to apply its
mandatory provisions, providing for the non-recognition of a measure contrary to a mandatory
law of the state concerned. According to the explanatory report accompanying the Convention,
it was primarily the medical field that was in mind while constructing those provisions.82 National
laws can require, for instance, a special representation of the adult person in medical matters,
particularly if the adult person has to be placed in a psychiatric hospital or geriatric clinic.
IV Names
The question of given and family names is always a very sensitive issue. It is at the threshold
of traditions, religion, history, language and, finally, law. To have a name means to be someone
in society. This is why states seem to be attached to the national rules regarding names and
not willing to cooperate in this field. For many years, the International Commission on Civil
Status attempted to have unified rules on different matters regarding names, and civil status
in general, adopted. Some of the conventions, for instance, its 16th Convention,83 were quite
successful, others not.84 A unification of at least some issues related to family names in the EU
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81 Convention on the International Protection of Adults signed 13 January 2000, 2600 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1
January 2009).
82 Paul Lagarde, ‘Explanatory Report on the 2000 Hague Protection of Adults Convention’ (Hague Conference on
Private International Law 2017, The Hague) 77.
83 Convention on the issue of plurilingual extracts from civil status records, signed 8 September 1976, 1327 UNTS 3
(entered into force 30 July 1983).
84 See, for instance,  or Convention on the recognition of surnames signed 16 September 2005 (not yet in force).
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is also missing. Since the Green paper ‘Less bureaucracy for citizens: promoting free movement
of public documents and recognition of the effects of civil status records’85 the Commission’s
work has not progressed, and so national private international laws continue to apply
regarding the determination of the law applicable to names.
It could seem that the states are so reluctant to adopt any unified measures related to
names because they consider all their provisions in this regard mandatory. However, due to
globalisation and intense migration, states face challenges in protecting the inviolability of
applying national name laws. Consequently, national conflict-of-law rules can lead to the
application of foreign law and only some national rules, the overriding mandatory rules, will
continue to apply. As an example of such rules can be Turkish rules on the names of the
spouses. Pursuant to Turkish law, the husband is not allowed to acquire his wife’s family name,
and accordingly, the wife cannot stay solely with her maiden name; she has to either change
her name to her husband’s name or add it to her current name.86
For a long time, rules regarding the spelling of the names of Lithuanian citizens were
considered overriding mandatory provisions in Lithuania. According to the Lithuanian law,
the names of the Lithuanian citizens in the personal identification documents must be spelled
in accordance with the Lithuanian language rules, regardless of the law otherwise applicable
or the fact that the family name was acquired abroad.87 This was a consequence of the strict
language policy pursued after the restoration of independence in 1990. The Lithuanian
language became a constitutional value, and the application of foreign law could not diminish
this status. For instance, in one of its rulings, the Supreme Court refused to allow the law of
the United States of America to be applied, 88 as it would allow name of a Lithuanian citizen
to be written in violation of Lithuanian law.89 An interesting issue is that the court considers
Lithuanian rules as both part of the public policy and overriding mandatory rules. Such
a conclusion is justified by the fact those rules were applied irrespective of the law otherwise
applicable, and at the same time, they constitute the ground for refusing to recognise names
acquired abroad. However, in the newer case-law, courts no longer follow this reasoning, and
therefore it is not justified to consider the provisions mentioned above as overriding
mandatory provisions.
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85 Green paper ‘Less bureaucracy for citizens: promoting free movement of public documents and recognition of
the effects of civil status records’, Brussels, 14.12.2010, COM (2010) 747 final.
86 Zeynep Derya Tarman, Başak Başoğlu, ‘Surname and the law applicable to surname under Turkish law’ in Mirko
Živković (ed), 4th Balkan Conference. Conference Proceedings: Personal Name in Internal Law and Private
International Law (University of Niš 2016, Niš, 47–70) 50–51.
87 Lietuvos Respublikos asmens tapatybės kortelės įstatymas (Law concerning identity cards) Valstybės žinios, 2001-
11-21, Nr. 97-3417, and Lietuvos Respublikos paso įstatymas (Law concerning passports) Valstybės žinios,
2001-11-28, Nr. 99-3524, and Nutarimas dėl vardų ir pavardžių rašymo Lietuvos Respublika piliečio pase (Decree
concerning the writing of surnames and forenames in passports of citizens of the Republic of Lithuania) Lietuvos
aidas, 1991-02-06, Nr. 26-0 provide that information set out on identity cards and in passports must be entered
according to Lithuanian orthography.
88 The question of a possible application of Nevada state law was at stake.
89 Ruling of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 8 June 2006, Civil Case No 3K-7-20/2006.
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Conclusions
A brief analysis of the overriding mandatory provisions in family matters and names allows
several conclusions to be drawn. In many instances, family and personal matters are left
outside the scope of application of the international and European legal instruments. Issues
such as the conclusion of marriage, personal relations between spouses, establishment of the
origin of the child and finally names are left within the scope of application of national
conflict-of-law rules. Hence, the possibility of applying overriding mandatory provisions is
also subject to national conflict-of-law rules. The more questionable situation is when the
applicable law is determined according to an international convention or the EU regulation.
Sometimes the international or EU legal instrument does not foresee the provisions on
overriding mandatory rules. The question is whether a national court can apply relevant
national rules in this regard.
The analysis reveals that there can be drawn general guidelines concerning the rules that
can be considered as overriding mandatory provisions. However, the important rules in one
legal system do not have any relevance in another (for instance, rules regarding the different
gender of the spouses in Poland are important, and in Denmark are not; and those regarding
the change of the family name after marriage in Turkey and in Poland: one requires a woman
to change, the other leaves the decision to the spouses). It is therefore impossible to make
a list of overriding mandatory provisions in particular matters, although it can be stated that
overriding mandatory rules must be of particular importance for the state and cannot solely
protect private interests, although the latter are not unimportant.
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Introduction
When arbitral tribunals have to decide whether to apply or give effect to certain mandatory
rules, they often face serious challenges. First of all, they are likely to receive no, or only very
limited, guidance under the governing arbitration law,2 the relevant institutional arbitration
rules (if any),3 and any domestic choice-of-law rules that they may consider relevant.4 Second,
they may be called upon to ponder over basic theoretical questions such as the role of
arbitrators (must arbitrators seek to defend certain state or public interests and, if so, which
ones?) and the legal significance of the place of arbitration (including the ‘classic’ question of
whether, or to what extent, arbitrators can be regarded as having a forum).
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1 Two clarifications need to be made with regard to the meaning of the term ‘mandatory rules’ (or ‘mandatory
norms’) used in this article. First, this article only deals with the application of mandatory substantive rules, i.e. it
is not concerned with the application of mandatory procedural rules (an issue that is far less controversial than the
one discussed in this contribution). Second, unless the opposite is expressly stated, the terms ‘mandatory rules’ 
or ‘mandatory norms’ must be understood as referring to ‘international’ or ‘overriding’ mandatory norms, not to
‘domestic’ mandatory norms. For an explanation of this distinction, see s I(3).
2 There does not appear to be a single arbitration statute that contains provisions addressing the application of
mandatory rules by arbitral tribunals. For illustrative examples of legislation that is silent on this question, see, for
example, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration art 28, English Arbitration Act s 46,
Swiss Private International Law Statute art 187 and French Code of Civil Procedure art 1511.
3 The rules of arbitration institutions are generally silent as regards the application of mandatory rules. See, for
example, ICC Rules art 21, LCIA Rules arts 22(3) and (4), ICDR Rules art 31, VIAC Rules art 24.
4 While domestic private international law statutes generally deal with the issue of the application of mandatory
rules, the relevant provisions are typically rather ambiguous, providing limited practical guidance to decision-
makers with regard to (a) the identification of mandatory rules and (b) the determination of whether a particular
mandatory rule is applicable or should be applied in a given case. See, for example, Swiss Private International Law
Statute art 19, which defines mandatory rules as those that reflect ‘interests that are legitimate and clearly
preponderant according to the Swiss conception of law’. It provides for the application of the mandatory rules of
the governing law and also allows for the application of the mandatory rules of a  ‘foreign law’ that is closely
connected to the case, provided that their application is appropriate in light of the aims pursued by such rules and
the consequences of their application. By any standard, art 19 fails to lay down simple and user-friendly rules
governing the application of mandatory norms.
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Another factor that complicates the legal analysis and, arguably, casts doubts on whether
the question asked (can/should arbitral tribunals apply mandatory rules and, if so, which
ones?) is at all appropriately framed pertains to the considerable heterogeneity of the rules that
are commonly considered as mandatory norms. Indeed, these rules range from general public
law norms, such as antitrust and currency exchange regulations, to decisions of the executive
branch of the government (e.g. trade sanctions) to private law norms, in particular those
aimed at the protection of weaker parties (consumers, workers, commercial agents etc.).5 One
might wonder whether it is a realistic aim to elaborate a single set of rules that would offer
sensible solutions for all these categories of mandatory norms.6
Despite the above-mentioned difficulties, scholarly commentators and arbitral tribunals
have reached some degree of consensus on a number of fundamental issues: 
a) arbitral tribunals can apply mandatory norms (i.e. that the applicability of such norms
does not render the relevant dispute non-arbitrable);7
b) arbitral tribunals should or even must apply such rules under certain circumstances;8
c) the mandatory rules of the lex contractus are, in principle always applicable;9
d) it is wise to apply the mandatory rules of the seat in the light of enforcement considerations10
and;
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5 See, for example, Adeline Chong, ‘The Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries in International
Contracts’ (2006) 2 Journal of Private International Law 27–70, 31 (mentioning that typical examples of
‘international’ mandatory rules notably include ‘rules concerning exchange regulations, antitrust laws, and import
and export prohibitions’, while observing that s 27(2) of the English Unfair Contract Terms Act also constitutes
such a mandatory norm. See also, with respect to the specific context of the 1980 Rome Convention, Council
Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations OJ [1980] C282/1 (the ‘Guiliano–
Lagarde report’). Commenting on Art. 7 of the Rome Convention – which deals with the application of mandatory
rules – the authors of the report mention ‘rules on cartels, competition and restrictive practices, consumer
protection and certain rules concerning carriage’ as examples of mandatory norms.
6 One argument presented in this article, namely the idea that one needs to distinguish between public and private
law mandatory norms (and that, as far as the lex contractus is concerned, only the mandatory rules of contract law
are per se applicable) suggests that the answer to this question is in the negative.
7 See, for example, Pierre Mayer, ‘Mandatory rules of law in international arbitration’ (1986) 2 Arbitration
International 274–293, 277 (observing that arbitrators have ‘nearly unanimously’ answered the question of the
arbitrability of disputes involving the application of mandatory rules in the affirmative); Marc Blessing, ‘Mandatory
Rules of Law versus Party Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1997) 14 (4) Journal of
International Arbitration, 23–40, 29–31 (focusing on Swiss arbitration law); Donald Francis Donovan, Alexander
K. A. Greenawalt, ‘Mitsubishi After Twenty Years: Mandatory Rules Before Courts and International Arbitrators’
in Loukas A. Mistelis, Julian David Mathew Lew (eds), Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration (Kluwer
Law International 2006, 11–60) (examining the arbitrability of antitrust disputes under US law).
8 See Mayer (n 7), 280–86; Constantin Calavros, ‘The application of substantive mandatory rules in International
Commercial Arbitration from the perspective of an EU UNCITRAL Model Law jurisdiction’ (2018) 34 Arbitration
International 219–240, 224 (apparently arguing that where the lex contractus is the law of the seat, the mandatory
rules of the lex contractus/seat must be applied).
9 See s I.B.
10 See s I.B. For example, Marcus Commandeur, Sebastian Gößling, ‘The determination of mandatory rules of law
in International Arbitration – An attempt to set out criteria’ (2014) 12 SchiedsVZ 12–20, 16 (observing that,
‘[g]iven the chance of vacating an award in its forum, mandatory rules are almost considered as a matter of fact 
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e) the mandatory rules of third countries (i.e. countries other than those of the lex contractus
and of the seat) may also, under certain circumstances (in particular, when there is a special
connection with the parties or the dispute), be applied.11
The purpose of this article is not to reiterate any of these points of agreement. Rather, it
is to contribute to the academic debate by addressing controversial or unresolved issues and
highlighting common misconceptions. Specifically, this study will discuss (a) the still
controversial question of whether arbitral tribunals called upon to apply certain mandatory
norms have to resort to the conflict norms of the seat, (b) the very widespread, but inaccurate,
view that arbitral tribunals necessarily have to apply the mandatory rules of the lex contractus,
and (c) the legal significance of the territorial scope of application of mandatory rules, an
issue frequently overlooked by commentators.12
This contribution is divided into four main sections. Section I provides a brief overview
of the relevant issues, describing the current state of the academic debate and arbitral case 
law. Section II argues that arbitral tribunals do not have to apply the conflict norms of the seat.
Section III shows that the scope of the lex contractus should be construed as covering only
rules of contract law and that only the mandatory rules of contract law of the lex contractus
are thus necessarily applicable. Section IV explains the legal significance of the territorial
scope of application of mandatory norms for the purposes of determining whether such
norms may or should be applied by arbitral tribunals.
I Overview of Issues
1 Application of Conflict Norms of the Seat
When an arbitral tribunal has to decide on the application of certain mandatory rules, it may
ask itself whether it must or should decide this issue on the basis of the conflict of laws
(choice-of-law) norms of the seat. The expression ‘conflict of laws norms of the seat’ (or
simply, ‘conflict norms of the seat’) refers to those conflict norms that the courts of the
relevant country are obliged to apply. For example, an arbitral tribunal seated in an EU
Member State may ask itself whether it has to apply the Rome I Regulation on the law
applicable to contractual obligations (which must be applied by EU courts) and, more
particularly, its Art. 9 dealing with the application of overriding mandatory norms.
THE APPLICATION OF MANDATORY RULES BY ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS n
71 n
by many tribunals’); Andrew Barraclough, Jeff Waincymer, ‘Mandatory Rules of Law in International Commercial
Arbitration’ (2005) 6 Melbourne Journal of International Law 205–244, 223–24 (‘Enforceability concerns should
therefore give mandatory rules of the seat a strong claim to be applied, at least insofar as they reflect the relevant
public policy’).
11 See Barraclough, Waincymer (n 10) 227–235 (arguing that arbitral tribunals possess discretion in determining
whether to apply the mandatory rules of third countries); Commandeur, Gößling (n 10) 16–17 (discussing the
application of the so-called ‘special-connection’ test).
12 See s I.C.
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Scholars generally provide a negative answer to this question. Gary Born, for example,
when discussing what he perceives as the ‘historic view that international arbitral tribunals
were mandatorily required to apply the arbitral seat’s choice-of-law rules’,13 observes that
‘virtually all developed jurisdictions have abandoned this approach’.14 A similar view is
expressed by other authoritative writers such as the authors of Redfern and Hunter on
International Arbitration15 and those of Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International
Commercial Arbitra tion.16 The present author has expressed an opinion that is largely
identical to such views.17
To a very large extent, arbitral case law confirms the view that arbitral tribunals do not
have to apply the choice-of-law norms of the seat. While there are of course arbitral tribunals
that have applied the conflict norms of the seat (which does not necessarily imply that they
considered themselves obliged to apply those rules), many arbitral tribunals have followed
different approaches. For example, a number of tribunals have chosen to apply the conflict
norms involved cumulatively, i.e. the conflict rules of the parties’ respective legal systems and,
at times, those of the seat.18 Other tribunals have resorted to what they perceive as general
principles of choice of law,19 again refusing to consider themselves bound by the seat’s conflict
norms.
However, the opposite view nevertheless remains alive. In the specific context of the
question of the application of mandatory rules, several authors either consider the conflict
norms of the seat to be necessarily applicable or advocate their application. Calavros, for
example, observing that the Rome I Regulation requires the application of the mandatory
rules of the forum, concludes that those mandatory rules must thus be applied by arbitral
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13 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2014) 2630.
14 Ibid 2631.
15 Nigel Blackaby and others, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (6th edn, Kluwer Law International,
Oxford University Press 2015) 222: ‘The seat of the arbitration is invariably chosen for reasons that have nothing
to do with the conflict rules of the law of the place of arbitration. This has led to the formulation of a doctrine that
has found support in both the rules of arbitral institutions and the practice of international arbitration – namely,
that, unlike the judge of a national court, an international arbitral tribunal is not bound to follow the conflict-of-
law rules of the country in which it has its seat.’
16 Emmanuel Gaillard, John Savage, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer
Law International 1999, The Hague – Boston – London) 867–868.
17 Markus Petsche, ‘Choice of Law in International Commercial Arbitration’ in Sai Ramani Garimella, Stellina Jolly
(eds) Private International Law – South Asian States’ Practice (Springer 2017, Singapore, 19–37) 21–26 (discussing
arbitral discretion in choice-of-law determinations and several approaches followed by arbitral tribunals in the
exercise of such discretion).
18 See, for example, Egyptian Company (buyer) v Yugoslav Company (seller) (Final Award, ICC Case No. 6281, 26
August 1989) (1990) 15 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 96, 97–98; Manufacturer v Distributor (Partial Award,
ICC Case No. 7319, 1992) (1999) 24 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 141, 145; Licensor and buyer v Manufac -
turer (Interim Award and Final Award, 17 July 1992 and 13 July 1993) (1997) 22 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration
197, 203. Evidently, such an approach is only feasible where the different conflict norms all refer to the same law.
19 See, for example, Indian Company v Pakistani Bank (Award, ICC Case No. 1512, 1971) (1976) 1 Yearbook Com -
mer cial Arbitration 128, 130; Seller v Buyer (Interim Award, ICC Case No. 6149, 1990) (1995) 20 Yearbook
Commercial Arbitration 41, 54.
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tribunals, ‘provided that the Rome I Regulation is effective in the State of the place of arbitra -
tion’.20 Even Born, who is otherwise critical of the idea that arbitral tribunals should be bound
by the conflict norms of the seat, argues that, when determining the applicability of mandatory
rules, arbitral tribunals ‘should presumptively apply the choice-of-law rules of the arbitral
seat’.21
In arbitral practice, it is not uncommon for arbitral tribunals to apply the conflict norms
of the seat. It is true that it is not always clear whether arbitral tribunals apply those rules
because they are the rules of the seat or for some other reason. However, in the absence of any
contrary indication, it is reasonable to consider that such determinations are based on the
assumption that arbitral tribunals must or should apply the choice-of-law rules of the seat.
Thus, decisions of arbitral tribunals seated in the Netherlands and Sweden applying Art. 7 of
the 1980 Rome Convention can be regarded as illustrative of this approach.22
2 Application of the Mandatory Rules of the Lex Contractus
The clearly predominant view in both scholarship and case law is that arbitral tribunals must
apply the mandatory rules of the lex contractus, i.e. of the law governing the contract. Neither
scholars, nor arbitral tribunals seem to have subjected this proposition to any restrictions
arising from (a) the specific choice-of-law norms that may be held to be applicable or (b) the
nature or type of the particular mandatory rule in question (in particular, no distinction is
made based on the public or private law nature of the relevant rule).
It can be assumed that this understanding originates, at least in part, from the language
used in the relevant provisions of domestic conflict of laws statutes, and the generally accepted
interpretation of those provisions. In Switzerland, for example, Art. 19(1) of the PILA provides
that ‘a mandatory provision of another law than the one referred to by this Act [i.e. in
contractual matters, the lex contractus] may be taken into consideration, provided that the
situation dealt with has a close connection with such other law’. Although this is not an
inevitable conclusion, this sentence may reasonably be understood as implying that the
mandatory provisions of the lex contractus are by definition applicable.
A very similar rule can be found in the 1980 Rome Convention. Art. 7 provides that ‘[w]hen
applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be given to the mandatory
rules of the law of another country with which the situation has a close connection…’ Like Art.
19(1) Swiss PILA, this provision can be understood as implying that the mandatory rules of
the lex contractus are necessarily applicable. Additional support for such an interpretation is
provided by the semi-official commentary to the Convention, the well-known Guiliano-
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20 Calavros (n 8) 225.
21 Born (n 13) 2707.
22 See Austrian Company (Seller) v Dutch Company (Buyer) (Award, 11 January 1982) (1983) 8 Yearbook Commercial
Arbitration 158, 160 (applying, without expressly referring to it, Art. 7 of the Rome Convention); Distributor (EU
country) v Manufacturer (EU country) (Final Award, SCC Case No. 158/2011) (2013) 38 Yearbook Commercial
Arbitration 253, 269–70.
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Lagarde report.23 In their commentary, the authors explain that Art. 7 of the Convention
reflects the established ‘principle that national courts can give effect under certain conditions
to mandatory provisions other than those applicable to the contract’,24 clearly suggesting that
the mandatory provisions of the lex contractus are applicable as such.
Art. 9 of the Rome I Regulation (which transforms the Convention into a piece of EU
legislation, while introducing some changes) can similarly be read as supporting the view that
the mandatory rules of the lex contractus are necessarily applicable. Like its predecessor, it
singles out the mandatory rules of the forum (which courts can always apply).25 As regards
the mandatory rules of other countries, it does not use language similar to that employed in
the Convention, given that it only condones the application of the mandatory rules of the
place of performance.26 However, the mere fact that Art. 9 specifically addresses the
application of the mandatory rules of both the forum and the place of performance, while
omitting to deal with the mandatory norms of the lex contractus, suggests that the applicability
of the latter was considered to be self-evident.
Scholarly writers almost unanimously acknowledge the general recognition of the
principle that the mandatory rules of the lex contractus must be applied. However, most of
them, including Mayer,27 Zhilsov,28 Barraclough/Waincymer,29 and Calavros,30 fail to provide
a specific justification for this principle, seemingly taking it for granted. Amongst the few
authors who have sought to explain the applicability of the mandatory norms of the lex
contractus, two basic approaches can be distinguished. Under one approach, the applicability
of those mandatory norms results from the fact that they fall, presumably as a purely legal
matter, within the scope of the lex contractus.31 Under another approach, the mandatory
norms of the lex contractus are not applicable per se; whether or not they are will depend on
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23 See n 5.
24 Ibid 26.
25 Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable
to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6 (Rome I Regulation) art 9(2).
26 Rome I Regulation art 9(3).
27 Mayer (n 7) 280 (stating, without any particular explanation, that the mandatory rules of the lex contractus are
unquestionably applicable when (a) they have not been excluded by the parties and (b) one party has invoked
them before the tribunal).
28 A.N. Zhilsov, ‘Mandatory and Public Policy Rules in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1995) 42 Netherlands
International Law Review 81–119, 109 (observing, without offering a personal opinion or analysis, that ‘most
commentators agree that an arbitrator should apply the law as it stands, including its mandatory rules’).
29 Barraclough, Waincymer (n 10) 219–223 (discussing in some detail – but without examining its foundation –
the view that the mandatory rules of the lex contractus should in general be applied and, what is more, regardless
of whether the lex contractus was chosen by the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal).
30 Calavros (n 8) 227 (‘It follows from the foregoing considerations [which are unfortunately very difficult to
comprehend] that the mandatory rules of law of the lex contractus are in any event applicable for the resolution
of the underlying dispute submitted to international arbitration’).
31 See Commandeur, Gößling (n 10) 15 (noting that ‘the mandatory rules of that substantive law [the lex contractus]
must be applied… [because] [t]he selection of the law of a particular jurisdiction is considered to naturally include
the selection of mandatory rules and public policies of that jurisdiction’).
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the will of the parties and, more specifically, on the wording of the choice-of-law provision
contained in the contract, if any.32
Unsurprisingly, numerous arbitral tribunals have recognised the applicability of the
mandatory rules of the lex contractus. Illustrative examples notably include the award in ICC
case No. 4237 (affirming, in general terms, that arbitrators can apply trade usages and
contractual stipulations only to the extent that ‘they do not deviate from the mandatory rules
of the applicable law’);33 the award in ICC case No. 14046 (examining compliance of
a contractual provision contained in a contract governed by Italian law with Italian antitrust
law);34 and the award in ICC case No. 12127 (applying French competition law to a contract
subjected to French law).35
3 Territorial Scope of Application of Mandatory Rules
Like all legal norms, mandatory rules necessarily have a particular scope of application. They
have, first of all, a material or substantive scope of application, i.e. they will only apply to
certain categories of contracts or certain types of actions or conduct. Mandatory rules
protecting commercial agents, for example, only apply to commercial agency agreements.
Likewise, mandatory rules of competition law only apply to conduct that has the effect of
excluding or distorting competition in a particular market.
Mandatory rules also have a territorial scope of application. Broadly speaking, one can
distinguish between so-called ‘domestic mandatory rules’ and ‘international mandatory
rules’.36 The former consist of norms of a particular legal system that are mandatory in
a domestic context only, i.e. in connection with contracts that do not present any connection
with countries other than the country that has enacted the relevant mandatory rule. The latter
comprise norms that are mandatory in an international context, i.e. when the contract is
connected to more than one country. It has to be noted that certain mandatory norms are by
definition (only) applicable in an international context because they are not concerned with
purely domestic conduct (e.g. currency exchange regulations, import/export restrictions, etc.).
In some cases, the determination of the specific territorial scope of application of a mandatory
norm may be difficult.37
When a particular situation or contract falls within both the material and the territorial
scope of application of a specific mandatory rule, then – to use the customary expression –
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32 See Born (n 13) 2708 (noting that ‘the question whether a particular mandatory rule is within the scope of the
choice-of-law agreement will require interpretation of the choice-of-law agreement’).
33 Syrian State trading organization, buyer v Ghanaian State enterprise, seller (Award, ICC Case No. 4237, 17 February
1984) (1985) 10 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 52, 55.
34 Company A (Italy) v 6 Respondents (Italy) (Final Award, ICC Case No. 14046) (2010) 35 Yearbook Commercial
Arbitration 241, 243.
35 Licensor (France) v Licensee (US) (Award, ICC Case No. 12127, 2003) (2008) 33 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration
82, 84.
36 See, for example, Chong (n 5) 31.
37 See s IV.A.
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that rule is applicable ‘on its own terms’.38 Applicability on its own terms (which can also be
referred to as ‘internal’ applicability) is of course not generally viewed as sufficient for a court or
arbitral tribunal to apply the mandatory norm at stake39 (with the exception of the mandatory
norms of the forum, which are necessarily applied by the courts concerned). The crucial issue
– which renders the analysis so complex and controversial – is in fact whether, or under what
circumstances, certain mandatory norms that are applicable on their own terms must or
should be applied by courts or arbitral tribunals (i.e. their ‘external’ applicability).
It is due to this focus on the external applicability of mandatory rules that legal scholars
have largely neglected the analysis of the scope of application of such rules and, more
particularly, of their territorial scope of application. This has led to some confusion and
created misunderstandings. In fact, as has been explained above, many authors consider the
mandatory norms of the lex contractus to be necessarily applicable, apparently implying that
those rules are applicable regardless of whether their own territorial applicability requirements
are met.40 Thus, Swiss competition law would in principle be applicable to a contract between
a US and a Japanese party subjected to Swiss law, even though the contract is very unlikely to
fall within its territorial scope of application (given that it most probably cannot have any
effect on the Swiss market) – a solution which defies common sense.41
As will be explained in Section IV, the determination of the territorial scope of application
of mandatory norms constitutes a significant aspect of the broader question of the application
of mandatory norms by arbitral tribunals and thus deserves closer examination. As will be
shown, arbitral tribunals should never apply mandatory rules if the contract or situation does
not fall within their territorial scope of application. In addition, the territorial scope of
application of a mandatory norm may be relevant to determine whether such norm qualifies
at all as an ‘overriding’ or ‘international’ mandatory norm, i.e. whether it meets the threshold
generally required in the context of international litigation and arbitration.42
II Arbitral Tribunals neither Must, nor Should Apply the Conflict 
Norms of the Seat
As has been explained above, the question of whether arbitral tribunals must or should apply
the conflict norms of the seat is still rather controversial. Tackling this controversy, this
Section answers both questions in the negative, i.e. it argues first that arbitral tribunals are not
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38 This terminology is commonly used by authors from common law jurisdictions. See, for example, Chong (n 5) 48;
Born (n 13) 2711 (noting that, ‘by their own terms, the public policies and mandatory laws of the seat may not be
applicable to the parties’ dispute’).
39 See Chong (n 5) 48 (observing that ‘[i]t is obvious that the fact that the foreign rule may be applicable on its own
terms to the contract in question is not sufficient to render it applicable’).
40 See ns 27–32.
41 See s IV.A.
42 See s IV.B.
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obliged to apply the seat’s conflict norms and, second, that it is generally not advisable for
them to do so. The first argument finds support in the absence of any relevant statutory or
institutional requirements (1). The second argument is based on the observation that the
application of the conflict norms of the seat would be incompatible with established choice-
of-law principles in the field of international commercial arbitration (2) and the fact that
domestic conflict rules governing the application of mandatory rules are likely to be unsuitable
in the context of international arbitration (3).
1 Absence of Statutory or Institutional Requirements to Apply 
the Conflict Rules of the Seat
It would, in theory, not be impossible for arbitration laws and institutional arbitration rules
to require arbitral tribunals to apply the choice-of-law norms of the seat. The arbitration
statute of country X could indeed provide for the mandatory application of X’s domestic
conflict norms, or a specific part thereof (e.g. the part dealing with contractual obligations).
A similar approach could, in principle, also be adopted by the drafters of institutional
arbitration rules.
However, as a matter of positive law, no such provisions are contained in either arbitration
statutes or institutional arbitration rules. Most arbitration statutes contain one single article
dealing with the law applicable to the merits,43 typically laying down two basic principles: 
(1) that the parties are free to choose the applicable law (party autonomy)44 and (2) that,
absent a choice of law by the parties, arbitral tribunals enjoy broad discretion in the
determination of the applicable law.45 No reference whatsoever is generally made to the
domestic conflict norms of the seat (or any other country, for that matter).
The absence of any obligation to follow the conflict rules of the seat also characterises
institutional arbitration rules. In fact, the rules of leading institutions such as the ICC, LCIA,
ICDR, and VIAC do not provide for any such duty.46 Like arbitration statutes, they are
typically limited to a statement of the two basic principles referred to above, i.e. of choice-of-
law party autonomy and arbitral discretion.47
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43 See, for example, Model Law art 28, English Arbitration Act s 46, Swiss Private International Law Statute art 187,
French Code of Civil Procedure art 1511.
44 See, for example, Model Law art 28(1): ‘The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with such
rules of law as are chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute.’
45 See, for example, Model Law art 28(2): ‘Failing any designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the
law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable.’
46 ICC Rules art 21, LCIA Rules arts 22(3) and (4), ICDR Rules art 31, VIAC rules art 24.
47 Ibid.
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2 Incompatibility of the Application of the Conflict Norms of the Seat 
with Established Choice-of-Law Principles in the Field of International
Arbitration
As has been explained above, the two basic choice-of-law principles in the field of international
commercial arbitration are party autonomy and arbitral discretion. As far as party autonomy
is concerned, it is characterised by a particularly high level of such autonomy, insofar as the
parties are generally entitled not only to choose whichever domestic law they deem suitable,
but also to opt for the application of so-called non-national or transnational law (for the sake
of simplicity, reference will be made hereinafter to ‘non-national’ law only). In fact, most
arbitration statutes do not allow the parties to select the applicable ‘law’, but ‘rules of law’,48
a concept that is generally understood as encompassing non-national law. The ability of the
parties to choose non-national law is, today, almost universally recognised.49
The second principle, arbitral discretion, means that arbitral tribunals have considerable
power in determining the applicable law. The specific level of arbitral discretion may vary
from one jurisdiction to another. Under the laws of a few countries, arbitral tribunals enjoy
particularly broad discretion, given that they are empowered not only to select a particular
domestic law, but also to choose non-national law.50 In most legal systems, however, arbitral
tribunals are free to choose the applicable law, but that law must be a particular domestic law.
In fact, under the relevant statutes, arbitral tribunals must apply conflict norms (which they
can freely choose), which implies that they will ultimately apply a particular country’s
domestic law.51
The application of the domestic conflict norms of the seat (or any other country) is likely
to conflict with the well-established principles of party autonomy and arbitral discretion. In
fact, as regards the former principle, it has to be observed that domestic choice-of-law rules
in matters of contract do not generally allow parties to opt for non-national law. The Rome I
Regulation, for example, recognises the principle of choice-of-law party autonomy, enabling
parties to a contract to choose the applicable law freely.52 However, as the language used in the
relevant provision suggests (the parties are free to choose the ‘law’ governing the contract),
the parties must choose a particular domestic law, i.e. they cannot select non-national rules.53
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48 See, for example, Model Law art 28(1).
49 See, for example, Blackaby (n 15) 206–11 [discussing the use of the lex mercatoria (a particular form of non-
national law) in international arbitration].
50 An example is French arbitration law. See French Code of Civil Procedure art 1511 which provides that, in the
absence of a choice of law by the parties, an arbitral tribunal shall apply ‘the rules of law it considers appropriate’
(emphasis added).
51 See, for example, Model Law art 28(2).
52 See Rome I Regulation art 3, which provides that: ‘A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.’
53 For recent scholarly commentary on this particular feature of the Rome I Regulation, see, for example, Markus
Petsche, ‘The Application of Transnational Law (Lex Mercatoria) by Domestic Courts’ (2014) 10 Journal of Private
International law 489–515, 493–94.
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The application of the conflict norms of the seat would also undermine arbitral choice-
of-law discretion. In fact, domestic conflict of laws statutes do not generally grant any
discretionary powers to courts. Instead, they lay down rather detailed choice-of-law rules
using various connecting factors. Under the Rome I Regulation, for example, there are specific
conflict norms for different categories of contracts. For example, a contract for the sale of
goods is, in the absence of a choice of law by the parties, in principle governed by the law of
the country where the seller has his habitual residence,54 while a distribution agreement would
in principle be governed by the law of the country where the distributor has his habitual
residence.55 It is true that the Regulation contains a so-called escape clause, under which a
different law may be determined to be applicable.56 However, this escape clause is not
intended to confer broad discretionary powers upon courts (or arbitrators); rather, it is
intended to apply in those (presumably very rare) cases in which the relevant connecting
factors fail to lead to the application of the law of the country presenting the closest
connection to the contract.57
The incompatibility of domestic conflict norms with the principles of choice-of-law party
autonomy and arbitral choice-of-law discretion is not merely a formal problem; it affects the
substance of the parties’ interests. In fact, the principles concerned have not been elaborated
randomly or without reason; rather, they serve specific underlying purposes. The parties’
ability to select non-national law (such as, for example, general principles of law, the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, or rules common to the parties’ respective
legal systems) is intended to address the perceived deficiencies of domestic laws and to allow
the parties to select rules that they consider as neutral and/or well-balanced.58 Arbitral choice-
of-law discretion has developed in response to the perceived rigidity and obscurity of
domestic conflict norms and seeks to promote the fairness and predictability of arbitral
choice-of-law determinations.59 The achievement of both of these objectives would be
compromised if arbitral tribunals had to apply the conflict norms of the seat (or any other
domestic conflict norms, for that matter).
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54 Rome I Regulation art 4(1)(a).
55 Rome I Regulation art 4(1)(f).
56 Rome I Regulation art 4(3).
57 Rome I Regulation art 4(3) provides that: ‘Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract
is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 [which contains
specific choice-of-law rules for different categories of contracts] or 2 [which provides for the application of the
characteristic-performance test in the event that the applicable law cannot be determined under paragraph 1], 
the law of that other country shall apply.’
58 See, for example, Blackaby (n 15) 201 (referring to the search for a neutral law in the specific context of State
contracts and beyond).
59 See, for example, Petsche (n 17) 26–28 (explaining arbitral choice-of-law discretion on the basis of the need to
ensure the predictability and legitimacy of choice-of-law determinations). Based on a concrete example, the author
explains the paradoxical idea that increased autonomy in the determination of the applicable law may, in individual
cases, improve the predictability of such determinations.
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3 Questionable Suitability of Domestic Conflict Norms Governing 
the Application of Mandatory Rules
As has been shown above, the application of the conflict norms of the seat may conflict with
established principles of choice-of-law in international commercial arbitration. It is thus
preferable if arbitral tribunals do not apply such rules or, at the very least, ensure that their
application does not threaten the parties’ legitimate interests. Now, it could of course be
argued that arbitral tribunals should only apply those conflict norms of the seat that deal with
the application of mandatory rules, a suggestion that would entail some form of ‘dépeçage’ 
at the level of choice-of-law rules. However, this would not be a suitable approach. For one,
such dépeçage could be a source of potential complications. Moreover, and more importantly,
it is questionable whether domestic conflict norms addressing the applicability of mandatory
rules are at all suitable for use by arbitral tribunals.
First of all, those conflict norms almost inevitably allow (or require?) domestic courts to
apply the mandatory rules of the forum.60 An Italian court, for example, will always be entitled
(and will generally make use of this right) to apply mandatory rules of Italian law. The well-
known reason for this is that the Italian court is an organ of the Italian state, charged with the
application of the law and the protection of the basic public interests of the Italian legal order.
Quite clearly, the same cannot be said about an arbitral tribunal seated in Italy. It might be
argued that such a tribunal, due to the dual contractual and judicial nature of arbitration,61
should take into account and protect certain State interests, but there appears to be no reason
why the interests of the place of the seat should receive priority over those of any other
country.62 It is true that enforcement considerations may ultimately prompt an arbitral
tribunal to apply the mandatory rules of the seat, but it is also true that the internationally
binding nature of annulment decisions of the seat is questioned with increasing frequency, i.e.
the courts of a number of countries have on occasion enforced arbitral awards that had been
set aside at the seat.63 Thus, the non-application by an arbitral tribunal of the mandatory rules
of the seat does not necessarily preclude the enforcement of the award in third countries.
Second, as regards the mandatory rules of third countries (i.e. countries other than the
forum), two basic justifications are generally provided for their application by domestic courts:
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60 See Rome I  Regulation art 9(2) (‘Nothing in this Regulation shall restrict the application of the overriding
mandatory provisions of the law of the forum.’); Swiss Private International Law Statute art 18 (‘This Act is subject
to those mandatory provisions of Swiss law which, by reason of their special aim, are applicable regardless of the
law referred to by this Act.’).
61 On this dual nature of arbitration, see, for example, Barraclough, Waincymer (n 10) 209–11 (discussing
contractual, jurisdictional, and hybrid theories of arbitration).
62 See Mayer (n 7) 283: ‘Such a distinction [between the lex fori and foreign law] is clearly not to be made by
arbitrators, because they do not have a forum. They are not faced with domestic mandatory rules as opposed to
foreign mandatory rules, but simply with mandatory rules external to the lex contractus… For this reason, the
arbitrator’s position is more favourable to an objective weighing of the interests that militate in favour of applying
the mandatory rules and the lex contractus, respectively: he views all laws as being of equal dignity.’
63 For discussion of the relevant case law, see Blackaby (n 15) 634–638.
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first, the actual interest in their application of the State concerned and, second, comity, a
principle that requires respect for the rules and decisions of other jurisdictions, notably to
ensure peaceful and harmonious relations between the countries concerned.64 None of these
underlying rationales is necessarily applicable in the context of international arbitration. In
fact, if one views arbitration primarily (or exclusively) as a creature of contract, there is no
compelling reason why arbitral tribunals should take State interests into account, whether
those of the country of the seat or any other country. As to comity, this is plainly not applicable
because arbitral tribunals are not charged with the task of preserving healthy relationships
between the country of the seat and other countries.
Last, the relevant domestic conflict norms may not be suitable inasmuch as they might
simply unduly restrict the right of arbitral tribunals to assess freely which mandatory rules, if
any, to apply. Under the Rome I Regulation, for example, mandatory norms other than those of
the forum can only be applied if (a) the rules are rules of the country of the place of performance
and (b) those rules render the performance of the contract unlawful.65 In other words, the
Rome I Regulation does not authorise the application of rules of countries other than those
of the place of performance, even though they may be closely connected with the dispute.66
Moreover, the Regulation only allows the application of those mandatory rules of the place of
performance that invalidate the underlying contract, i.e. it does not, for instance, authorise the
application of protective provisions such as, for example, consumer protection laws or laws
protecting commercial agents, which do not have an invalidating effect. Arguably, such
restrictions may unduly interfere with the ability of arbitral tribunals to render appropriate
decisions.
III Only the Mandatory Rules of Contract Law of the Lex Contractus
Are Necessarily Applicable
As has been explained above, the vast majority of commentators are of the opinion that the
mandatory rules of the lex contractus are necessarily applicable. They affirm the applicability
of those rules in general terms, without drawing any distinctions between different categories
or types of mandatory rules. In particular, they fail to draw a distinction between mandatory
norms of public and private law. Thus, according to the prevailing opinion, if Indian law applies
to the contract (either because it has been chosen by the parties or because it is otherwise
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65 Rome I Regulation art 9(3): ‘Effect may be given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country
where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed, in so far as those overriding
mandatory provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful.’
66 This approach is different from the seemingly more flexible one followed in the Swiss Private International Law
Statute, art 19 of which merely requires the existence of a close connection between the situation and the 
law concerned.
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deemed to be applicable), all Indian mandatory norms (for example, currency exchange
regulations, trade restrictions and competition law rules) will necessarily be applicable. 
While most scholars provide little to no justification for the application of the mandatory
rules of the lex contractus, those that do offer either of two explanations.67 One explanation
consists of the idea that, as a matter of legal principle, the applicable law (and this is not
necessarily confined to the lex contractus, but also applies to other areas) extends to all rules
of the relevant legal system, including its mandatory rules. The alternative explanation focuses
on the intent of the parties and posits that the application of the mandatory rules of the lex
contractus depends on such intent and, more particularly, on the wording of the choice-of-
law provision contained in the contract (if any).
As will be shown below, both approaches are flawed or, at the very least, highly
questionable. In fact, it is much more sensible to hold that the scope of the lex contractus is
confined to rules of (private) contract law, thus excluding public law rules and private law
rules outside the field of contract law (e.g. tort law). Also, considering that the application of
mandatory rules rests upon the importance of the State interests concerned, the intent of the
parties should not be a relevant factor, i.e. it should not be possible for the parties to either
choose or exclude the application of such rules.
1 The Scope of the Lex Contractus Is Confined to Rules of (Private)
Contract Law
It is true that domestic conflict of laws statutes do not generally specify that the applicable law
refers only to the relevant area of private law (in contractual matters, to the relevant contract
law). The Rome I Regulation, for example, specifies which issues fall within the scope of the
lex contractus, without however expressly restricting such scope to rules of private law. Under
Art. 12 of the Rome I Regulation, the lex contractus governs: (a) contract interpretation, 
(b) performance, (c) remedies, (d) the extinction of obligations, as well as prescription and
limitation of actions, and (e) the consequences of nullity of the contract.68 A separate provision
of the Regulation essentially extends the scope of the lex contractus to the issue of substantive
validity.69
While the Rome I Regulation does not expressly state that the rules falling within the
scope of the lex contractus are only rules of (private) contract law, the nature of the issues
governed by the lex contractus rather clearly suggests that the relevant rules are extremely
likely to be rules of contract law. Indeed, one will, for example, not be able to find rules governing
remedies for breach of contract outside the boundaries of the relevant contract law. One may,
however, hesitate when it comes to the issue of substantive validity. Here, one may indeed
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68 Rome I Regulation art 12.
69 Rome I Regulation art 10(1): ‘The existence and validity of a contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be
determined by the law which would govern it under this Regulation if the contract or term were valid.’
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consider that competition law rules that prohibit certain categories of restrictive agreements
are in fact rules that govern the validity of a contract in the sense of the relevant provision of
the Regulation. In principle, such rules could thus be considered as falling within the scope
of the lex contractus.
This is, however, not a sensible approach. There are three – somewhat connected –
reasons for understanding the lex contractus as exclusively comprising rules of contract law.
The first pertains to the very object of the choice of law as a legal area or discipline. In fact,
although this may not always be expressly stated, choice of law deals with the determination
of the law governing legal relationships or situations of private law, which suggests that choice of
law is merely concerned with designating the applicable private law.70 This is also implicit in
the terminology used in a number of countries to refer to the broader field of conflict of laws
(which covers jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in addition to choice of law), namely
the commonly used terms ‘private international law’ and ‘international private law’. In short,
choice of law is not, as a matter of principle,71 concerned with the determination of applicable
rules of public law.
The second reason pertains to choice-of-law methodology. It is based on the observation
that the determination of the applicable law and the determination of applicable mandatory
rules are two separate, entirely independent, issues. They are separate in the sense that
different conflict rules or ‘standards’72 are applied to determine the application of a particular
governing law, on the hand, and the application of certain mandatory rules, on the other.
They are independent insofar as the applicable law is determined without having regard to
possibly applicable mandatory rules, and vice versa. Thus, the fact that, say, Chinese law is deter -
mined to govern a particular contract has no implications for the determination of possibly
applicable mandatory norms other than those that are part of the lex contractus.
The third and last reason, which is connected to the second, relates to the fact that the
determination of the applicable law and the determination of possibly applicable mandatory
norms are based on entirely different considerations. The former focuses on the private
interests73 of the parties and, more particularly, on the need to ensure predictability of the
applicable law, which explains the quasi-universal recognition of choice-of-law party autonomy
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70 See, for example, Gilles Cuniberti, Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Approach (Edward Elgar 2017, Cheltenham-
Northampton) 1 (defining the object of choice of law as the determination of ‘the law governing private
relationships’).
71 There is, of course, an exception to this principle. That exception is precisely that choice-of-law rules also address
the issue of the application of mandatory rules, many of which are rules of public law. However, arguably, such
provisions are largely superfluous because the relevant norms may be applied even without an express legal basis
in the relevant choice-of-law principles.
72 The term ‘standard’ is used here because it is debatable whether a provision such as Rome I Regulation art 9 can
properly be considered as a conflict norm. See also Cuniberti (n 70) 19 (explaining that mandatory rules ‘are
applied directly, as opposed to other substantive rules which only apply if designated by the relevant multilateral
choice of law rule’).
73 See, for example, Cuniberti (n 70) 18 (explaining that choice-of-law rules do not in principle take into account State
interests because ‘most private law disputes are only concerned with private interests’).
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in matters of contract. The latter, on the other hand, focuses on the (public) interests of States in
the application of specific rules that are considered instrumental for the preservation of vital
public interests.74
The present author is not the only, or first, person to express the view that only the
mandatory rules of contract law of the lex contractus are necessarily applicable. Such a view
appears to be implicit in the reservations that a few scholars have expressed vis-à-vis the
principled application of all mandatory norms of the lex contractus.75 The approach advocated
in this article has also been adopted by the arbitral tribunal in ICC case No. 7528.76 In that
case, the tribunal refused to apply mandatory provisions of French law governing sub-
contracts, arguing that the scope of the lex contractus was confined to general contract law.77
2 The Parties Can neither Choose, nor Exclude the Application 
of Mandatory Rules
Some authors argue that whether the mandatory norms of the lex contractus apply or not
essentially depends on the parties’ intent. Thus, they argue, it is primarily a matter of
interpretation of the choice-of-law clause contained in the contract. Born, for example,
maintains that a choice-of-law clause providing that the contract ‘shall be interpreted in
accordance with the laws of State X’ does not in principle cover non-contractual mandatory
provisions.78 He reaches the same conclusion in relation to a broader (standard) choice-of-law
clause under which ‘[t]his contract shall be governed by the laws of State X’, arguing that non-
contractual mandatory provisions (he specifically lists competition law, trade controls, and
intellectual property rules) would not in principle fall within the scope of such a clause.79
Other authors also attach importance to the parties’ actual or presumed intent. Derains,
for example, claims that whether the mandatory norms of the lex contractus apply notably
depends on whether it (i.e. the lex contractus) has been chosen by the parties (in which case
they must be applied)80 or determined by the arbitral tribunal (in which case they may or may
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74 Ibid 19.
75 See, for example, Nathalie Voser, ‘Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in International
Commercial Arbitration’ (1996) 7 American Review of International Arbitration 319–357, 339–340 (‘[T]here is
no justification for assuming that the mandatory rules of the lex contractus have a special and paramount position
and that therefore the interests of the state that provides the lex contractus have to be respected with less scrutiny
than the interests of other states, simply because they are part of the chosen law.’).
76 Sub-contractor v Contractor (Partial Award, ICC Case No. 7528, 1993) (1997) 22 Yearbook Commercial
Arbitration 125.
77 Ibid 128.
78 Born (n 13) 2708.
79 Ibid.
80 Yves Derains, ‘Public Policy and the Law Applicable to the Dispute in International Arbitration’ in Pieter Sanders
(ed), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series vol 3 (Kluwer Law
International 1987, 227–256) 244 (stating that, ‘when the parties have chosen a law to apply to their contract, it
will be concluded from the outset that the arbitrator has to apply the mandatory rules of that law’).
ELJ-2020-1__press  2020.12.22.  11:17  Page 84
not be applied),81 thus attaching significance to the presumed intent of the parties. Even Mayer
considers (negative) party intent to be relevant, insofar as he considers that the absence of an
express exclusion of the mandatory norms of the lex contractus by the parties strongly
militates in favour of their application.82
The views of these authors are not correct. In fact, they disregard what has been explained
above, namely that mandatory rules, by their very nature (and by reason of the public interests
involved in their application), are outside the sphere of party autonomy. Thus, the parties
should not be allowed to exclude the application of mandatory rules.83 Conversely, they should
not be allowed to choose specific mandatory rules either. More generally, the parties’ intent
or preference should not be a factor having any impact on whether certain mandatory rules
are held to be applicable or not.  
IV The Territorial Scope of Application of Mandatory Rules
1 Mandatory Rules Only Apply if the Contract Falls within Their Territorial
Scope of Application
It may seem obvious that mandatory rules should only be applied if they are applicable on
their own terms and, more particularly, if the territorial requirements for their application
are met. However, as has been mentioned above, the categorical affirmation of the applicability
of the mandatory rules of certain countries (in particular, of the seat and the lex contractus)
by a number of authors appears to imply that mandatory norms could be applied even if those
requirements are not met. It is thus important to clarify that satisfaction of the territorial
requirements of a particular mandatory norm is a necessary prerequisite for its application
and should constitute the first step in the analysis performed by arbitral tribunals.
In practice, this first step may often be the end of the analysis, rendering any further inquiry
into the appropriateness of applying the mandatory norms of certain jurisdictions (which, as
has been seen, may be a very complex exercise) unnecessary. For example, as Born suggests,
it is very unlikely for a purely domestic Zambian transaction to fall within the territorial scope
of application of either Swiss or US competition law (which may be the law of the seat).84 Also,
an export ban adopted by the country of the seat is obviously not territorially applicable to a
transaction that does not involve any exports originating from that country.
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81 Ibid 245 (noting that in such a case the mandatory provisions of the lex contractus do not enjoy any special status
when compared to the mandatory rules of other countries).
82 Mayer (n 7) 280.
83 That one cannot derogate from, or exclude the application of, mandatory rules is actually part of the very definition
of the concept of mandatory rules. See, for example, Rome I Regulation art 9(1), which defines overriding mandatory
norms as ‘provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such
as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within
their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation.’ (emphasis added).
84 Born (n 13) 2711.
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One may of course argue that by choosing a particular lex contractus, the parties have
implicitly agreed on the application of all mandatory rules of such law, regardless of whether
those rules are applicable on their own terms. For example, one could argue that, by choosing
German law to govern their contract, a US and a Japanese party have agreed on the application
of EU competition law. This is not, however, a sensible approach. Indeed, as has already been
explained, the application of mandatory norms is outside the sphere of party autonomy and
parties should thus not be allowed to affirmatively choose certain mandatory norms.
In practice, it may often be difficult to determine the exact territorial scope of application
of a given mandatory norm, in particular as far as mandatory rules of private law are
concerned. The mandatory French rule prohibiting parties from excluding judicial adaptation
of contractual penalties,85 for example, does not specify its territorial scope of application.86
Thus, it is only certain that such a prohibition necessarily applies in connection with purely
French contracts, i.e. contracts that do not present a connection with any other country, but
whether it also applies (and whether a French court would thus necessarily apply such
prohibition) in relation to a contract involving a foreign party (or two foreign parties) is a
question that is not answered by the provision itself.
Uncertainty may also arise as to the extent to which a particular mandatory norm is
applicable in an international context. Under the EU Agency Directive and domestic
implementing legislation,87 for example, provisions protecting commercial agents in the event
of contract termination by principals are expressly stated to be of a mandatory nature.88 This
means that they are unquestionably mandatory in a purely EU context, i.e. in connection with
contracts involving an EU principal and an EU agent. But what if the principal is not
established in the EU? What if the agent is not established in the EU? And what if neither
party is established in the EU? None of these questions finds an express answer in the
Directive and it is thus for the CJEU to clarify its territorial scope of application.89
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85 French Civil Code art 1231-5 provides:
‘Where a contract stipulates that the person who fails to perform shall pay a certain sum of money by way of
damages, the other party may be awarded neither a higher nor a lower sum.
Nevertheless, a court may, even of its own initiative, moderate or increase the penalty so agreed if it is manifestly
excessive or derisory. Where an undertaking has been performed in part, the agreed penalty may be reduced by
a court, even of its own initiative, in proportion to the advantage which partial performance has procured for the
creditor, without prejudice to the application of the preceding paragraph. Any stipulation contrary to the preceding
two paragraphs is deemed not written.’
86 Ibid.
87 Council Directive of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-
employed commercial agents (86/653/EEC) (Agency Directive) [1986] OJ L382/17.
88 See Agency Directive art 19: ‘The parties may not derogate from Articles 17 and 18 [pertaining to the payment
of an indemnity or compensation upon termination by the principal of the agency contract] to the detriment of
the commercial agent before the agency contract expires.’
89 The Court has answered the first question in the affirmative, while providing a negative answer to the second
one. See Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc [2000] ECR I-9325 (first question), Case
C-507/15 Agro Foreign Trade & Agency Ltd v Petersime NV (second question).
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2 Relevance of the Territorial Scope of Application for the Determination
of the ‘Overriding’ or ‘International’ Character of Mandatory Norms
As has been explained above, one habitually distinguishes mandatory norms that are
mandatory in a domestic context (only) from those that are mandatory in an international
context. The former are generally referred to as ‘domestic mandatory norms’, while the latter
are labelled ‘international mandatory rules’. Since this terminology might suggest that the
second category of norms are norms of international law (in particular treaty law), it would
in fact be more appropriate to use the terms ‘domestically’ and ‘internationally’ mandatory
norms instead, emphasising the specific context in which the rules concerned possess
a mandatory character (those expressions will be preferred for the remainder of this article).
It should be noted that the distinction between domestically and internationally
mandatory norms is not entirely compelling, given that the latter concept is not particularly
precise. In fact, there is no such thing as an ‘international context’; rather, there are different
ways in which a particular transaction may be connected to a plurality of countries. For example,
as has been explained above, it does not make much sense to affirm, in general terms, that the
EU Agency Directive is applicable in an international context. Indeed, it may apply in some
such contexts, but not in others, depending on the specific connections that exist with EU
countries.90
In arbitral practice, it is well-established that only ‘internationally’ or ‘overriding’ mandatory
rules should be applied – domestically mandatory norms are essentially irrelevant.91 In light
of the close connection between this particular threshold (overriding mandatory rules) and
the territorial scope of application of mandatory rules, it is clear that the territorial scope will
generally be decisive as regards whether particular norms meet the relevant threshold. Where
this threshold is not met, the application of the mandatory rule concerned is excluded, and
there is no need for any further inquiry or assessment.
Conclusion
This article has aimed to contribute to the academic discussion of the application of
(substantive) mandatory rules by arbitral tribunals by examining selected controversial or
neglected issues, namely: (a) the duty of arbitral tribunals to apply the conflict norms of the
seat, (b) the applicability of the mandatory rules of the lex contractus, and (c) the relevance
of the territorial scope of application of mandatory rules. 
Specifically, this contribution has argued that (a) arbitral tribunals are neither bound by
the conflict rules of the seat, nor generally well-advised to apply those rules, (b) it is incorrect
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91 See, for example, Grantor of exclusive distributorship v (Former) exclusive distributors (Final Award, ICC Case No.
6752, 1991) (1993) 18 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 54, 56.
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to affirm in general terms that all mandatory rules of the lex contractus are necessarily
applicable, the better view being that only the mandatory norms of contract law of the lex
contractus are applicable per se, and (c) the territorial scope of application of mandatory rules
is relevant, not only because it constitutes a necessary prerequisite for their application
(contrary to what a number of authors suggest), but also because it frequently proves decisive
in resolving any threshold issue that may arise.
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Introduction
The story of the treatment of overriding mandatory rules of third countries (i.e. the law of
which is neither the lex fori nor the lex causae)1 in private international law in Europe2 is well
known. Before the adoption of the Rome Convention,3 national systems of private international
law had dealt with third countries’ overriding mandatory rules in different ways. English
courts pursued a relatively strict approach in the field of choice of law in contract. Most other
national systems of private international law were at least as, if not more, open to the idea of
giving effect to third countries’ overriding mandatory rules. The Rome Convention introduced
an era of partially unified treatment of mandatory rules in the field of contract in the European
Economic Community. Article 7(1) of the convention allowed the courts of Contracting States
to give effect to the overriding mandatory rules of a foreign country with which the situation
had a close connection, even if the law of that country was not the lex causae. However, seven
Contracting States, including the United Kingdom, considered Article 7(1) to be too radical
and reserved the right not to apply its provisions. The Rome I Regulation4 replaced the Rome
Convention on 17 December 2009. It achieved a full unification of the treatment of mandatory
rules in the field of contract in the European Union (‘EU’). The cost of this was a new Article
9(3), which was modelled on the English common law rules on foreign illegality and has
significantly curtailed the ability of Member State courts to give effect to third countries’
overriding mandatory rules. The drafters of the Rome II Regulation5 eventually decided not
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to include a general provision on the treatment of third countries’ overriding mandatory rules,
although Article 17 of the Rome II Regulation allows Member State courts to take into account
the rules of safety and conduct at the place and time of the event giving rise to liability.
The story does not end there. There are some recent developments that bring into
question the wisdom of curtailing the ability of the courts to give effect to overriding
mandatory rules of third countries. One development is the judgment of the Court of Justice
of the EU (‘CJEU’) in Greece v Nikiforidis,6 in which the court adopted an approach that
appears more in line with Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention than Article 9(3) of the Rome
I Regulation. Another development is the recent English judgments in Lilly Icos LLC v 8PM
Chemists Ltd7 and Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc,8 in which the courts seem to have
expressed a willingness to take foreign illegality into account in a wider set of circumstances
than the English common law would have traditionally allowed. These developments prompt
us to consider whether the courts should have a wider discretion to give effect to third
countries’ overriding mandatory rules or whether the CJEU and English judgments rest on
shaky foundations.
This article is divided into eight sections. Following this introduction, the next two
sections briefly outline the treatment of overriding mandatory rules of third countries under
the English common law conflict of laws and pre-Rome Convention Continental systems of
private international law. The fourth section describes the solutions adopted in the EU private
international law of obligations, namely the Rome Convention, Rome I Regulation and Rome II
Regulation. The following two sections present the two abovementioned recent developments.
The last section discusses the relevance of these developments for the future of private
international law in the EU and England. The final section provides conclusions.
I English Common Law Conflict of Laws
At common law, the law applicable to a private law relationship is in principle determined by
virtue of the operation of choice-of-law rules. There are some exceptions to this principle, the
most important of which are the operation of domestic overriding statutes and public policy.9
The UK constitution is based on the principles of parliamentary sovereignty and legislative
supremacy. This has two consequences for choice of law. The first is that English courts apply
an English statute to all situations falling within its scope and do not apply an English statute
to situations falling outside it.10 Some statutes expressly define their territorial reach. Usually,
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6 Case C-135/15 ECLI:EU:C:2016:774, [2016] IL Pr 39. See also Dana Gas PJSC v Dana Gas Sukuk [2017] EWHC
2928 (Comm), [2018] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 177.
7 [2009] EWHC 1905 (Ch), [2010] FSR 95.
8 [2014] UKSC 55, [2015] AC 430.
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Contractors Inc [1983] 2 AC 130 (HL), 152: the question of territorial scope ‘requires an inquiry to be made as to 
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however, statues are silent in this respect. If asked to apply such a statute to a private law
relationship with an international element, an English court has to construe the statute in order
to determine its territorial scope. In performing this task, the courts are guided by the general
principle of construction that UK statutes are prima facie territorial.11 Consequently, almost
all UK statutes have either express or implied territorial limits. The second consequence is
that the determination of the territorial scope of an English statute that contains rules of
substantive law does not directly depend on the operation of choice-of-law rules. Parliamentary
commands contained in a statute that contains rules of substantive law cannot be restrained
by choice-of-law rules. Of course, an English statute can provide expressly or impliedly that it
applies only to relationships governed by English law by virtue of the operation of choice-of-
law rules, but this is because Parliament so wills, not because a choice-of-law rule so demands.
Because foreign parliaments are not sovereign and foreign legislation does not enjoy
supremacy in the UK, an English court will apply a foreign statute only when the foreign law
of which it forms part applies by virtue of the operation of English choice-of-law rules. The
application of a foreign statute before an English court does not, therefore, depend on the will
of the foreign legislature. In order to apply a foreign statute, an English court has to determine
whether the issue before the court fits into one of the recognised choice-of-law categories,
apply the relevant choice-of-law rule and determine the applicable law – the court will be
able to apply the foreign statute only if it forms part of the applicable law so determined.
Importantly, statutory claims are not a recognised choice-of-law category as such in English
law. Unless the party relying on a foreign statute can plead the application of the foreign law
of which the statute forms part by relying on one of the recognised choice-of-law categories,
such as contract, tort, unjust enrichment etc., it will not be able to invoke the statute. For this
reason, it is said that ‘the conflict of laws does not do statutes well’.12
Public policy in the English common law conflict of laws operates in negative and positive
ways. English courts can refuse to apply a rule of the foreign applicable law if either that rule
or its application is contrary to English public policy (negative aspect of English public
policy).13 Even if a relationship is legal under its foreign applicable law, English courts can in
some circumstances apply an English rule on illegality, even if that rule is not of statutory
origin (positive aspect of English public policy).14
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the person with respect to whom Parliament is presumed, in the particular case, to be legislating. Who, it is to be
asked, is within the legislative grasp, or intendment, of the statute under consideration?’ (Lord Wilberforce). See
also Hartley (n 9) 354–55; A. Briggs, ‘A Note on the Application of the Statute Law of Singapore within its Private
International Law’ [2005] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 189; cf M. Keyes, ‘Statutes, Choice of Law and the Role
of Forum Choice’ (2008) 4 Journal of Private International Law 1, 20–21.
11 Lawson, para 6.
12 Briggs (n 10) 190. See also A. Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (OUP 2014) 13–15.
13 Oppenheimer v Catermole [1976] AC 249 (HL) (foreign racist laws); British Nylon Spinners v ICI Ltd [1953] Ch 19
(CA) (application of American anti-trust legislation in England).
14 Lemenda Trading Co v African Middle East Petroleum Co [1988] QB 448, 458-60 (English rule prohibiting
contracts to promote sexual immorality and contracts involving corruption in British public life or defrauding the
British tax authorities).
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Sometimes, a party might argue before an English court that a relationship governed by
the law of one country is affected by the operation of an overriding mandatory rule of a third
country. The problem of overriding mandatory rules of third countries traditionally arises in
the field of contracts. At common law, every contract is governed by its proper law.15 Two
exceptions to this principle, namely the operation of domestic overriding statutes and public
policy, have been mentioned. Another exception is often said to have been laid down in cases
in which English courts took foreign illegality into account, even if the contract in question
was governed by English law in which there was no equivalent illegality. An English court will
not enforce an English contract to the extent to which its performance is illegal under the law
of the contractual place of performance.16 Although the matter is controversial, the prevailing
view is that this rule forms part of English contract law only, and not of English private interna -
tional law.17 An English court will also hold an English contract invalid if the real object and
intention of the parties necessitates them joining in an endeavour to perform in a foreign 
and friendly country an act which is illegal under the law of that country, even if that act is not
necessarily required by the terms of the contract.18 The prevailing view is that this is a conflicts
rule, not merely a rule of English contract law.19
II Pre-Rome Convention Continental Systems of Private
International Law
Before the adoption of the Rome Convention, national systems of private international law on
the Continent also subjected private law relationships to the law determined as applicable by
virtue of the operation of choice-of-law rules. The courts also applied overriding mandatory
rules of the lex fori to situations falling within their scope20 and recognised the negative aspect
of public policy.
The treatment of overriding mandatory rules of third countries was less uniform.
Comparative analyses of the key Continental systems of private international law21 reveal two
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15 Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50 (HL).
16 Ralli Bros v Cia Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 KB 287 (CA). See also Lemenda.
17 L. Collins (gen ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (15th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2012), paras
32-094, 32-096-32-103; Ryder Industries Ltd v Chan [2015] HKCFA 85, para 43 (Lord Collins).
18 Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470 (CA); Regazzoni v KC Sethia (1944) Ltd [1958] AC 301 (HL).
19 Dicey, Morris and Collins, para 32-193.
20 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infant (Netherlands v
Sweden) (Advisory Opinion) [1958] ICJ Rep 55.
21 T.G. Guedj, ‘The Theory of the Lois de Police: A Functional Trend in Continental Private International Law –
A Comparative Analysis with Modern American Theories’ (1991) 39 AJCL 661; A. Bonomi, ‘Mandatory Rules in
Private International Law: The Quest for Uniformity of Decisions in a Global Environment’ (1999) I YBPIL 215;
P. Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (Clarendon Press 1999) 217–26; M. Wojewoda, ‘Mandatory Rules
in Private International Law with Special Reference to the Mandatory System under the Rome Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations’ (2000) 7 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 183; 
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facts; first, the cases in which Continental courts gave effect to third countries’ overriding
mandatory rules concerned international contracts; and second, the courts in Europe were
willing to give effect to overriding mandatory rules of third countries, in certain circumstances,
even before the adoption of the Rome Convention.
Around the middle of the 20th century, German courts and academics developed two
theories that justified giving effect to overriding mandatory rules of third countries, namely
the Schuldstatuttheorie and the Sonderanknüpfungstheorie.22 According to the former, the
violation of a law that is neither the lex fori nor the lex causae can lead to the invalidity of
a contract by virtue of the application of a rule of the lex causae. In the famous Kulturgüterfall,23
for example, the Bundesgerichtshof held an insurance contract governed by German law to be
invalid for lack of an insurable interest, because it concerned the insurance of goods of cultural
heritage illegally exported out of Nigeria, an immoral act under §138 of the German Civil
Code. The court held that the parties violated justified and commonly respected interests of
a foreign state and, therefore, did not deserve protection of the law. Vischer mentions that this
was in line with other examples of the application of the Schuldstatuttheorie, which concerned
cases of contraband and smuggling, in which German courts usually held that intentional
offences against foreign import restrictions were immoral acts invalidating the contract:
‘Immorality thus becomes the collecting vessel for State interests when foreign compulsory
law outside the proper law is deliberately disregarded and when that interest of the foreign
State is considered legitimate by German standards.’24 The Sonderanknüpfungstheorie was
developed by Wengler, Zweigert and Neumayer.25 These authors called for a uniform treatment
of domestic and foreign overriding mandatory rules and advocated the direct application of
foreign public laws that interfered with private law relationships.
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A. Bonomi, ‘Article 7(1) of the European Contracts Convention: Codifying the Practice of Applying Foreign
Mandatory Rules’ (2001) 114 Harvard Law Review 2462; A. Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law
(CUP 2018) 484–86.
22 F.A. Mann, ‘Contracts: Effect of Mandatory Rules’ in K. Lipstein (ed), Harmonization of Private International Law by
the EEC (IALS 1978) 31, 31–32; F. Vischer, ‘General Course on Private International Law’ (1992) 232 Hague Recueil
21, 168 and 170; Wojewoda (n 21) 186; A. Chong, ‘The Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries in
International Contracts’ (2006) 2 Journal of Private International Law 27, 40–42; M. Hellner, ‘Third Country
Overriding Mandatory Rules in the Rome I Regulation: Old Wine in New Bottles?’ (2009) 5 Journal of Private
International Law 447, 448-49; M. Renner, ‘Article 9 Overriding Mandatory Provisions’ in G.-P. Callies (ed), Rome
Regulations (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2015) 242, 259–61; M. Lehmann and J. Ungerer, ‘Applying or Taking
Account of Foreign Overriding Mandatory Provisions – Sophism under the Rome I Regulation’ (2017/2018) 
19 YBPIL 53, 71–75; R. Plender and M. Wilderspin, The European Private International Law of Obligations (5th
edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2019), paras 12-034-12-057.
23 BGH, 22 June 1972, BGHZ 59, 82.
24 Vischer (n 22) 170-1. See also Bonomi, ‘Article 7(1) of the European Contracts Convention’ (n 21) 2471.
25 W. Wengler, ‘Die Anknüpfung des zwingenden Schuldrechts im internationalen Privatrecht’ (1941) 54 Zeitschrift
für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 168; K. Zweigert, ‘Nichterfüllung auf Grund ausländischer
Leistungsverbote’ (1942) 14 RabelsZ 283; K.H. Neumayer, ‘Autonomie de la volonté et dispositons impératives en
droit international privé des obligations’ (1957) 46 Revue critique de droit international privé 577; (1958) 47 Revue
critique de droit international privé 53; W. Wengler, ‘Les conflits de lois et le principe d’égalité’ (1963) 52 Revue
critique de droit inter national privé 203.
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The Schuldstatuttheorie is similar to the way in which the English common law approaches
illegality under the law of the contractual place of performance, whereas the Sonder an -
knüpfungs theorie is an idea that has no equivalent in the English common law conflict of laws.
It appears that French law had adopted a similar approach as the English common law in the
pre-Rome Convention times. After summarising the practice of German courts applying the
Schuldstatuttheorie, Bonomi writes the following in an article reviewing the practice of
applying foreign overriding mandatory rules before the adoption of the Rome Convention:
French appeals courts used similar rationales to take into account the ‘public policies’ of foreign
states regardless whether the applicable law was the forum law, the law of another state as chosen
by the parties, or the law of another state as provided for by the conflicts rules employed in the
absence of party choice. For example, French courts have invalidated contracts that provide for
smuggling, citing the strong interest of the smugglers’ destination state in regulating such activities.
Also relying on the mandatory rules of a foreign state, the Tribunal de la Seine invalidated a loan
governed by French law that would have supported a revolution in Venezuela.26
The Sonderanknüpfungstheorie was further developed in the Netherlands. The work of de
Winter, who advocated the application of overriding mandatory rules of third countries
sufficiently closely connected with the legal relationship in question,27 is particularly important
because it influenced the Hoge Raad in the famous Alnati case.28 The question in this case was
whether the court should give effect to a Belgian overriding mandatory rule to invalidate
a clause in a contract for the carriage of goods from Belgium to Brazil that limited the liability
of the ship-owner and which the parties subjected to Dutch law. The court stated that:
it may be that, for a foreign State, the observance of certain of its rules, even outside its own
territory, is of such importance that the courts must take account of them, and hence apply them
in preference to the law of another State which may have been chosen by the parties to govern their
contract.29
The Alnati case was not an isolated decision. In Compagnie Européenne des Pétroles SA v
Sensor Nederland BV,30 the District Court at the Hague was confronted with the question
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • UGLJEŠA GRUŠIĆ
n 94
26 Bonomi, ‘Article 7(1) of the European Contracts Convention’ (n 21) 2471-2 (footnotes omitted; all cases cited in
these footnotes involved contracts governed by French law).
27 L.I. de Winter, ‘Dwingend recht bij internationale overeenkomsten’ (1964) 11 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor
Internationaal Recht 329. See J.C. Schultz, ‘Dutch Antecedents and Parallels to Article 7 of the EEC Contracts
Convention of 1980’ (1983) 47 RabelsZ 267.
28 Van Nievelt, Goudriaan and Co’s Stoomvaartmij NV v NV Hollandsche Assurantie Societeit, HR 13 May 1966,
[1967] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie No 3 at p 21, annotated by H. van den Bergh; (1967) 56 Revue critique de droit
international privé 522, annotated by T.H.D. Struyken. The Advocate General in Alnati referred to de Winter’s
article cited in the preceding footnote.
29 Quoted in M. Giuliano and P. Lagarde, ‘Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations’ [1980] OJ C282/1, 26.
30 Pres Rb Den Haag, 17 September 1982, (1983) 22 International Legal Materials 66.
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whether an embargo placed by the United States on the export by American companies and
their foreign subsidiaries of equipment for the trans-Siberian pipeline provided a defence
against the enforcement of a Dutch contract that did not involve performance in the US. The
court held that:
Under the rules of Netherlands private international law, even where Netherlands law has to be
applied to an international contract, as in the present case, the Netherlands courts are nevertheless,
under certain circumstances, bound to accord priority over Netherlands law to the application of
mandatory provisions of foreign law.
Among the circumstances under which the Netherlands courts are required to accord such
priority is the situation in which the contract meets the condition of showing a sufficient nexus
with the foreign country concerned.31
Although the courts in the Alnati and Sensor cases did not apply overriding mandatory rules
of third countries, their willingness to do so if the right case presented itself caught the
imagination of private international lawyers on the Continent. What followed was
a codification of the practice of giving effect to third countries’ overriding mandatory rules in
international treaties concerning choice of law in contract and trust32 and in the Swiss statute
on private international law, where it was codified as a provision of general application.33 The
culmination of this trend was Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention.
III Overriding Mandatory Rules of Third Countries in EU Private
International Law
The first step towards the unification of treatment of mandatory rules in the field of private
international law in the European Economic Community was the 1972 draft convention on
the law applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations. Article 7 of the draft
convention provided:
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32 Benelux Treaty concerning a Uniform law on private international law, signed 3 July 1969, which never entered into
force and is reproduced in (1979) 18 AJCL 420, art 13(2) of the Uniform law (concerning choice of law in contract);
Convention on the law applicable to agency, signed 14 March 1978 (entered into force 1 May 1992), art 16 (binding
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between Private Persons or Entities’ (Resolution, Basel, 31 August 1991), art 9(2); Principles on Choice of Law in
International Commercial Contracts (The Hague, approved 19 March 2015), art 11. See further Convention on the
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the law applicable to product liability, signed 2 October 1973 (entered into force 1 October 1977), art 9.
33 Swiss Private International Law Act 1987, art 19(1).
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Where the contract is also connected with a country other than the country whose law is applicable
under Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 16, 17, 18 and 19, paragraph 3, and the law of that other country contains
rules which govern the matter compulsorily in such a way that they exclude the application of every
other law, these rules shall be taken into account to the extent that the exclusion is justifiable by the
particular character and purpose of the rules.34
With respect to non-contractual obligations, Article 12 provided that the courts could in
some cases take into account the rules of a law that was not the lex causae:
Irrespective of which law is applicable under Article 10 [setting out choice-of-law rules for
determining the law applicable to certain non-contractual obligations], in the determination of
liability, account shall be taken of such rules issued on grounds of security or public order as were
in force at the place and time of occurrence of the event which resulted in damage or injury.
The draft convention project never came to fruition. The European Economic Community
scaled down its ambition and instead focused on what eventually became the Rome Convention.
Article 7(1) of this convention concerned the operation of overriding mandatory rules of third
countries and provided that:
When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be given to the mandatory
rules of the law of another country with which the situation has a close connection, if and in so far
as, under the law of the latter country, those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to
the contract. In considering whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be had 
to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-application.
Although the group that drafted the Rome Convention was of the opinion that Article 7
merely embodied principles that existed in Member State laws,35 Article 7(1) largely remained
a  dead letter. Not only did seven Contracting States reserve the right not to apply this
provision,36 there are also few reported decisions of national courts from the countries that
did not opt out of the application of Article 7(1) on the application of this provision.37
During the drafting of the Rome I Regulation, the treatment of overriding mandatory
rules of third countries proved to be a deal-breaker for the UK. In its original proposal of the
Rome I Regulation, the European Commission proposed a provision in essentially identical 
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34 Art 2 allowed the parties to a contract to choose the applicable law. Arts 4–6 set out choice-of-law rules for
determining the law applicable to a contract in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. Arts 16–19
concerned the assignment of claims, formal validity, presumptions of law, burden of proof and admissibility of
evidence.
35 Giuliano–Lagarde Report (n 29) 26.
36 Rome Convention, art 22(1)(a). The seven states were Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia
and the UK.
37 See the judgment of the French Cour de cassation No 330 of 16 March 2010 (Moller v Maersk). Plender and
Wilderspin (n 22), para 12-038, fn 129 argue that this judgment is not particularly strong authority on the
application of art 7(1) since the decision of the Court of Appeal was annulled not because the court had wrongly
interpreted that provision but because it had failed even to consider its application.
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terms to that of Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention from which Member States could not
opt out.38 As the UK Ministry of Justice explains in its consultation paper ‘Rome I Regulation:
Should the UK Opt In?’: ‘The prospect of applying this provision gave rise to widespread
concern in commercial circles, particularly in the City of London […] This issue subsequently
became a key factor in the Government’s decision not to opt in to the Rome I proposal.’39 The
current wording of Article 9 is a compromise that the UK and other negotiating parties
reached – a provision that allowed the courts to give effect to third countries’ overriding
mandatory rules was retained, but its scope was significantly curtailed. Article 9(3) concerns
the operation of overriding mandatory rules of third countries and provides that:
Effect may be given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country where the
obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed, in so far as those
overriding mandatory provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful. In considering
whether to give effect to those provisions, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to
the consequences of their application or non-application.
The inspiration for the drafting of Article 9(3) was the English common law rules on foreign
illegality,40 in particular Ralli Bros. However, Article 9(3) represents a significant improvement on
the common law. As mentioned above, the common law has never clearly answered whether the
rules on foreign illegality form part of English contract law only or of English private international
law.41 If the rules on foreign illegality form part of English contract law only, they can only apply
if the contract is governed by English law. But if the rules on foreign illegality form part of English
private international law, they can apply even if the contract is governed by foreign law and can
lead to the invalidity or unenforceability of that contract, regardless of what the lex causae says.
In contrast, Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation clearly provides that effect may be given to the
overriding mandatory rules of a law that is neither the lex fori nor the lex causae.
In its original proposal of the Rome II Regulation, the European Commission proposed
a provision modelled on that of Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention.42 This provision,
however, was abandoned. Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation only provides for the application
of overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori. There is, however, a provision in Article 17 that
allows the courts to take into account in some cases the rules belonging to a law that is not
the lex causae:
In assessing the conduct of the person claimed to be liable, account shall be taken, as a matter of
fact and in so far as is appropriate, of the rules of safety and conduct which were in force at the place
and time of the event giving rise to the liability.
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39 (Consultation Paper CP05/08, 2 April 2008), para 77.
40 Ibid paras 79–80.
41 Nn 16–19 above.
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IV Recent Development 1: Nikiforidis
The first recent development that prompts us to consider whether the courts should have
a wider discretion to give effect to overriding mandatory rules of third countries is the
judgment of the CJEU in Nikiforidis. Nikiforidis, a Greek national, was employed as a teacher
at the Greek primary school in Nuremberg, Germany. The school was run by the Greek state.
Nikiforidis’ employment relationship was governed by German law. Following the Greek
financial crisis, the European Council required Greece, among other things, to adopt a reform
of its wage legislation in the public sector with a view to reducing its public deficit.43 Greece
also entered an agreement with the European Commission, the European Central Bank and
the International Monetary Fund in which it agreed to reduce its public deficit in return for
receiving support from these institutions. Pursuant to the Council’s request and the
agreement, Greece implemented a number of measures, including Law No 3833/2010, which
provided for an immediate freeze of any salary increases and imposed a reduction of 12% in
the allowances of any kind, reimbursement and remuneration of officials and employees of
public authorities, and Law No 3845/2010, which imposed a further pay cut of 3%. Following
the entry into force of these provisions, Greece reduced Nikiforidis’ salary, despite the fact that
this was not in accordance with German employment law. Nikiforidis then commenced
proceedings in Germany, seeking unpaid wages and payslips.
The lex fori and the lex causae were both German law. Greek law was, therefore, the law
of a  third country. It was undisputed that the provisions of Laws Nos 3833/2010 and
3845/2010 were overriding mandatory rules within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the Rome
I Regulation. Prima facie, however, the requirements for giving effect to the overriding
mandatory rules of a third country laid down in Article 9(3) were not met – Germany, not
Greece, was the place of performance of the contract. The German Bundesarbeitsgericht was
presented with a dilemma. On the one hand, it appeared that Article 9(3) prevented it from
giving effect to the Greek provisions. On the other hand, the Greek provisions were an
implementation of a decision of the European Council and of an international agreement
which, among other things, was supposed to stabilise the Eurozone, a matter of concern for
many EU Member States, including Germany. The Bundesarbeitsgericht referred the following
two questions to the CJEU:
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Does Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation exclude solely the direct application of overriding
mandatory provisions of another country in which the obligations arising out of that contract are
not to be performed, or have not been performed, or does that provision also exclude indirect
regard to those mandatory provisions in the law of the Member State the law of which governs the
contract?
Is the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU relevant, for legal purposes,
for the decision of national courts on whether overriding mandatory provisions of another Member
State are directly or indirectly applicable?44
The CJEU followed the Opinion of Advocate General Spuznar regarding these two questions.45
With respect to the first question, the CJEU adopted the following line of reasoning. Article
9 is an exception from the general principle of party autonomy.46 That exception is designed
to enable the courts to take into account considerations of public interest in exceptional
circumstances.47 Article 9 must be interpreted strictly.48 More generally, Article 9 is a derogation
from the normal operation of choice-of-law rules, which is all the more reason for its strict
interpretation.49 The application of the overriding mandatory rules of a third country that is
not the place of performance of the contract would undermine the general objectives of legal
certainty50 and foreseeability51 and the particular objective of the choice-of-law rules for
individual employment contracts of protecting employees.52 It followed that ‘the list, in Article
9 of the Rome I Regulation, of the overriding mandatory provisions to which the court of the
forum may give effect is exhaustive’.53 Surprisingly, however, this was not the end of the CJEU’s
reasoning. Although Article 9 must be interpreted as preventing the court of the forum ‘from
applying, as legal rules,’ overriding mandatory rules other than those of the lex fori or the law
of the place of performance, with the consequence that the German courts could not ‘apply,
directly or indirectly,’ the Greek provisions,54 the CJEU held that:
Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation does not preclude overriding mandatory provisions of a State
other than the State of the forum or the State where the obligations arising out of the contract have
to be or have been performed from being taken into account as a matter of fact, in so far as this is
provided for by a substantive rule of the law that is applicable to the contract pursuant to the
regulation.55
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45 ECLI:EU:C:2016:281, [2016] IL Pr 39.
46 Nikiforidis, paras 42–43.
47 Ibid, para 43.
48 Ibid, para 44.
49 Ibid, para 45.
50 Ibid, para 46.
51 Ibid, para 47.
52 Ibid, para 48.
53 Ibid, para 49.
54 Ibid, para 50.
55 Ibid, para 51.
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This is because the Rome I Regulation does not have the harmonisation of substantive
contract law as one of its objectives. Consequently, if the substantive rules of the lex causae
provide that the court is to take into account, as a matter of fact, overriding mandatory rules
other than those of the lex fori or the law of the place of performance, Article 9 cannot prevent
the court from taking into account that fact.56 This is for the referring court to ascertain.
With respect to the second question, the CJEU concluded that the principle of sincere
cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU did not authorise Member States to circumvent
the obligations imposed on them by EU law, namely by Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation.57
Consequently, the German courts could not give effect, as legal rules, to the Greek provisions
on this basis.
The Bundesarbeitsgericht eventually refused to take the Greek provisions into account
and held that Nikiforidis was entitled to unpaid wages and payslips under German law: ‘Even
in times of financial crisis, the employer may not reduce the agreed remuneration
unilaterally’.58
V Recent Development 2: Lilly and Les Laboratoires
It is possible that a similar, although much less obvious, development is taking place in the
English common law conflict of laws. The traditional approach to foreign illegality has been
brought into question by three cases, the High Court judgment in Lilly and, more importantly,
the recent Supreme Court judgments in Les Laboratoires and Patel v Mirza.59 The first two
cases concerned enforcement of cross-undertakings in damages following the grant of
injunctions ultimately held to have been wrongly granted. Claims for enforcement of cross-
undertakings in damages are not contractual claims, but are enforceable in equity. The third
case restated the law on domestic illegality in English private law.
In Lilly, the claimants argued that the defendants were not entitled to recover profits for
lost sales of pharmaceutical products to Canadian internet pharmacies because the drugs
would have been imported into the US in breach of US law. Arnold J first confirmed the
traditional approach to foreign illegality in the field of contract.60 He then turned to the defence
of illegality in tort. After reviewing some of the leading English cases on domestic illegality
in the law of torts,61 Arnold J stated that it was not clear whether the principles stated in these
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59 [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467.
60 Lilly, paras 262–264.
61 Ibid, paras 267–270. The most important case reviewed by Arnold J is Gray v Thames Trains Ltd [2009] UKHL
33, [2009] 1 AC 1339 where the House of Lords mentioned a principle that a person could not recover for damage
that was the consequence of his own criminal act.
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cases applied where the acts in question were unlawful because they were criminal offences
under foreign law. But, he said, ‘the principle of international comity suggests that they
should’.62 The claim in Lilly was neither a contractual nor a tortious one, but one in equity.
Arnold J thus also dealt with the effect of foreign illegality on an English equitable claim for
damages under a cross-undertaking. Arnold J rejected a submission made by the claimants
that the contract and tort cases were merely instances of a broader principle, namely that the
court would not order a defendant to compensate a claimant for loss, or a head of loss, that
arose out of the claimant’s own involvement in an illegal activity, whether under English law
or foreign law.63 Arnold J then concluded that:
the court will not award compensation under a cross-undertaking for the loss sustained by an
unlawful business or where the beneficiary of the cross-undertaking has to rely to a substantial
extent upon his own illegality in order to establish the loss. As a matter of international comity, it
does not matter for this purpose whether the acts in question are unlawful under English law or
under foreign law.64
Arnold J rejected the claimants’ argument on the basis that the defendants did not have to rely
on their own illegality in order to establish their loss, since their business of purchasing the
pharmaceutical products in Turkey, importing those products into the UK, transhipping and
exporting those products under a suspensive customs procedure known as ‘inward processing
relief ’ and selling those products to the Canadian internet pharmacies upon terms that title
and risk passed at the point where Royal Mail collected the goods was not illegal; it was the
claimants who sought to rely on the illegal acts of importation into the US by others.65
Les Laboratoires also concerned a claim for damages on a cross-undertaking given by the
claimant that it would comply with any order the court might make if it later found that an
interim injunction the claimant had obtained against the defendant caused loss to the
defendant. The claimant raised as a defence that the defendant’s lost profits would have
accrued from sales in England of a product, the manufacture of which in Canada would have
infringed a Canadian patent. The matter came before Arnold J at first instance, who applied
his decision in Lilly and held that the defendant failed because its claim was founded on its
own illegality.66 It was conceded in the Court of Appeal that the illegality defence could apply
where the source of the profits from sales in England was illegal under foreign law: ‘In such
a case, an important policy consideration, and possibly the principal one, is comity, that is to
say respect for the law and courts of other countries’.67 The Supreme Court did not discuss
English cases on foreign illegality and apparently proceeded on the basis that violations of
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ELJ-2020-1__press  2020.12.22.  11:17  Page 101
foreign laws were to be treated in the same way as violations of domestic laws for the purposes
of applying substantive English law rules founded on the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur
actio.68 The Supreme Court held that the infringement of the Canadian patent did not
constitute a  relevant illegality (‘turpitude’) for the illegality defence to operate. Had the
Supreme Court considered English cases on foreign illegality, it should have assessed whether
the claim in Les Laboratoires should have been refused on the basis that Canadian law could
simply not be taken into account because it was neither the proper law nor the law of the
place of performance of the relevant obligation to pay under the cross-undertaking.
The Supreme Court discussed Les Laboratoires in Patel v Mirza. Since this case did not
concern the conflict of laws but domestic illegality in English substantive private law, its facts
need not be presented. The majority of the Supreme Court departed from rule-based
approaches to domestic illegality that had been set out in the preceding case law, including
in Les Laboratoires, and laid down a flexible, policy-based approach. Lord Toulson summarised
the majority’s approach to domestic illegality as follows:
The essential rationale of the illegality doctrine is that it would be contrary to the public interest to
enforce a claim if to do so would be harmful to the integrity of the legal system (or, possibly, certain
aspects of public morality […]). In assessing whether the public interest would be harmed in that
way, it is necessary (a) to consider the underlying purpose of the prohibition which has been
transgressed and whether that purpose will be enhanced by denial of the claim, (b) to consider any
other relevant public policy on which the denial of the claim may have an impact and (c) to consider
whether denial of the claim would be a proportionate response to the illegality, bearing in mind that
punishment is a matter for the criminal courts. Within that framework, various factors may be
relevant, but it would be a mistake to suggest that the court is free to decide a case in an undisciplined
way. The public interest is best served by a principled and transparent assessment of the considera -
tions identified, rather by than the application of a formal approach capable of producing results
which may appear arbitrary, unjust or disproportionate.69
Since Patel v Mirza concerned domestic, not foreign illegality, the Supreme Court neither
approved nor disapproved the aspect of Les Laboratoires concerning foreign illegality.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, whilst the majority in Patel v Mirza disagreed and
the minority agreed with the rule-based approach to domestic illegality adopted in Les
Laboratoires, none of the judges in Patel v Mirza questioned the assumption in Les Laboratoires
that the infringement of a Canadian patent would have been relevant for the illegality defence
to operate had it constituted a relevant illegality (‘turpitude’). It is impossible to draw any solid
conclusions about the correctness of the omission of a conflicts analysis in Les Laboratoires
from the mere fact that such an omission was not questioned in Patel v Mirza. But, as the
editors of Dicey, Morris and Collins conclude, there may be scope to extend the flexible,
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • UGLJEŠA GRUŠIĆ
n 102
68 L. Collins (gen ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws: Fifth Supplement to the 15th edn (Sweet and
Maxwell 2018), para 32–102.
69 Ibid, para 120.
ELJ-2020-1__press  2020.12.22.  11:17  Page 102
policy-based approach to illegality of the majority in Patel v Mirza to foreign illegality and
reconsider the rule-based approach to foreign illegality of the preceding English case law.70
This could entail giving English courts a discretion to take into account illegality under the law
of a foreign country, even if that law is not the proper law of the contract and if the place of
performance of the contract is not in that country. This could further entail the extension 
of this flexible approach to other fields of law, whereby English courts would be given discretion
to take into account illegality under the law of a foreign country closely connected with the
situation. This would be a tectonic shift in the common law conflict of laws. On the one hand,
foreign illegality would become the concern of conflict of laws in general and not just an
awkward doctrine in the field of contract. On the other hand, this would harmonise the
methodological approach to illegality in English substantive law and the common law conflicts
of laws.
The effect of Lilly and Les Laboratoires (but not Patel v Mirza) on foreign illegality was
recently reviewed by Lord Collins, sitting as a Non-Permanent Judge of the Hong Kong Court
of Final Appeal in Ryder Industries, a case that concerned the enforcement of a contract with
cross-border elements. After reviewing the relevant English case law, which is in this respect
identical to the law of Hong Kong,71 Lord Collins stated that ‘It is possible that the line
between foreign illegality and domestic illegality has been blurred in two recent cases on
enforcement of cross-undertakings in damages following the grant of injunction ultimately
held to have been wrongly granted’.72 However, after reviewing Lilly and Les Laboratoires,
Lord Collins concluded that ‘No principle can be derived […] which is relevant to the present
case, or which suggests that purely domestic rules of illegality can be applied to the
consequences of the illegal performance of a contract in a foreign country’.73 Lord Collins
also dismissed as much too broad an obiter dictum from Barros Mattos Jnr v MacDaniels Ltd
that a contract which is valid by the governing English law may be refused enforcement if it
has been ‘performed in such a way that one party (or both parties) commits a legal wrong’.74
But Lord Collins also stated, somewhat cryptically, that:
There may nevertheless be cases in which a sufficiently serious breach of foreign law which reflects
important policies of the foreign state […] may be such that it would be contrary to public policy
to enforce a contract. But there is no basis in authority or principle for holding that every breach
of foreign law would come into this category.75
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VI Lessons for the Future
European systems of private international law accept that there is a sharp distinction between
the application of overriding mandatory rules of third countries and their taking into account
as fact. This is indeed an old distinction. Its antecedents lie in English cases on foreign
illegality76 and the German Schuldstatuttheorie and Sonderanknüpfungstheorie. It has become
quite prominent in EU private international law.77 In theoretical terms, it was Currie who
started to shed light on the phenomenon of taking into account foreign law as fact, local
datum.78
In theory, the distinction appears clear at first sight. When a third country’s overriding
mandatory rule is applied as law to a particular set of facts, it itself provides a legal sanction.
When a third country’s overriding mandatory rule is taken into account as fact, it is the lex
causae that is being applied and provides a legal sanction; the factual situation created by the
third country’s overriding mandatory rule is taken into account in the context of application
of a rule of the lex causae, such as a rule concerning frustration, force majeure, hardship,
morality, illegality, good faith, breach of duty etc.
The reality is, however, that in many cases there is no real distinction between the
application of a third country’s overriding mandatory rule as law and taking it into account
as fact. Consider the facts of Ralli Bros and Kulturgüterfall. In the former case, a supervening
illegality in the place of performance led to the frustration of the contract under English law,
the lex causae. In the latter case, an insurance contract governed by German law was held to
be invalid for lack of an insurable interest because it concerned the insurance of goods of
cultural heritage illegally exported out of Nigeria, an immoral act under §138 of the German
Civil Code. In both cases, the lex causae was applied and a third country’s overriding mandatory
rule was taken into account in the context of application of a rule of the lex causae. The
contracts were held to be invalid and were not enforced. However, the outcome of these cases
would have been the same had the courts adopted an alternative approach of directly applying
the foreign overriding mandatory rule in question and deriving the sanction for its breach
from the law of which the rule formed part. In other words, in cases like Ralli Bros and
Kulturgüterfall, the application of a third country’s overriding mandatory rule as law and
taking it into account as fact are functional equivalents.79 This indicates that there is a close
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functional link between Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation and Article 17 of the Rome II
Regulation. Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation allows a  court to take a  foreign rule
prohibiting certain conduct into account and to hold the contract invalid or unenforceable on
the basis that the performance of the contract would violate the prohibition. Similarly, Article
17 of the Rome II Regulation allows a court to take a foreign rule mandating or prohibiting
certain conduct into account and to hold a party liable for the breach of a non-contractual
obligation on the basis that the defendant’s conduct fell short of the conduct required by the
rule.
There are cases, however, where the distinction between the application of a  third
country’s overriding mandatory rule as law and taking it into account as fact matters. For
example, if a foreign overriding mandatory rule creates a cause of action, a party to a private
law relationship will be able to advance the foreign cause of action if the law that creates the
cause of action is the lex causae. However, if the application of third countries’ overriding
mandatory rules as law were allowed, that party could advance a cause of action created by
a foreign overriding mandatory rule, even if the law that creates the cause of action is not the
lex causae. A foreign overriding mandatory rule which creates a cause of action is not suitable
to be treated as fact and be given effect on this basis. Briggs gives the following example to
make a related point:
Take for example legislation which requires entities associated with a company whose pension fund
has been depleted to make specified payments into it. Would it be possible for such a law to be
applied by an English court if proceedings were to be brought in England, against an English
company liable according to such a rule for an order for payment? The answer appears to be that
there is nothing wrong with the law as such, but that an English court would not apply it. The
explanation for this result is that an English court could only arrive at the point at which foreign
law might be applied if the issue before the court were characterised as one on which a court might
look to foreign law. The rules which regulate the exercise of characterisation are rigid. If the claim
were contractual in nature, a court might apply a foreign lex contractus, but such a claim against
an associated entity is not contractual. If the matter were tortious in nature, the court might apply,
or at least take account of, the lex loci delicti commissi, but there is no basis for arguing that the
associated entity has committed a tort. If the matter were one which fell within the principle which
prevents unjust enrichment at the expense of another, it might apply a foreign law if that were the 
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law which was closest to the supposed obligation. But if the issue in the matter before the court
could not be said to be any of these, there would be no mechanism for applying foreign law, even
though the legislation was plainly designed to apply and even though the foreign law of which the
particular statute was a part may well have been the law with which the claim was most closely
connected. In short, there would be no rule or category of private international law for ‘foreign
statutory claims’.80
It is clear that the rules of private international law exclusively determine and limit the
effectiveness of foreign overriding mandatory rules that create causes of action. Article 9(3)
of the Rome I Regulation, for example, provides that third countries’ overriding mandatory
rules can only operate in a negative way, to deprive a contract of its validity or enforceability;
it does not allow the application of third countries’ overriding mandatory rules that create
causes of action. The Rome II Regulation does not allow the application of third countries’
overriding mandatory rules, but only contains a provision that allows the rules of safety and
conduct at the place and time of the event giving rise to liability to be taken into account even
if those rules do not belong to the lex fori or the lex causae. In English law, a foreign cause of
action can be advanced if the foreign law that creates the cause of action is the lex causae; the
doctrine of public policy (normally) operates as a shield, not a sword.81 Comparative analyses
of the key Continental systems of private international law82 do not mention any examples of
the application of third countries’ overriding mandatory rules creating causes of action.
Do the rules of private international law also exclusively determine and limit the effective -
ness of foreign overriding mandatory rules that do not create causes of action but affect private
law relationships in other ways? The abovementioned recent developments suggest that the
answer to this question is ‘no’ because substantive law also has a role to play in determining
and limiting the effectiveness of foreign overriding mandatory rules that do not create causes
of action.
Three questions arise. Should the rules of private international law allow the application
of overriding mandatory rules of third countries that create cause of actions; in other words,
should the rules of private international law allow third countries’ overriding mandatory rules
to operate as a sword, and not just as a shield? Should the rules of private international law
allow the courts to take into account an overriding mandatory rule of a third country, even if
performance or the event giving rise to liability does not take place in that country? Should
the rules of private international law exclusively determine and limit the effectiveness of
foreign overriding mandatory rules that do not create causes of action but affect private law
relationships in other ways, despite the statements of the CJEU in Nikiforidis and the English
courts in Lilly and Les Laboratoires?
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1 A Sword, not Just a Shield?
The answer to the question whether the rules of private international law should allow third
countries’ overriding mandatory rules to operate as a sword, and not just as a shield, depends
on the theory of private international law to which one subscribes.83 As Buxbaum explains,
the justification for a doctrine that permits courts, in certain circumstances, to apply not only
overriding mandatory rules of the forum and the lex causae but also overriding mandatory
rules of other countries connected with the transaction in question lies in perceptions of the
appropriate role for courts in addressing international disputes:
In its fullest form, the doctrine supports two different aspects of that role. First, vesting courts with
broad authority to apply foreign law recognizes their ability to correct for imbalances in the
bargaining process […] Second, recognizing the authority of courts to apply foreign law validates
judicial participation in the processes of cross-border governance, in the sense of supporting the
important regulatory and policy goals of other nations.84
The first aspect of the courts’ role focuses on the individual private dispute between the
parties in question. The goal is to achieve private justice and fairness in individual cases. This
accords with the traditional theory which finds justification for private international law in
that it implements ‘the reasonable and legitimate expectations of the parties’,85 in the need to
avoid ‘gross injustice and inconvenience’ that would arise if the courts refused to apply foreign
law in appropriate cases,86 and in the ‘desire to do justice’ to the parties.87 An alternative view
of private international law perceives this field of law as primarily concerned with the
collective, public, systemic interests involved in the allocation of regulatory authority among
states over private law relationships.88 The difference between the individualistic and systemic
views of private international law is reflected in two influential articles on third countries’
overriding mandatory rules. In an article published in the Journal of Private International
Law in 2006, Chong put forward two principal reasons for giving effect to third countries’
overriding mandatory rules: the interests of third countries in having their laws applied and
comity; in her opinion, these reasons justify a  provision like Article 7(1) of the Rome
Convention.89 In an article published in the same journal a year later, Dickinson argued that
giving effect to third countries’ overriding mandatory rules should be limited because
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a provision like Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention undermines party autonomy and legal
certainty and increases economic costs and risks.90 Dickinson proposed replacing this article
with a provision that resembles what is now Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation.91
English cases on foreign illegality are based on two ideas. The prevailing view is that the
rule laid down in Ralli Bros, namely that an English court will not enforce an English contract
to the extent to which its performance is illegal under the law of the contractual place of
performance, forms part of English contract law only, and not of English private international
law.92 This suggests that the main concern of this rule is to correct imbalances in the bargaining
process that arise in situations where the performance of a party’s contractual obligation has
become impossible in the place of performance. On the other hand, Foster v Driscol and
Regazzoni, which stand for the proposition that an English court will hold an English contract
invalid if the real object and intention of the parties necessitates them joining in an endeavour
to perform in a foreign and friendly country an act that is illegal under the law of that country,
are based on the idea of comity and the prevailing view is that this is a conflicts rule.93 The
main concern of this rule is to avoid embarrassment that would arise if an English court were
to enforce a contract whose purpose is to commit an illegal act in a foreign and friendly
country; the court thereby indirectly supports the important regulatory and policy goals of
that country. The recent cases on foreign illegality that concerned enforcement of cross-
undertakings in damages following the grant of injunctions ultimately held to have been
wrongly granted lay down rules that are also based on the idea of comity.94
Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention is based on the idea that the appropriate role for
courts in addressing international disputes is to support the important regulatory and policy
goals of other nations. Advocate General Spuznar indicated in his Opinion in Nikiforidis that
Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation is principally based on the same idea.95 But the drafting
history of this provision shows that its main concern is to correct imbalances in the bargaining
process that arise in situations where the performance of a party’s contractual obligation has
become impossible in the place of performance. The original proposal of the Rome I Regulation
contained a provision in essentially identical terms to that of Article 7(1) of the Rome Conven -
tion. In order to encourage the UK to opt into the regulation, a compromise was reached and
Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation was modelled on the rule laid down in Ralli Bros. Given
that the main concern of this rule is to correct imbalances in the bargaining process that arise
in situations where the performance of a party’s contractual obligation has become impossible in
the place of performance, it is logical to conclude that the main concern of Article 9(3) of the
Rome I Regulation is the same. Important regulatory and policy goals of other nations can only
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • UGLJEŠA GRUŠIĆ
n 108
90 A. Dickinson, ‘Third-Country Mandatory Rules in the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations: So Long,
Farewell, Auf Wiedersehen, Adieu?’ (2007) 3 Journal of Private International Law 53, 56–73.
91 Ibid, 86–88.
92 N 17 above.
93 N 19 above.
94 Lilly, paras 271, 287; Les Laboratoires EWCA, para 69.
95 Nikiforidis, paras 74, 80, 88, 90, 92.
ELJ-2020-1__press  2020.12.22.  11:17  Page 108
be given effect within the narrow confines of Article 9(3). That is why, from the perspective of
the individualistic view of private international law, Nikiforidis can be criticised for undermining
legal certainty and predictability by not interpreting Article 9(3) as preventing the courts from
taking third countries’ overriding mandatory rules into account as a matter of substantive law
under the lex causae.96 On the other hand, authors who subscribe to the systemic view of private
international law use Nikiforidis to support an argument for the amendment of Article 9(3) of
the Rome I Regulation along the lines of Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention.97
Given that the main concern of the key rules of English law and European private interna -
tional law concerning third countries’ overriding mandatory rules is to correct imbalances in
the bargaining process that arise in situations where the performance of a party’s contractual
obligation has become impossible in the place of performance, and that even the rules of
English private international law concerning third countries’ overriding mandatory rules that
are based on comity can only lead to the refusal of a claim, it follows that the rules of private
international law are not open to the idea of allowing third countries’ overriding mandatory
rules to operate as a sword, and not just as a shield. In order for the rules of private international
law to allow third countries’ overriding mandatory rules to supply a cause of action, a paradigm
shift would first have to take place.
2 Giving Effect to Overriding Mandatory Rules of a Third Country that 
Is not the Country of the Place of Performance or of the Event Giving
Rise to Liability?
In the field of contract, our understanding of the interaction between the lex fori, the lex
causae and third countries’ overriding mandatory rules is relatively advanced because most
of the relevant cases and academic literature discuss the problem of third countries’ overriding
mandatory rules in this context. If one adopts the individualistic view of private international
law and rejects the possibility of third countries’ overriding mandatory rules operating as
a sword, one accepts that the role that third countries’ overriding mandatory rules may play
is negative, in the sense that they may deprive a contract of its validity or enforceability.
A contract’s validity or enforceability can be potentially affected not only by a rule that exists
in the place of performance of the contract but also by a rule from another legal system closely
connected to the contract, such as the law of the place of a party’s habitual residence, domicile
or nationality98 or the law of the place of a party’s parent company’s habitual residence,
domicile or nationality.99 The law as it stands achieves a balance between the individual private
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interests of the parties concerned by allowing a  court to give effect to the overriding
mandatory rules in the place of performance, not those in another legal system closely
connected to a contract.100
With respect to the other parts of the law of obligations, our understanding of the
interaction between the lex fori, the lex causae and third countries’ overriding mandatory
rules is rudimentary. In that sense, we still find ourselves in terra incognita.101 We know,
however, that the principles and rules applicable to international contracts are not necessarily
applicable in the other parts of the law of obligations.102
In the field of torts, the lex fori and the lex causae can differ from the law of the place of
conduct. Although the Rome II Regulation does not contain a provision equivalent to Article
9(3) of the Rome I Regulation, Article 17 allows the courts to give effect to the rules of safety
and conduct at the place and time of the event giving rise to liability. According to Recital 34
of the regulation, the main concern of Article 17 is not to support the important regulatory and
policy goals of other nations, but to achieve an adequate balance between the individual private
interests of the parties concerned: ‘In order to strike a reasonable balance between the parties,
account must be taken, in so far as appropriate, of the rules of safety and conduct in operation
in the country in which the harmful act was committed, even where the non-contractual
obligation is governed by the law of another country.’ A similar rule was not needed in England
before May 1st 1996, the date of entry into force of part III of the Private International Law
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995103 because of the operation of the double actionability
rule. However, some of the recent cases decided under the 1995 Act can be interpreted as giving
effect to the foreign rules of conduct at the place and time of the event giving rise to liability,
even if the law of which those rules were part was not the law supplying the cause of action.104
Some national systems of private international law on the Continent, in particular Germany,
also traditionally give effect to the rules of safety and conduct at the place of conduct.105
With respect to issues other than the standard of conduct that may arise in the context
of a claim based on a non-contractual obligation, we do not yet have a good understanding
of the role that overriding mandatory rules of third countries potentially play. Lilly and Les
Laboratoires are rare examples of this phenomenon. They can be regarded as supporting the
proposition that, in the context of an equitable claim, the claimant cannot recover damages
‘for the loss sustained by an unlawful business’ or where the claimant ‘has to rely to
a substantial extent upon his own illegality in order to establish the loss. […] it does not matter
for this purpose whether the acts in question are unlawful under English law or under foreign
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law.’106 Lilly can also be regarded as supporting the proposition that the defence of illegality
in the English law of torts can be applied where the acts in question are unlawful because
they are criminal offences under foreign law.107
Nevertheless, more research is needed in order to understand whether, and in what
circumstances, the rules of private international law should allow the courts to give effect, in
the context of a non-contractual claim, to an overriding mandatory rule of a third country
even if the event giving rise to liability does not take place in that country.
3 Should Private International Law Preclude Taking Foreign Overriding
Mandatory Rules into Account?
Private international law rejects the possibility of third countries’ overriding mandatory rules
operating as a sword. In that sense, the rules of private international law exclusively determine
and limit the effectiveness of foreign overriding mandatory rules that create causes of action.
The question arises whether the rules of private international law should also exclusively
determine and limit the effectiveness of foreign overriding mandatory rules that do not create
causes of action but affect private law relationships in other ways.
The application of a third country’s overriding mandatory rules as law and taking them
into account as fact can be regarded in some cases as functional equivalents. By not
incorporating the provision of Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention into the Rome regulations
and by restricting the range of third country’s overriding mandatory rules that can be given
effect, the EU legislator has made a decision on where the adequate balance between the
individual private interests of the parties concerned should lie. This was a political decision
that, among other things, paved the way for the UK to opt into the Rome I Regulation.
Academics can debate whether the Rome regulations strike the right balance between the
individual private interests of parties concerned, but that balance can be disturbed only in
a future amendment of the regulations. Seen from this perspective, the judgment in Nikiforidis
cannot be regarded as correct.
The same cannot be said about the judgments in Lilly and Les Laboratoires. The English
common law conflict of laws has not had an opportunity to consider the interaction between
the lex fori, the lex causae and third countries’ overriding mandatory rules outside of the
contractual context. Lilly and Les Laboratoires are the first steps in this direction. The rules laid
down in these cases are based on the idea of comity, the same idea that inspired the rules 
laid down in Foster v Driscol and Regazzoni.
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Conclusions
This article has described the treatment of overriding mandatory rules of third countries in
private international law in Europe, focusing on the recent developments in Nikiforidis, Lilly
and Les Laboratoires and the lessons that these developments hold for the future of private
international law in the EU and England. The article reaches the following conclusions.
The distinction between the application of overriding mandatory rules of third countries
and taking them into account as fact matters where a party to a private law relationship wishes
to advance a  cause of action created by a  foreign overriding mandatory rule. A  foreign
overriding mandatory rule which creates a cause of action is not suitable to be treated as fact
and be given effect on this basis.
There is no real distinction between the application of a third country’s overriding manda -
tory rule as law and taking it into account as fact in many cases where the overriding
mandatory rule does not create a cause of action but affects private law relationships in other
ways. The application of a third country’s overriding mandatory rule as law and taking it into
account as fact can be regarded as functional equivalents in such cases. This indicates that
there is a close functional link between Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation and Article 17
of the Rome II Regulation.
Whether the rules of private international law should allow the application of overriding
mandatory rules of third countries that create cause of actions depends on the theory of
private international law to which one subscribes. The individualistic view of private international
law prevents the rules of private international law from allowing third countries’ overriding
mandatory rules to operate as a sword, and not just as a shield. In that sense, the rules of
private international law exclusively determine and limit the effectiveness of foreign overriding
mandatory rules that create causes of action.
In the field of contract, the rules of private international law allow a court to give effect
to the overriding mandatory rules of the place of performance.
More research is needed in order to understand whether, and in what circumstances, the
rules of private international law should allow the courts to give effect, in the context of a non-
contractual claim, to an overriding mandatory rule of a third country even if the event giving
rise to liability does not take place in that country.
The EU legislator has made a decision in the Rome regulations of where the adequate
balance between the individual private interests of the parties concerned should lie. Seen
from this perspective, the judgment in Nikiforidis cannot be regarded as correct.
The English common law conflict of laws has not had an opportunity to consider the
interaction between the lex fori, the lex causae and third countries’ overriding mandatory
rules outside of the contractual context. Lilly and Les Laboratoires, which are based on the idea
of comity, are the first steps in this direction.
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Introduction
One of the novelties of the new Hungarian Private International Law Act (PIL Act) is that, for
the first time in autonomous Hungarian private international law, it provides explicitly for the
possibility of applying overriding mandatory provisions.1 However, prior to this change, legal
literature and court practice had already acknowledged that certain rules apply irrespective
of the otherwise governing law. Moreover, with Hungary’s accession to the EU, Hungarian
private international law had to adapt itself to the EU private international law regime, which
includes several legal sources addressing the application of overriding mandatory rules.2
At EU level, the notion of overriding mandatory provision was defined for the first time
by Article 9 (1) of the Rome I Regulation.3 According to this Article, overriding mandatory
provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding
its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that
they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise
applicable to the contract under the Rome I Regulation. In addition, the Rome II Regulation
on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations also contains a rule on overriding
mandatory norms.4 However, not all fields of private law are covered by the EU private
international law regulations and these remain in the regulatory competence of the Member
States. The areas concerned may include personal status, family law, property law and
company law. 
This paper intends to give an overview primarily on the application of overriding provisions
outside the scope of application of the EU private international law regulations in light of
Hungarian legislation, the judicial practice of domestic courts and Hungarian legal science.
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3 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable
to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6.
4 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable
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The authors’ view is that the PIL Act undoubtedly clarifies several questions concerning the
application of overriding mandatory norms in autonomous Hungarian private international
law. Legislation gives little help to practice in identifying overriding mandatory rules, though.
The questions related to the application of overriding mandatory provisions in Hungary were
answered on the basis of the PIL Act, the relevant case law and legal literature. The PIL Act
entered into force on 1 January 2018, and we are not aware of any court practice related to
overriding mandatory provisions under the PIL Act since then. Therefore, regarding cases
falling under the scope of autonomous private international law, the article relies on the case
law based on the preceding private international law legislation, Decree-Law 13 of 1979 on
Private International Law (PIL Decree-Law).5
I Overriding Mandatory Rules in the New PIL Act
The PIL Act contains an explicit rule on overriding mandatory norms in Section 13 (1).
Section 13 (1) does not give a precise definition, but specifies certain characteristics of
overriding mandatory rules. The appearance of an explicit provision on overriding mandatory
norms is a novelty introduced by the PIL Act. The PIL Decree-Law did not contain any
provision on overriding mandatory provisions; nevertheless, private international law scholarship
found it possible to apply overriding mandatory rules even in the absence of a statutory
provision. Court practice also accepted the applicability of overriding mandatory provisions
and mostly cited the definitions given by the legal literature.6
In the new PIL Act, Section 13 of the PIL Act addresses overriding mandatory provisions
in the following way:
(1) Those provisions of Hungarian law whose content and purpose unequivocally establish their
mandatory application in the legal relationships falling under the scope of application of this Act
shall apply irrespective of the law governing under this Act (overriding mandatory provisions).
(2) The overriding mandatory provisions of another state may be taken into consideration if they
are closely connected to the facts and they have decisive significance as to the determination of
the case.7
The PIL Act describes overriding mandatory provisions as norms that gain application
irrespective of the law governing under the PIL Act. The need for their application can be
deduced from their content and scope. In the explanatory memorandum prepared for the PIL
Act, further information may be found on overriding mandatory provisions.8 The memoran dum
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is an explanation and justification of the provisions of the PIL Act drafted by the Hungarian
Ministry of Justice. As it states, the direct objective of overriding mandatory provisions is the
protection of public interests, such as political, social or economic organisation. Overriding
mandatory provisions hence include rules that have a sufficiently close relationship with the
political, social or economic system of Hungary. The explanatory memorandum adds that
the purpose of overriding mandatory provisions is the protection of the fundamental values
of Hungary. Whenever a Hungarian judge faces a situation that is regulated by an overriding
mandatory provision of Hungarian law, the judge is obliged to apply it.
Section 13 (1) of the PIL Act does not determine exactly what kinds of norms are included
in the category of overriding mandatory rules. For this reason, in Hungarian law it may raise
a problem to decide whether a provision may qualify as an overriding mandatory provision.
Section 13 (1) of the PIL Act refers to the content and purpose of the legislation as factors to
be taken into account as to whether a norm requires application irrespective of the otherwise
governing law. 
Overriding mandatory norms, as their name suggests, have to claim mandatory application.
From this perspective, it must be stated that national legislation, court practice and literature
clearly delimit mandatory norms and overriding mandatory provisions.9 Overriding mandatory
provisions are far ‘more’ than mandatory rules. Internationally mandatory provisions are
a narrower category than mandatory norms.10 Mandatory norms may be usually avoided if
foreign law is applied, due to the operation of conflict of laws, while overriding mandatory
norms apply irrespective of the otherwise applicable law.11
It happens that the PIL Act gives some guidance on the nature of the norm. Despite the
difficulties of having an exact list of overriding mandatory provisions, as a specific expression
of overriding mandatory norms, Section 26 (4) of the PIL Act states that the marriage may not
be celebrated in Hungary if there is an unavoidable impediment to the celebration of the
marriage under Hungarian law. Unavoidable impediments to the celebration of marriage in
Hungarian law are an already existing marriage or certain close family relationships between
the parties.12 In such a way, the PIL Act rules out double marriage or a marriage between close
relatives, even if it was permissible under the personal law of the persons to be married. The
fact that the parties are of the same sex is also considered as unavoidable obstacle, because
under the Hungarian Fundamental Law, only a man and a woman may enter into a marriage.13
Thus, Article L of the Fundamental Law, according to which the marriage is a life community
between a man and a woman based on a voluntary decision, is deemed to be an overriding
mandatory norm.14
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Another example may be Section 25 of the PIL Act, by virtue of which Hungarian law shall
apply to family law relationships concerning a child, provided that it is more favourable to
the child. A rule similar to the current Section 25 of the PIL Act was considered an overriding
mandatory provision in the legal literature.15
Apart from these rules, the PIL Act does not provide much help in identifying overriding
mandatory norms. Examples for overriding mandatory provisions given by the explanatory
memorandum of the PIL Act include the prohibition of expropriation without compensation,
the nullity of contracts or a unilateral declaration limiting legal capacity, and the nullity of
contracts limiting consumers’ possibility to enforce their rights before courts or otherwise.16
Judicial practice has rarely had to address overriding mandatory norms; it mainly
occurred in contract law disputes. The Kúria, the supreme court of Hungary, stated that the
resolutions of the UN Security Council and the measures of the European Union imposing
economic sanctions are overriding mandatory provisions that are applicable irrespective of
the law governing the contract under the Rome I Regulation.17 Regarding a contract falling
under the scope of application of the Rome Convention, it was held that Hungarian legislative
provisions determining the coming into existence, form, validity, content, the scope and extent
of the rights and obligations, the performance and the termination of a loan agreement do not
qualify as overriding mandatory provisions.18
Legal literature tries to give some support to identifying overriding mandatory rules and
the explanatory memorandum also relied on these scholarly opinions when having formulated
the abovementioned examples. It can be assumed that the constitutional provisions and
respect for human rights form part of overriding mandatory provisions.19 The constitutional
provisions stating that all persons have legal capacity and the corresponding rules in the Civil
Code that state that a legal declaration restricting legal capacity is null and void are often-
cited examples of overriding mandatory provisions in textbooks.20 It may also be noted that,
among the norms which have a sufficiently specific content, those standing at a higher level
of the hierarchy of legal sources (e.g., the Fundamental Law) have a bigger chance of qualifying
as overriding mandatory norms than those at an inferior level. Legal literature mentions
export and import restrictions,21 foreign exchange provisions,22 competition law, the protection
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of cultural property and environmental protection legislation,23 as well as the rules protecting
workers24 and consumers. Further examples may be brought from the area of labour law; the
rules on industrial relationships and works councils are considered as overriding mandatory
norms and cannot be avoided by agreement if the seat or the independent establishment of
the employer is in the territory of Hungary.25
Since there is no limitation in the PIL Act as to the nature of overriding mandatory
provisions, the concept of overriding mandatory norms might embrace both public and
private law provisions. In the Hungarian legal tradition, public and private law have been
differentiated. The most common demarcation principle is functionality, which considers
whether the legal relationship concerned involves exercising public power. Public law
provisions regulate the structure of the state, the exercise of public authority and the relation -
ship between the state and the citizens.26 Private law comprises norms governing the legal
relationships between parties in a non-hierarchical relationship.
Furthermore, the PIL Act does not differentiate between public or private interests
regarding overriding mandatory provisions. Some of the examples provided by the explanatory
memorandum include rules protecting public interests, such as those serving the protection
of the environment or cultural goods. However, other rules provided as examples of overriding
mandatory norms do not only protect public interests, but also private interests (e.g., the
nullity of contracts limiting legal capacity, interests of consumers and workers).27
It is worth noting that a proposal was put forward by Palásti, according to which a special
act should be adopted with a non-exhaustive list of those rules of the Hungarian Civil Code
that are considered overriding mandatory provisions.28 Such a solution would facilitate the
identification of overriding mandatory norms contained in the Civil Code for both domestic
and foreign courts. The proposal was, however, not endorsed by the legislature. 
It must be noted that the approach of the legislative provision and the explanatory
memorandum, as well as the scholarly definitions, largely correspond to the definition of the
Rome I Regulation. The explanatory memorandum of the PIL Act lists the same interests to
be taken into account as the Rome I Regulation: public interests, including political, social or
economic interests.29 There is no explicit rule in the PIL Act or case law according to which
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EU law or the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union should be followed
when interpreting overriding mandatory provisions in autonomous private international law.
However, in light of the similarity of their approaches, it can be inferred that they may be
interpreted in the same way. In their book, Mádl and Vékás note that the definition accepted
in EU private international law, in particular in Article 9 (1) of the Rome I Regulation, can be
helpful in interpreting domestic overriding mandatory provisions.30
For the first time, in autonomous Hungarian private international law, the PIL Act
contains an explicit provision on overriding mandatory rules. It lays down that overriding
mandatory rules are norms that must be mandatorily applied, irrespective of the governing
law, on the basis of their content and purpose. The general reference to the content and the
purpose of the norms and their mandatory claim for application provides quite flexible pivots
and it remains largely uncertain which norms have an overriding mandatory nature. Although
legal literature and the explanatory memorandum give some examples of overriding mandatory
rules, in practice it may be difficult to ascertain whether a norm qualifies as an overriding
mandatory rule. 
II The Application of Overriding Mandatory Rules of the Lex Fori, 
Lex Causae and the Law of Another Foreign Country
Overriding mandatory provisions may appear in the lex fori, the lex causae and in the law of
a third state. In the absence of a legislative provision on the application of overriding mandatory
provisions prior to the adoption of the PIL Act, but based on the legal literature and some
court decisions, it was quite clear that the overriding mandatory norms of Hungarian law
could be applied; however, it remained questionable whether the overriding mandatory norms
of the lex causae or another foreign country may be applied or given effect. The application of
foreign overriding mandatory norms could find some support in a decision of the Hungarian
Constitutional Court. Hungarian private international law does not follow the principle of
the non-application of foreign public law.31 On the contrary, the Hungarian Constitutional
Court pointed out that courts have the possibility to take the public law provisions of the
governing foreign law into consideration in private law disputes.32 This could suggest that
overriding mandatory norms having a public law origin could be applied as part of the
governing law. No guidance could be found, however, on the potential impact of overriding
mandatory norms of third countries.
The PIL Act has clarified the situation. As far as the overriding mandatory rules of the
forum are concerned, section 13 (1) of the PIL Act requires domestic courts to apply the
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overriding mandatory provisions of Hungarian law. Regarding overriding mandatory norms
other than those of the forum, the PIL Act follows the approach of Article 7 (1) of the Rome
Convention. Section 13 (2) of the PIL Act provides that the overriding mandatory provisions
of another state may be taken into consideration if they are closely connected to the facts and
they have decisive significance as to the determination of the case. From this paragraph, it
follows that both the overriding mandatory norms of the lex causae and of another foreign
country may be taken into account, and the PIL Act does not make any difference between
the overriding mandatory provisions of the lex causae and those of third countries. In order
to give them effect, the same conditions have to be fulfilled: the provisions of the foreign law
have to be closely connected to the factual situation and they have to have decisive significance
as to the assessment of the case. The close connection may, in particular, be based on the
nationality, domicile or habitual residence of the party or parties concerned. It is more difficult
to see what the requirement on decisive significance involves. If a rule qualifies as overridingly
mandatory by definition, it claims application to any case falling in its scope of application,
regardless of the governing law. In this sense, all overriding mandatory norms closely related
to the case seem to be decisive. Section 13 (2) of the PIL Act gives the possibility of taking the
overriding mandatory provisions into consideration, but does not impose an obligation on
Hungarian courts to give effect to the overriding mandatory norms of a foreign country.
Legislation does not make a distinction between overriding mandatory provisions of EU
Member States and third countries in areas outside the scope of application of the EU private
international law regulations. We are not aware of any difference in treatment in the case law.
In conclusion, the PIL Act makes it clear which states’ overriding mandatory norms can
be applied or given effect. The overriding mandatory provisions of the lex fori shall be applied
by the judges. The overriding mandatory provisions of the lex causae and the law of another
country may be taken into account provided that they are closely connected with the factual
situation and are of decisive importance regarding the assessment of the case.  
III Delimitation of the Ordre Public Clause and Overriding 
Mandatory Provisions
Legal literature distinguishes the ordre public clause and overriding mandatory provisions,
although it is often considered that they constitute two methods for the same purpose, namely
the protection of public policy.33 Several textbooks deem the ordre public clause as the
negative way of protecting public policy, since it rules out the application of foreign law
breaching public policy, while overriding mandatory provisions constitute the positive method
of protecting public policy.34
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Accordingly, the PIL Act contains two different sections for the two different techniques.
As we have seen, Section 13 addresses overriding mandatory provisions, while Section 12
contains the ordre public exception. According to Section 12:
(1) The application of the foreign law governing under this Act breaches Hungarian public policy
and therefore shall be disregarded if the result thereof in the given case obviously and seriously
violated the fundamental values and constitutional principles of the Hungarian legal system. 
(2) If the violation of public policy cannot be prevented in any other way, the provisions of Hungarian
law shall apply instead of the disregarded provision of foreign law.
As mentioned above, in literature it is common to begin with the concept of public policy, and
then explain that, in private international law, there are two legal techniques in the hands of
the national legislature to protect it: overriding mandatory provisions and the ordre public
clause. Certain representatives of the legal literature insist on the function of overriding
mandatory provisions to protect public policy positively. Public policy consists of the main
principles that reflect the core ethical values of a society. Világhy considered the concept 
of overriding mandatory norms as part of the broader ordre public clause.35 In his formulation,
overriding mandatory provisions are those rules that directly protect the bases of the
Hungarian social and economic order expressed in the Constitution. Mádl and Vékás similarly
define overriding mandatory norms as those rules that directly serve and protect the
foundations of the economic and social order mostly expressed in the Fundamental Law of
Hungary as well.36 Case law usually cites the definition given in the leading private international
law textbook written by Professor Mádl and Professor Vékás.37
Other authors reject the above distinction, because overriding mandatory norms should
be applied irrespective of the need to protect of public policy, and they have to be applied
even if the lex causae does not endanger the public policy of the lex fori. In 1938, István Szászy
wrote about the ‘absolute ordre public clause’ that enabled the application of certain provisions
of domestic law, irrespective of any potentially applicable foreign law. Szászy stated that in the
case of the ‘absolute ordre public clause’, the dismissal of the application of the designated
foreign law does not depend on its content.38 Réczei also underlines the difference between
the ordre public clause and overriding mandatory provisions.39 Overriding mandatory
provisions prevent the application of conflict of laws rules and courts decide a dispute based
on the overriding mandatory provisions. What is excluded is not the application of foreign law,
but the collision itself. In his view, in such a case there is no collision. The ordre public clause
intervenes and prevents the application of foreign law once the collision between legal systems
has already been decided in favour of the foreign law.  There are scholars today who share the
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above opinion that the examination of public policy protection is unnecessary with regard to
overriding mandatory provisions.40
IV Conflicts between Overriding Mandatory Provisions
A situation might occur whereby two overriding mandatory provisions are in conflict. In the
PIL Act, there is no concrete provision on how to resolve a conflict between two mandatory
provisions. There is no guidance in court practice either. However, the interpretation of
Section 13 of the PIL Act may help to resolve conflicts between Hungarian and foreign
overriding mandatory norms. 
The PIL Act explicitly states that Hungarian overriding mandatory provisions have to be
applied by Hungarian courts, whilst there is no obligation imposed on the courts to apply
foreign ones. Hungarian courts only have the possibility to take foreign overriding mandatory
provisions into consideration provided that they are closely connected to the factual situation
and are of decisive importance regarding its assessment. Consequently, if there was a contra dic -
tion between a Hungarian overriding mandatory provision and a foreign overriding mandatory
rule, the Hungarian overriding mandatory provision would prevail, because courts are bound
to apply the overriding mandatory norms of Hungarian law, but not those of a foreign law. In
the legal literature, the same view is accepted for conflicts between the overriding mandatory
provisions of the forum and those of a third state.41
The legislative provision does not provide guidance in a case where a Hungarian court
should decide on the conflict between two foreign overriding mandatory norms. In our view,
in resolving such a conflict, several factors can be taken into account. The court has to ascertain
which overriding mandatory norm is more closely connected to the case and it is also to be
examined which overriding mandatory norm is more in accordance with the interests and
values represented by Hungarian legal order. 
Conclusions
Due to the gradual expansion of EU law within the field of private international law, the role
of autonomous private international law is becoming increasingly limited. In certain areas
not covered by EU law, however, the PIL Act keep its relevance. This also holds for the
application of overriding mandatory norms. The PIL Act has introduced an express rule on
overriding mandatory provisions in autonomous Hungarian private international law for the
first time. Thereby, the PIL Act makes the difference between the application of overriding
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mandatory norms and the ordre public exception unequivocal. Section 13 of the PIL Act
provides for the application of overriding mandatory rules and at the same time describes
some elements of such norms. However, the rule seems to be fairly flexible. Which norms can
be applied under the new PIL Act as overriding mandatory rules is essentially left to court
practice.
Prior to the adoption of the new PIL Act, it was not clear whether courts could only apply
the overriding mandatory rules of Hungarian law, or those of other states could be applied or
taken into consideration as well. The PIL Act distinguishes the overriding mandatory
provisions of the lex fori and those of a foreign country. Hungarian courts are to apply the
overriding mandatory provisions of the lex fori. In addition, the PIL Act unequivocally states
that Hungarian courts have the option (but not an obligation) to give effect to the overriding
mandatory provisions of a foreign country, provided that the overriding mandatory provision
is closely connected to the underlying case and is decisive in terms of the assessment of the
case. This formulation largely corresponds to the solution of the Rome Convention.
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Introduction
The European Union (EU) – Southern African Development Community (SADC) Economic
Partnership Agreement (EPA) is the first regional EPA in Africa to become fully operational.
West Africa (WA) is the EU’s largest trading partner in Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, the WA – EU
EPA has not been ratified. Although the recent entry into force of the African Continental Free
Trade Agreement (AfCFTA)1 signals progress in the regional integration of the fragmented
African economies, the regional EPAs – considered as its building blocks – are slowly aligning.
Inflexibility and insufficient financial guarantees from the EU to help the African States deal
with the detrimental fiscal impacts of the EPAs are the key reasons for the reluctance to ratify.
Nigeria, the largest economy on the continent has blocked the WA – EU EPA from coming
into force. The WA – EU EPA deserves a focused legal analysis to establish its strengths and
weaknesses. In the event of a dispute in trade relations under the EPA, is the current dispute
settlement mechanism suitable and effective? The article analyses the text of the WA – EU
EPA to determine the characteristics of the legal safeguard provisions and the dispute
settlement procedures applicable. It also assesses the legal implications of these legal
safeguards to illustrate why they act as disincentives to ratification. The article concludes that
the current form of the dispute settlement mechanism is not sufficiently reassuring to the
WA States especially in the context of a purportedly development-friendly trade agreement.
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1 Agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area between the Member States of the African
Union. Signed in Kigali on 21 March 2018 (Entry into force 30 May 2019) (hereafter AfCFTA).
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I Dispute Settlement Mechanism in the WA — EU EPA
Prevailing factors in WA States such as a  lack of diversification of economy and limited
sources of fiscal revenue are common. These challenges provide fertile ground for trade
barriers.
The European Commission considers dispute settlement as ‘a precious tool to address
trade barriers’.2 The provisions embodied in the EPAs should give a legitimate expectation of
legal certainty, predictability, and protection to both parties. The extent of their interpretation,
application, and enforcement arguably relies on the effectiveness of the underlying dispute
settlement mechanism. The EPAs are a partnership based on economic and development
cooperation. Although, the EPAs makes many references to the WTO Agreements, the dispute
resolution mechanism in the WA – EU EPA cannot be said to be modelled on the WTO
Dispute Settlement System. The dispute settlement mechanism provided in the WA – EU EPA
have presumably been legally scrubbed in the course of negotiations, however, there remain
weaknesses.
Firstly, the lack of capacity, in terms of technical and financial capacity, of the WA States
to initiate or participate in the dispute settlement mechanisms is not new, nor does it come
as a surprise. This is explicitly acknowledged in the WA – EU EPA under the provision on
Cooperation:3
The Parties agree to cooperate, including financially, in accordance with the provisions of Part III
of this Agreement4, with regard to legal aid and in particular with regard to building up capacities
in order to make possible the use by the West Africa Party of the dispute settlement mechanism
provided for in this Agreement.
The agreement to cooperate can be interpreted as meaning that the EU party would provide
financial and technical support in the form of legal aid. On the other hand, the WA party
would need to cooperate by respecting the terms and conditions of the aid. Although it can
be argued that the (financial) legal aid is a precondition or a prerequisite before the WA party
can be expected to ‘make possible the use’5 of the dispute settlement mechanism. The article
is phrased to imply that the (financial) legal aid and capacity building is neither a unilateral
obligation of the EU party, nor an absolute right of the WA party. Several EU Civil Society
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2 Report from the Commission to the Parliament and the Council on Trade and Investment Barriers, 
January–December 2017, 24. <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/june/tradoc_156978.pdf http://trade.ec.
europa.eu/doclib/ docs/2018/june/tradoc_156978.pdf> accessed 01 June 2019.
3 Economic partnership agreement between the West African States, the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), of the one part, and the
European Union and its Member States, of the other part (hereafter WA – EU EPA), art 86.
4 PART III: Cooperation for Implementation of Development and Achievement of the Objectives of the Agreement,
WA – EU EPA.
5 Ibid.
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Organisations (CSOs)6 have remarked on the implied non-committal of the WA – EU EPA
provisions on development cooperation in general.7 They note that the EU resisted ACP
requests for EPAs to contain development cooperation provisions from the start of the
negotiations and since then the EU has only accepted non-committal language. It should be
recalled that the development objective/dimension, that is, an intentional support by the EU
party to the WA party in this regard, has always been espoused as the raison d’être of past
and pending ACP-EU trade agreements. The development finance cooperation commitment
enshrined under Part 4 of the CA, which is the foundation of the WA – EU EPA states:
ARTICLE 55 Objectives
The objectives of development finance cooperation shall be, through the provision of adequate
financial resources and appropriate technical assistance, to support and promote the efforts of ACP
States to achieve the objectives set out in this Agreement on the basis of mutual interest and in
a spirit of interdependence.
Without an unequivocal commitment to financial and technical aid, it is unsettling to consider
that one party in a dispute has an outright comparative advantage over the other, as would be
the case since the WA party would rely on the EU party, if it so wishes, to provide the technical
and financial means for consultations, mediation, and arbitration. The fairness and equality
(key principles of public international law) implications of this are not hard to imagine.
The Africa – EU regional EPAs are intended to be building blocks for the AfCFTA.8 The
general provisions of the AfCFTA are very similar to the EPAs. For example, Article 26 (e) of
the AfCFTA covers the same matters (except data privacy and protection) to Article 87(c) of the
WA – EU EPA. However, the AfCFTA is said to be ‘still very weak and needs a lot of work
which could take at least three more years’ to finalise.9 There are also the same outstanding
regulatory issues as in the EPA such as investment, intellectual property, competition, rules
of origin, and e-commerce.10 Notably, Benin, Eritrea, and Nigeria have not signed the
AfCFTA. Nigeria’s main objection is that, just as with the EPA, the protection of domestic
industry is not guaranteed. To add to the complexity of the lacking harmonisation between
the WA – EU EPA and the AfCFTA, some authors argue that the iEPAs disrupt regional
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6 Afrikagrupperna/Africa groups of Sweden; AITEC, France; ATTAC France; 11.11.11, Belgium; Both Ends,
Netherland; Coordinadora de ONGD de Euskadi, Spain; CNCD 11.11.11, Belgium; Comhlamh, Ireland; Fair, Italy;
Forum Syd, Sweden; German Stop EPA Coalition www.stopepa.de; Germany; IBIS, Denmark; Micah Challenge,
Portugal; MS ActionAid, Denmark; Oxfam International; Setem-Catalunya, Spain; Traidcraft, UK; Trocaire,
Ireland; World Development Movement, UK; World Rural Forum, Spain.
7 Critical issues in the EPA negotiations, An EU CSO discussion paper, August 2009, <https://www.ft.dk/samling/
20081/almdel/euu/bilag/555/718662.pdf> accessed 10 March 2020.
8 ‘Strengthening the EU’s partnership with Africa Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs’
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/factsheet-africaeuropeallianceprogress-
18122018_en.pdf> accessed 04 May 2019.
9 Landry Signé and Colette van der Ven, ‘Keys to success for the AfCFTA negotiations’ May 30, 2019
<https://www.brookings.edu/research/keys-to-success-for-the-afcfta-negotiations/> accessed 03 June 2019.
10 Ibid.
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integration because borders will need to be established in those countries, which have not
signed iEPAs in order to prevent EU imported goods into the iEPA States from coming into
their territories.11 There is potential for dispute. In this regard, although another key tenet of
the WA – EU EPA is the promotion of regional integration, it is difficult to see how the WA
– EU EPA could co-exist compatibly with the continent-wide trade agreement: the African
Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). Furthermore, like the WTO system, the
AfCFTA makes provision for a Dispute Settlement Body to be established, which can form
a dispute settlement panel and appellate body to assist the DSB in making recommendations
or rulings on a dispute. It also allows the State Parties to request/undertake the process of
good offices, conciliation, and mediation.12 This option is not given in the WA – EU EPA.
There is also the risk of procedural and jurisdictional confusions that can affect legal certainty
due to the fact that the issues of dumping and subsidies fall under a distinct dispute resolution
mechanism in the EPA [Article 20(6)]. This special legal review procedure is to be applied
where the dispute concerns anti-dumping duties, countervailing measures, and multilateral
safeguards. Although Article 20(1) WA – EU EPA allows for both parties to individually or
collectively take anti-dumping or countervailing measures under the relevant WTO
Agreements (including the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)),
on the other hand, Article 20 (8) WA – EU EPA curtails the dispute settlement procedure to
be applied. It states: ‘The provisions of this Article shall not be subject to the dispute
settlement provisions of this Agreement’. This implies that these measures can neither be
subjected to arbitration, nor to the extensive special or additional dispute settlement rules
and procedures under the SCM Agreement, nor to the invocation of the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism. The following flow chart illustrates the special procedure [Article
20(6)] proposed in the WA – EU EPA:
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11 K. Nnamdi and K. Iheakaram, ‘Impact of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) on African Economy: A legal
perspective’ <http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/miscellaneous_files/6-ABCA-Nnamdi-Impact_of_EPA_on_AFR_
economy.pdf> accessed 17 May 2019, 12.
12 AfCFTA, Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes, art 8.
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Figure 1.
Source: (D. F. Akinyooye) Author’s illustration
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II Stepping Stone Agreements under the WA — EU EPA
As an illustration of the nature of Stepping Stone Agreements, the Ghanaian case is briefly
examined. The Stepping Stone Agreement (iEPA) with Ghana was signed on 28 July 2016, and
ratified by the Ghanaian Parliament on 3 August 2016. A recent headline points to alleged
dissatisfaction with the EPA by the local private sector.13 The Chief Executive Officer of the
Private Enterprises Federation (PEF) criticised the EPA stating ‘they can ban our products
anytime they want without arbitration; without recourse to us’. To judge this statement, the
relevant provisions of the EPA are assessed. Firstly, under Article 24(2), the EU cannot impose
multilateral safeguards on imports from Ghana within five years of the coming into force of
the iEPA. At the end of that period, the EPA Committee will need to review the development
situation of Ghana to determine if this exception should be extended.14 If it is not, and the EU
enforces multilateral safeguards, such as those having the effect of a ‘ban’, the matter can only
be addressed using the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism, and not that of the EPA.15
Concerning bilateral safeguards only between the EU and Ghana, the EPA lays down
prerequisite scenarios (either of them would suffice, they need not be accumulated) that would
warrant the imposition of a safeguard measure by the EU on Ghana, and vice versa:
(a) serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products
in the territory of the importing Party, or
(b) disturbances in a sector of the economy, particularly where these disturbances produce
major social problems, or difficulties which could bring about serious deterioration in the
economic situation of the importing Party; or
(c) disturbances in the markets of like or directly competitive agricultural products or
mechanisms regulating those markets.16
However, only one or more of any of the following safeguard measures (including surveillance
measures are also permitted17) can be imposed to remedy any of the above situations:
(a) suspension of the further reduction of the rate of import duty for the product concerned,
as provided for under this Agreement;
(b) increase in the customs duty on the product concerned up to a level which does not
exceed the customs duty applied to other WTO Members; and
(c) introduction of tariff quotas on the product concerned
Presumably, these measures would fall under the general dispute settlement mechanism
(including arbitration) provided for in the EPA, but this is not explicitly mentioned under the
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13 ‘Ghana’s private sector will block implementation of EPAs in its current form’, New Ghana, 01 June 2019:
<https://www.newsghana.com.gh/ghanas-private-sector-will-block-implementation-of-epas-in-its-current-
form/> accessed 02 June 2019.
14 Stepping stone Economic Partnership Agreement between Ghana, of the one part, and the European Community
and its Member States, of the other part. Signed in December 2014. (Entry into force December 2016) (Hereafter
Ghana – EU Stepping Stone Agreement), art 24(3).
15 Ghana – EU Stepping Stone EPA, art 24(4).
16 Ghana – EU Stepping Stone EPA, art 25(2).
17 Ghana – EU Stepping Stone EPA, art. 25(4)–(5).
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article. Instead, there is a repeated emphasis on notification to, and periodic consultations
within, the EPA Committee.18 It follows that PEF’s interpretation holds true in the case of
bilateral safeguards too. This illustrates that the concerns of the private sector have not been
allayed, even in an EPA that has been heralded as a showcase of the WA – EU trade relations.19
The main issues are similar to those put forward by Nigeria, that is, the lack of local
capacity to develop indigenous industries and to implement the EPA without adequate
support for the local transformation process and reforms.20
III Dispute Avoidance in the WA — EU EPA
Some legal reports opine that the dispute settlement mechanism in the EPA will not be used
in practice since state-to-state disputes are rather addressed through alternative, less adversarial
means.21 The first joint meeting of the SADC – EU EPA Implementation Committee already
gives an indication of this preference.22 As the excerpt below shows, the parties agreed to
disagree on the legality of the investigation into the South African safeguard duty on EU
poultry;23 the EU party disputed the findings and recommendations of the South African
International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC)24:
1. SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION ON POULTRY
• A discussion took place on the safeguard measure. The EU reiterated its disagreement on using
Article 34 EPA as a  basis for the continuation of the investigation. The parties noted their
disagreement on this issue.
• SACU stressed that the ITAC investigation is closed and that any measure needs to be based on
facts and on the applicable legal provisions.
• EU to provide a comprehensive written submission on the ITAC recommendation within 14 days.
• Parties agreed to hold a technical discussion on that basis in the week of 21 November 2017
with a view to finding a solution acceptable to the parties concerned.
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18 Ghana – EU Stepping Stone EPA, art 25(7) (a–e).
19 See <https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ghana/7766/eu-welcomes-ghanas-signing-and-ratification-of-the-
epa_en> accessed 02 June 2019.
20 See <https://www.newsghana.com.gh/ghanas-private-sector-will-block-implementation-of-epas-in-its-current-
form/> accessed 02 June 2019.
21 Andrew Mizner, ‘EU – Africa deal comes into effect’ (November 2016) African Law and Business
<https://www.africanlawbusiness.com/news/6863-eu-africa-deal-comes-into-effect> accessed 02 June 2019.
22 ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT between the European Union and its Member States, of the one
part, and the SADC EPA States, of the other part, signed on 10 June 2016 (Entry into force February 2018)
(hereafter SADC – EU EPA). The SADC – EU EPA is used as an example here because there are no publicly
accessible records on such issues with the WA – EU EPA or the Ghana / Ivory Coast iEPAs.
23 It concerned a 13.9% provisional safeguard duty in 2016, expired in 2017, then renewed in 2018 to 35.3% imposed
by South Africa on bone-in chicken imports from the EU. It will decrease to 15% over 4 years between March
2021–2022. Brazil and the US are strong competitors in the sector where the EU has lost some of its market share.
24 Joint Report of the 2nd Meeting Of The Trade And Development Committee Of The Economic Partnership
Agreement Between The European Union And The Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA 
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Since then, the safeguard duty has been maintained and extended resulting in lost
competitiveness for the EU.25 The case is significant because it illustrates the two separate
adjudicatory paths available for a  State party (the South African Minister of Trade and
Industry) and for a private entity (the South African Association of Meat Importers and
Exporters and the South African Poultry Association) on the valid interpretation and
application of the EPA.26 SADC brought the dispute before the Trade and Development
Committee for consultations and periodic reviews in line with Article 34 (7) (e).
The measure is prohibited under Article 34 (10) from being dealt with using the WTO
Dispute Settlement mechanism. The private entity can only bring a case before the domestic
courts for a judgment on the validity of a State entity’s actions in accordance with national
legislation. Such a judgment could impact the State’s application of the EPA. As some legal
academics have rightly opined:
A claim by a private party that executive action is invalid because transitional arrangements in
successive trade agreements have been wrongly interpreted, takes arguments about rationality and
respect for the rules on the intra vires exercise of powers, into new territory.27
The information exchanged and positions adopted by both parties during consultations and
mediation remain confidential.28
IV Arbitration under the WA — EU EPA
The WA – EU EPA can be deemed a contract between the EU and WA. The Rome Treaty,29
and subsequently the Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Lisbon Treaties,30 provide that the Court
of Justice of the EU shall have jurisdiction to give judgement pursuant to any arbitration clause
contained in a contract concluded by or on behalf of the Community, whether that contract
be governed by public or private law. Furthermore, the legal basis for jurisdiction of the
General Court in the WA – EU EPA context is also supported by case law.31 During the first
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States, 21 October 2017, Brussels: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/october/tradoc_156355.pdf>
accessed 04 May 2019.
25 South Africa: South Africa Extends Safeguard Duty on EU Bone-in Broiler Meat, 22 October 2018:
<https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/south-africa-south-africa-extends-safeguard-duty-eu-bone-broiler-meat>
accessed 04 May 2019.
26 Gerhard Erasmus and Willemien Viljoen: The Battle over Safeguards on Poultry Imports from the EU continues,
September 2017: <https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/12101-the-battle-over-safeguards-on-poultry-
imports-from-the-eu-continues.html> accessed 04 May 2019.
27 Ibid.
28 WA – EU EPA, art 65(3) and art 66(6).
29 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty, hereafter Rome Treaty) Signed in: Rome
(Italy) 25 March 1957. (Entry into force: 1st January 1958), art 181.
30 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (OJ
C 306, 17.12.2007); (entry into force on 1 December 2009) (hereafter Lisbon Treaty), art 272.
31 C-274/97 Commission v Coal Products; T-401/07 Caixa Geral de Depósitos v Commission; C-43/17 P Jenkinson v
Council and Others, etc.
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ten years of implementation of the WA – EU EPA, the SDT applied with respect to dispute
settlement is to abstain from arbitration. It is not clear though whether this obligation is to
be observed by the WA States too.
ARTICLE 82 Transitional provision
To take account of the special situation of West Africa, the Parties agree that, for a transitional
period of ten (10) years following the entry into force of this Agreement, the European Union Party
shall give full preference to consultation and mediation as ways of settling disputes and shall display
moderation in its demands.
In the WA – EU EPA, arbitration is the last resort. There is no appeal procedure. The nature of
arbitration deserves some analysis. It is said that the substance of arbitration is procedure as
has been famously quoted ‘arbitration as a subject is procedure’32 In international commercial
arbitration, the duty of the arbitration panel is to give full satisfaction to party autonomy while
simultaneously maintaining fairness and efficiency between the parties.33 This is especially
important for the parties with different legal traditions and norms. Expediency and flexibility
are key expectations by the parties in a dispute. Arbitration is also invariably expensive, not
least because of the fees charged by highly experienced private lawyers, and rental costs of
arbitration forums. It can be inferred that the absence of an appeal level in the EPA is deliberate
in the interest of saving cost and time. But where time is paramount, quality and accuracy
might be subverted. Given that the arbitration panel rulings may or may not be publicised,34
it will be difficult to determine how decisions were reached.
Under the CA, if a party requests for arbitration, within thirty days from the request,
both parties are to appoint one arbitrator each. The two arbitrators appoint a third arbitrator.
In the event of failure to do so, either Party may ask the Secretary General of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration to appoint an arbitrator.35
Interestingly, the CA does not provide for mediation as a dispute avoidance / resolution
mechanism. It only encompasses consultations in general terms36 and arbitration as the
specific dispute settlement mechanism.37
The rules of interpretation applicable to the CA, (as for the regional WA – EU EPA), are
the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, including those set out in the
Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties.38
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Evidence in International Arbitration, Volume 4 (Kluwer Law International 2012).
33 Waincymer, ibid, 8.
34 WA – EU EPA, art 81 (2).
35 CA, art 98.
36 CA, art 38A.
37 CA, art 98.
38 WA – EU EPA, art 80.
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Under the WA – EU EPA, the same measure cannot simultaneously be initiated before
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and the EPA Arbitration Panel.39 The initiated proceeding
must first be concluded. A party can suspend observance of its obligations under the EPA if
the WTO DSB authorises it to do so. Conversely, if a party is authorised under the EPA to
suspend benefits, the WTO Agreement cannot prevent it.40 Arbitration under the EPA cannot
rule on any WTO-related rights and obligations of each Party.41 The Table 1 below outlines
the three main dispute settlement options under the WA – EU EPA.
Table 1. Comparison of the dispute settlement options in the WA – EU EPA








Written request  Written request  Written request  
Party to inform – The other party 
– The JIC 
– The other party 
– The JIC 
– The other party 
– The JIC 
Aim of request Formal initiation 
of consultations 





The JIC presides 1 mediator 
– Parties to select within 10 
days, or 
– JIC to select w/in 20 days 
3 arbitrators selected from the List  
(21 general list + 15 sectoral list) 
Action Consultation Convene mediation Establish panel 
Time limits 
modifiable? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Time limit for 
general cases 
60 days 30 days from date of 
agreement 
Within 10 days from the request, 
each party appoints an arbitrator.  




40 days  Within 45 days of 
appointment, give non-
binding Opinion  
Within 120 days of establishment,  
the panel presents an interim report. 
The parties have 15 days to send 
written comments. 
Conclude within 60 days  Within 15 days from date 
of meeting collect parties’ 
submissions. 
Within 150 days of establishment,  
the panel ruling.  
Time extension until 180 days from  
the date of establishment. 
In urgent cases 15 days until  
30 days 
 Within 75 days of establishment 
until 90 days 
Within 10 days of establishment,  
the panel can give a preliminary 
ruling on urgency of the case 
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40 WA – EU EPA, art 84 (3).
41 WA – EU EPA, art 84 (1).
ELJ-2020-1__press  2020.12.22.  11:17  Page 134









Non-binding opinion (may 
include recommendation) 
A binding arbitral ruling that sets 
out the findings of fact, the 
applicability of the relevant 
provisions of the EPA and the 
reasoning for the  
No consultation 
held 
Arbitral ruling within 150 days from 
the date of establishment of the 
panel, or 180 days, at the latest, after 
notifying the Parties and the Joint 
Implemen-tation Committee (JIC) 
in writing.  
Within 90 days from establishment, 





agreement, seek  
a mediator  
Request arbitration Actions formulated to achieve 
compliance with ruling. 
Request 
arbitration  
Agreement on reasonable time to 
comply with ruling. 
Within 30 days from ruling, the 
Defendant party informs the 
Complainant and the JIC of the time  
it will take to comply. 
If there is disagreement, the 
Complainant must send a written 
request within 30 days from receipt  
of Defendant’s estimated time, to 
the panel to rule on reasonable time.  
The reasonable period of time can 
be extended by mutual agreement of 
the parties.  
Status of 
information  
Confidential Confidential Arbitral ruling can be publicised or 
kept confidential if the JIC so 
decides.  
   Before end of reasonable 
compliance time, the Defendant 
notifies the Complainant and the 
JIC of the measure taken to comply.  
Complainant can send a reasoned 
written request for a ruling on the 
compatibility of the measure to the 
Panel. 
Within 90 days from date of request, 
Panel gives its ruling on compliance. 
Within 45 days, for urgent cases. 
Within 105 days from request, if 
original Panel cannot reconvene.  
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   If Defendant fails to notify before 
end of reasonable time, or if ruling 
determines non-compliance, 
Complainant can ask for 
compensation (incl. financial). 
If no mutual agreement on 
compensation is reached within 30 
days from end of reasonable time or 
from delivery of ruling, Complainant 
can adopt appropriate measures 
after notifying Defendant. The 
measure(s) must be those which 
least affect the attainment of the 
objectives of the EPA.  
Where the Defendant is the EU, and 
the complaining Party is entitled to 
adopt appropriate measures, but 
asserts that the adoption of such 
measures would result in significant 
damage to its economy, the EU shall 
consider providing financial 
compensation. The EU shall 
exercise due restraint in asking for 
compensation or adopting 
appropriate measures. These must 
be temporary until the dispute is 
settled or the violation is rectified.  
The Defendant shall notify the 
Complainant and the JIC of the 
measures taken to comply with the 
EPA and request that the 
appropriate measures be ended.  
   If the Complainant does not agree 
that the measure is compliant, it can 
request within 30 days from 
notification, the original Panel to 
rule on the compliance. It must also 
inform the Defendant and the JIC of 
this request.  
Within 45 days, the Panel gives a 
ruling on compliance notifying the 
parties and the JIC. If incompatible, 
the Panel determines whether the 
Complainant may continue to apply 
appropriate measures. If compliant, 
the measures must be terminated. If 
original Panel unable to reconvene, 
the ruling can be given within 60 
days from receipt of request.  
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V Legal Certainty under the WA — EU EPA
A dispute settlement mechanism should be comprehensive and reassuring to Parties that it
provides legal certainty, clarity through interpretation of provisions, and security in protecting
rights and enforcing obligations. It is interesting to note that the term ‘arbitral award’ is not
used at all. There is no indication of how to overcome potential or actual deadlock. This raises
questions to be further analysed. What appeal options are available beyond the arbitral ruling?
What is the status of Panel recommendations (as opposed to ruling)?
A few criticisms can be drawn from these options, especially on arbitration. The set
number of arbitrators on a panel is questionable. Why is it fixed to only three arbitrators?  The
most common composition of the arbitration panel is three as many literatures42 highlight the
speed, cost effectiveness, and efficiency of a three-person panel compared to a higher or lower
number. Similarly, international arbitration courts43 have set the number three as default, but
do allow the parties to decide on the number of their choice.44 Yet in a multiparty case such as
would be the case under WA – EU EPA, the issue of party equality and influence over the
nomination of arbitrators is an issue. It is probable that the parties on each side would not
agree on the designations because of their differing interests. As the watershed Dutco case45






   Panel sessions may be open to the 
public unless requested otherwise by 
the parties or the Panel. 
Interested entities are authorised to 
submit amicus curiae briefs to the 
arbitration panel. The Panel must 
notify the Parties of these 
submissions and allow them to 
comment.  
Panel rulings are taken by consensus 
or, if not possible, then by majority 
vote.  
Mutually agreed solution can be reached at any time. It should be notified to the JIC (and the 
Panel, if any) and adopted.  
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42 J. Mair, ‘Equal treatment of Parties in the Nomination Process of Arbitrators in Multi-Party Arbitration and
Consolidated Proceedings’ Austrian Review of International and European Law Online, 1 January 2010, pages
59–82. J-Louis Delvolvé, ‘Multipartism: The Dutco Decision of the French Cour de cassation’ (1993, June) 9 (2)
Arbitration International 197–202.
43 International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules of Arbitration, art 10; Belgian Centre for Mediation and
Arbitration (CEPANI) art 9; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art 7, etc.
44 London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Rules have three-person tribunal as the maximum number.
45 Siemens AG and BKMI Industrienlagen GmbH v Dutco Construction Co., Cour de Cassation, Jan. 7, 1992.
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outlined, the issue of party autonomy and discretion in appointing their choice of arbitrator
is a matter of public policy.46 It is crucial that the parties to a dispute be treated fairly and
equally and reach a mutual agreement on the constitution of the arbitration panel, otherwise
the arbitral award risks being unenforceable and annulled. Under the Yaoundé Conventions,
disputes were first addressed by the Association Council to reach an amicable settlement.
Failing this, the dispute was brought before the arbitration court consisting of five arbitrators
ruling by a majority vote: a president appointed by the Association Council and four judges
(two appointed by the Council of the EEC, and two by the Associated States).47 It should be
noted that the arbitration court under Yaoundé (and Lomé) was a fixed institution, and it was
later defunct. The current method relies on the appointment of an ad hoc arbitration panel
by the parties.48
According to Article 68 WA – EU EPA, the applicant and the respondent are to propose
one each, and agree on the chair. They are to consult one another to agree on the selection.
However, what about when there are many parties on both sides of a dispute? It is not far-
fetched to imagine the additional delay and difficulty of several parties agreeing on just one
arbitrator in whom they could unequivocally bestow their confidence. According to general
principles of international law, the dispute resolution mechanism between contracting parties
should provide for a neutral forum that can guarantee the observance of impartiality and
fairness. To ensure neutrality, there must be a depoliticization of the dispute resolution
mechanisms. However, the Joint Implementation Committee, the executive decision-maker,
or at the least, the watchdog on the interpretation and application of the EPA, is to be comprised
of senior officials appointed by the Parties. These officials are representatives of the parties’
governments and thus inevitably bound by political affiliations and allegiances.
Among the 79 ACP countries,49 28 are major common law countries (a distinct feature
of their Commonwealth history): Botswana, Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Kiribati,
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Samoa,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad
and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia, Jamaica.
To achieve a  level of harmonization that makes the EPA provisions workable, ACP
domestic laws and legal systems are undergoing reform. This can be seen as a migration of
EU law. The map below illustrates the myriad of mixed legal systems across African States.
Such a context adds a layer of complexity to achieving regulatory harmonisation and legal
reform.
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46 R. Ugarte & T. Bevilacqua, ‘Ensuring party equality in the process of designating arbitrators in multiparty
arbitration: An update on the governing provisions’ (2010) 27 (1) Journal of International Arbitration 9–49, 2010.
47 The First Yaoundé Convention (1963–1969) – OJ 093, 11/06/1964 P. 1431, signed on 20 July 1963, end of validity:
31/05/1969 (hereafter YC I); Expiry in 1969 with a renewable term of five years. Art 51.
48 Eric C. Djamson, The Dynamics of Euro-African Co-operation Being an Analysis and Exposition of Institutional,
Legal and Socio-Economic Aspects of Association/Co-operation with the European Economic Community (Martinus
Nijhoff/The Hague 1976).
49 There are 48 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, 16 from the Caribbean and 15 from the Pacific. <http://www.acp.
int/content/secretariat-acp> accessed 06 May 2019.
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Figure 2. Geographical mapping of legal systems in Africa
Source: Opiniojuris.org
The EPA is framed as a stand-alone, self-contained agreement that is neither above nor below
in the order of precedence among international economic and development cooperation laws
or regulations. This is seen in provisions such as Article 87(c):
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or application by either
Party of measures: (c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement…
And Article 105(1):
1. Nothing in this Agreement may be interpreted as preventing the taking by the European Union
Party or any of the West African States of any measure deemed appropriate concerning this
Agreement in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Cotonou Agreement.
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This provision implies that the EPA is subordinate to the CA because measures not
sanctioned or contained in the EPA, and measures that can affect the EPA, can nevertheless
be taken by the parties if they are based on the CA. However, in view of the expiration of the
CA in February 2020, this provision would become obsolete, thereby rendering the any
contemplated measures subject to the EPA itself.
Article 105 (2) provides that: ‘(2) The Parties agree that nothing in this Agreement
requires them to act in a manner inconsistent with their obligations in connection with the
WTO.’
Article 84 (3) raises the legal status of the EPA to the same level as the WTO. Since the EPA(s)
was (were) established to rectify and regulate Africa – EU trade regimes on the principle of
conformity with the WTO, it follows that the EPAs fall under the umbrella of the WTO
Agreement. However, attention should be paid to Article 84 (3) which is ambiguous, and
therefore can be misleading, in understanding the order of precedence of both agreements:
‘The WTO Agreement cannot prevent the Parties from suspending the benefits granted
under this Agreement.’
The few exceptions where parties’ actions are permitted to ‘subordinate’ the EPA are
those that concern security purposes,50 balance of payments difficulties,51 taxation52. Having
said this, the EPA accumulates the existing rights and obligations under the various WTO
Agreements as it makes reaffirmations of these across a significant number of provisions.
Notably, mutual obligations pertaining to SPS and TBT standards.53
VI EU Case Law and Potential Impact on the WA — EU EPA
There are notable legal safeguards in place within EU primary law and secondary law.
The ECJ has the competence to give a preliminary ruling on the provisions of the Cotonou
Agreement. In Afasia Knits Deutschland,54 the Court ruled that all contracting states of the
CA, as well as the European Commission, have the right, even when a matter does not directly
concern their national authorities, to initiate an investigation into a suspected infringement
of the CA provisions. The main proceedings of this particular case involved the post-clearance
recovery of import duties by the German customs based on the wrongful issuing of (EUR.1)
certificates of origin by the Jamaican (ACP States) authorities entitling the exported textiles
to preferential treatment. The Court further held that the findings of such a verification
investigation are binding on the national authorities of the importing State concerned:
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50 WA – EU EPA, art 88.
51 WA – EU EPA, art 89.
52 WA – EU EPA, art 90 (3): ‘Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights and obligations of the Parties under
any tax convention. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and such a convention, the
convention shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency.’
53 WA – EU EPA, art 28.
54 Case C-409/10 Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen v Afasia Knits Deutschland GmbH [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2011:843.
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32. It follows that, as pointed out in the written observations of the Czech and Italian Governments
and of the Commission, and as observed by the Advocate General at point 23 of his Opinion,
subsequent verification must be carried out not only when the importing Member State so requests,
but also, in general, when, according to one of the States party to the Agreement or according to
the Commission, which, in accordance with Article 211 EC, is charged with ensuring the correct
implementation of the Agreement, there are indications which point to an irregularity in regard to
the origin of the imported goods.
This judgment highlights the importance of mutual trust and administrative cooperation
provisions in the CA, and consequently, in the EPA. There is, as yet, no EU case law that
refers to the EPA. Given the fierce economic diplomacy and internationalisation of EU trade
values, it is not farfetched to posit that the long arm of the ECJ’s jurisdiction will increasingly
adjudicate on EPA provisions. It is only a matter of time, however, before main proceedings
in an EU Member State(s), are referred by a national court to the ECJ to interpret the proper
meaning of the EPA. Through Articles 56 (2) (d) and (e), and Articles 64 (2)–(5) of the
Modernised Customs Code,55 the EPA-based EU commitment to duty-free, quota-free
(DFQF) ACP imports are enshrined in EU law.
It has become settled EU case law that a ‘special situation’56 such as ‘ambiguous and
inconsistent determinations’ by an exporting State customs authority resulting in unreliability
justifies an overruling of the mutual trust principle and places the onus on the Commission
to take over the investigation.57 The Court has also emphasised the key role which the
exporting State has to play in order to derive the benefits of the preferential treatment:
50. …it is only after the authorities of the State of export have been involved that the products
originating from the ACP State in question will be permitted to benefit from the arrangement
introduced by Annex V to the Cotonou Agreement.58
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55 Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the
Union Customs Code (recast) (hereafter Customs Code).
56 This refers to an exception to the obligation of import or export duty repayment covered under Article 239 of the
Customs Code, and Article 905 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down
provisions for the implementation of Regulation No 2913/92 (OJ 1993 L 253, 1), as amended by Commission
Regulation (EC) No 1335/2003 of 25 July 2003 (OJ 2003 L 187).
57 See the following judgments: Case C-204/07 P, C.A.S. v Commission [2008] EU:C:2008:446; Case C-574/17 P
Commission v Combaro [2018] EU:C:2018:598; and Case C-589/17 Prenatal S.A [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:104,
Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 7 February 2019(1).
58 In Case C-175/12 REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Finanzgericht München
(Germany), made by decision of 16 February 2012, received at the Court on 13 April 2012, in the proceedings
Sandler AG v Hauptzollamt Regensburg, [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:681, para. 50. [Per curiosum, the Court chamber
was composed of Hungarian judges: E. Juhász, President of the Tenth Chamber, A. Rosas and C. Vajda
(Rapporteur), Judges].
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VII WTO Case Law and Potential Impact on the WA — EU EPA
Free trade can be brutal. The ‘Banana wars’ that lasted from 1993 to 2012 between the US and
the EU illustrates this. The WTO ruled in favour of the US and demanded the EU to revoke
its preferential arrangement with the Caribbean on its banana exports. It held that the special
arrangement was discriminatory towards Latin American suppliers and therefore a violation
of WTO rules. As at November 2018, there have been no cases brought by or against any
ACP State in WTO DSU. In contrast, the EU has been a party to cases brought to the WTO
DSU, with the main opponents being the US, Canada, India, China, and Argentina.59
There are multiple anti-dumping disputes brought against the EU by WTO Members
before the WTO DSB. One such case was between China and the EU concerning anti-dumping
duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes (HP-SSST) from the EU.60 The
EU argued that China had contravened Article 6.9 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement
because it did not disclose the facts underlying its dumping determinations with respect to
specific cost and sales data determining the margin of dumping, which therefore prevented
the affected parties from properly defending their interests. The Panel rejected the EU’s claim
and instead ruled that a narrative description was sufficient to satisfy the require ment for
essential facts under Article 6.9, so long as the technical details were in the possession of the
investigating authority.61
The Panel itself referred to past WTO rulings to support its understanding of the article:
Previous WTO dispute settlement panels have established that the basic data underlying an
investigating authority dumping determination constitute “essential facts” within the meaning of
Article 6.9. We agree. In addition, the panel in China – Broiler Produ62cts found that a narrative
description of the data used cannot ipso facto be considered insufficient disclosure, provided the
essential facts the authority is referring to are in the possession of the respondent... We agree.
The EU appealed the Panel’s ruling as erring in the interpretation and application of the said
article, whereas China argued that the article can be interpreted in different ways that equally
satisfy the obligation.63 The Appellate Body considered this issue to be a point of law concerning
a legal standard64 and therefore allowed the appeal. The Appellate Body applied a logical
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59 WTO Dispute Settlement Reports and Arbitration Awards: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/
ai17_e/tableofcases_e.pdf accessed 25 May 2019.
60 China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes (HP-




61 WT/DS460 (n 60), EU Panel Report, (n 60), para. 7.236.
62 WT/DS460 (n 60), EU Panel Report, para. 7.235 and fn 396 thereto. (fns 395 and 397 omitted) cited in
WT/DS460/AB/R, 54.
63 WT/DS460/AB/R, (n 60) China’s appellee’s submission, para. 333.
64 WT/DS460/AB/R, (n 60) para. 5.128.
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approach to construe the meaning of the Article. It referred to previous WTO rulings on,
and further analysed, the word ‘essential’:
Whether a particular fact is essential or “significant in the process of reaching a decision”65 depends
on the nature and scope of the particular substantive obligations, the content of the particular
findings needed to satisfy the substantive obligations at issue, and the factual circumstances of each
case, including the arguments and evidence submitted by the interested parties… Thus, while
Article 6.9 does not prescribe a particular form for the disclosure of the essential facts, it does
require in all cases that the investigating authority disclose those facts in such a manner that an
interested party can understand clearly what data the investigating authority has used, and how
those data were used to determine the margin of dumping.66
By applying both inductive and deductive interpretation methods,67 the Appellate Body laid
down the parameters of the obligation, and found that the scope of the legal standard is to be
determined by having regard to the object and purpose of the obligation. This is consistent
with the customary rules of interpretation, particularly Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.
It held that:
While the Panel’s reading of the scope and meaning of Article 6.9 is not entirely clear, it appears to
us that…contrary to what the Panel stated, it does not suffice for an investigating authority to
disclose “the essential facts under consideration” but, rather, it must disclose the essential facts
under consideration that “form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures”.68
Following on from its interpretation, the Appellate Body proceeded to complete the legal
analysis of the merits of the case finding in favour of the EU.
This case is illustrative of the significance of interpretation of the legal standard applicable
to investigating authorities’ obligations in anti-dumping measures determination. The Appellate
Body’s reversal of the Panel’s interpretation marked the turning point in favour of the EU’s
appeal.69 China lost the case as it was requested to bring its measures into conformity with
the Anti-Dumping Agreement and GATT 1994.70
AFRICA – EU TRADE RELATIONS: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS... n
143 n
65 WT/DS460 (n 60), Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 240.
66 WT/DS460/AB/R, 53.
67 Panos Merkouris, ‘Interpreting the Customary Rules on Interpretation’ (2017) 19 (1) International Community
Law Review 134–135, https://doi.org/10.1163/18719732-12341350 (This is an interesting study on the overall
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68 WT/DS460/AB/R, 54.
69 Up until the issue of interpretation on Art. 6.9., the Appellate Body upheld the first set of the Panel’s findings.
70 WT/DS460/AB/R, 105–107.
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VIII Development Cooperation
The EPA is not just an FTA. It is intended to be a development instrument. The rationale for
the waiver is predicated on the special situation of the developing countries. The key principles
of development effectiveness defined in the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in
2011 and renewed at the last High-Level Meeting in Nairobi (2016) are: Country ownership;
Transparency and accountability; Focus on results; and Inclusive development partnerships.
The EU itself regularly monitors its performance in implementing the effectiveness principles
through, for example, consultancies on partner country analysis, consultations with the EU
Delegations on ground, and evaluation of the progress against the development effectiveness
indicators. Such continuous monitoring and reporting is a standard development management
system of major donors like the EU, World Bank, USAID, ADB, and AfDB. The findings are
used by the senior officials in high-level committees. This system is their means of promoting
accountability among their members, in their region, and on the global stage.
One credible solution would be to define development targets and indicators to be linked
to the EPA implementation and review process.71 By setting a benchmark for the EPA, the
success or failure towards its objectives can be objectively measured. In sum, as succinctly put
by some authors: ‘reciprocity should be based on the attainment of objective socioeconomic
indicators rather than on arbitrary timeframes and percentage of traded goods’.72
At the expiry of the tariff-dismantling period, the trade-related part of the EPA would
have served its purpose. It would essentially become obsolete and the WTO Agreement
provisions would govern the trade and economic relations. What would be left of the EPA is
its development cooperation dimension?
Conclusions and Recommendations
In the process of writing this article, there are a few significant events that have occurred and
are worth mentioning. The French ‘Yellow Vest’ protest against high tax rates imposed by the
Macron government. The Nigerian incumbent president was voted in again for a second four-
year term. The US banned Huawei’s access to US mobile networks and software updates,
sparking a trade sanctions retaliation by China in ceasing its rare earth mineral supplies to the
US. British Prime Minister Theresa May resigned after several failed attempts to secure a good
deal to finalise Brexit. The European Parliament elections resulted in more seats for the Greens
and Liberals, as well as for the far-right Eurosceptic parties. After ratification by the 24th State,
the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) came into force on 30 May 2019,
marking a historic milestone globally. This is a short, and perhaps bewildering, list, but its
purpose is to illustrate the current state of affairs across continents in this globalized world.
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Though direct and indirect impacts of all of these events on the state of the Africa – EU
relations can be drawn, perhaps the most poignant for this article is the AfCFTA. When the
continent-wide market of 1.2 billion people launches on 7 July 2019, the world’s largest free
trade area will be formed since the establishment of the WTO.
The negative consequences of market liberalization most often feared by parties of
a  preferential trade agreement such as the EPAs are dumping and subsidies. The EPAs
explicitly provide that anti-dumping and countervailing measures shall be governed by the
WTO Agreements. Disputes related to these are to be dealt with in the WTO Dispute
Settlement mechanism (in the SADC – EU EPA) or by a special legal review mechanism (in
the WA – EU EPA). This single legal review mechanism is not sufficiently detailed to inspire
confidence about its workability. The WA States do not have the requisite level of experience,
expertise, or capacity to initiate a WTO Dispute Settlement procedure, and therefore have
little chance of successful claims. Reviewing the records of WTO disputes, the more active
developing countries have been from Latin America and Asia. There are practically no WTO
cases brought by or against African States (except South Africa). The closest experience
Nigeria has had with WTO dispute settlement proceedings is as a third party.
In view of the findings of this article, there are several recommendations to be made.
Firstly, the WA – EU EPA should incorporate development indicators to measure its progress
at achieving its development objective. This would ensure that the original aim of the CA, to
promote the growth and sustainable development of the ACP States, is respected. Secondly,
the general principles of international law, particularly the need for independent and neutral
dispute settlement mechanisms, can be better observed if the implementation committees of
the EPAs are not politically affiliated officials of the contracting States. Instead, the role of the
committee could be undertaken by dedicated officers in a neutral international institution
such as the WTO, World Customs Organization (WCO), UNCTAD or OECD.
The arbitration mechanism under the EPA could be designed to better incorporate the
privileges provided to developing countries under the WTO.73 The EPA could provide for
detailed rules on the possibilities for deadline extensions and accelerated procedures for the WA
party. Fifthly, recalling Article 82 under which consultation and mediation are to be the only
dispute settlement methods for the first ten years of EPA operation, it would be pragmatic to
also include the method of good offices. Incorporating this diplomatic method into the overall
dispute settlement mechanism of the EPA is logical since it is compatible with the other
options of consultation and mediation. The positive impact of good offices should not be
underestimated especially in the context of international trade and development relations
between unequal partners as the WA, the ACP, and the EU.
The emerging political context in the EU should not be ignored either. The growing clout
of the Green party in the European Parliament reflects the steady prioritization of environmental
issues, which is likely to change the substance of the EPAs in the near future given the
interdependence between commerce and environmental resources. Aspects like rules of
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origin and SPS would need to be progressively revised. In view of this, the author also proffers
a sixth recommendation that focuses on the influence of public policy on the reasoning of
adjudicators. Dedicated trainings for the Joint Implementation Committee and the pool 
of arbitrators of the WA – EU EPA (but also for the other ACP-EU EPAs) on impact and
causal analyses could sharpen their understanding of the relationships between market
situations and factors of production. Keeping up-to-date in this regard would give them
greater confidence in correctly interpreting and applying the provisions of the EPA.
The author acknowledges that there are several ways in which this topic can be further
enhanced possibly within a doctoral program. For example, to attain a comprehensive picture
of the strengths and weaknesses of the EPAs, a comparative legal analysis of the EU’s trade
agreements with the US, China, and Japan could be made. The methodology could be
supplemented by quantitative analysis and an impact assessment. The findings would rank the
quality of the Africa – EU EPAs within a broader global context. Another way would be to
further elaborate on the regional integration dimension of the EPA. The research could hone
in on the evolving process of the AfCFTA juxtaposed against the continuing negotiations of
the EPAs towards becoming full and comprehensive regimes covering Services, Competition,
and Investment. The findings would shed a new light on the nature of the Africa – EU EPA
on how they can harmonise inter-, and intra-regional objectives.
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Today it is barely conceivable but, in the post-Second World War world of international civil
aviation, issues of security did not generate special concern. At that time nobody envisaged
that one day terrorists would hijack airplanes or use them as weapons and unruly passengers
will cause everyday problems. In the beginning, states put emphasis exclusively on flight safety.
The establishment of flight safety first and foremost required the elaboration of an international
system of rules concerning technical requirements. It is not accidental that air transport is one
of the most regulated industries in the world. The slogan has persisted in similar forms: Safety
is our priority, Safety is a priori, Safety does not allow compromise, Safety safeguards 24 hours
a day, etc. Despite that, all of us are aware that safety in itself does not suffice.
Hardly had the ink dried on the Paris Peace Treaty (1947),1 then humankind had to realise
that it was returning to a battlefield, the scene of the Cold War, which again divided the world
into two parts; in this way, it forestalled the way to the so-longed-for state of peace and unity.
Simultaneously, terrorism emerged as well and it was manifested in manifold versions. Besides
the unique nature of civil aviation embracing the world and the primacy of flight safety, the
world demanded a paradigm shift, and urged for a new way of thinking and a new system of
rules: aviation security.
Flight safety and aviation security, despite their close relationship, differ from each other
fundamentally. Although in both areas, the dual purpose of the law-maker is preventing or
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averting danger and thereby saving lives as well as protecting property, we are dealing with
two sharply distinct areas.
– Flight safety means a system of capabilities, in which the performers in the industry can
react effectively and competently to eventual emergencies related to operation and upkeep,
as a result of which no accidents or flying incidents occur. (Regarding the fact that flight safety
is never 100%, from a practical viewpoint it is more pragmatic to use the phrase ‘no avoidable
or as few as possible accidents or incidents occur’).2
– Aviation security is a system of capabilities, due to which the performers of the industry
can provide effective and competent protection to aircraft on the ground or in the air, to the
passengers and crew on board the aircraft or on the grounds of airports, to the ground-staff
and third persons on the ground vis-à-vis unlawful acts endangering their security.
Unlawful acts include all acts or attempts committed by a person endangering the safety
of international civil aviation. Such acts include unlawful seizure, sabotage, taking hostages,
violent intrusion (on board, at the airport, or in the area of an air navigation facility) and the
placement of weapons, a dangerous tool or material with the purpose of the commission of
a crime.3 Furthermore, what frequently occur are threats of bomb attacks, imparting misleading,
false information or refusing to cooperate with staff during the flight.
Beyond the difference between the notions, flight safety prevails via the completion of
mainly international and transparent regulatory tasks, while aviation security, although its
effect is global, consists primarily of tasks of protection to be tackled nationally. The system of
rules of flight safety is open and knowable for everyone, whereas the security rules constitute
a closed system, excluding access to the inherent confidential information for those not
concerned. However, the safety and security of international civil aviation may only be effective
if these two prominent areas cooperate continually and support each other unconditionally.
I The Tokyo Convention (1963)
Although in the early phase of aviation unlawful acts against staff, or devices used during
flights also occurred, no social demand prevailed for their international regulation due to
their isolated character and low number.4 In our days, the presence of people in the air has
become constant; it is therefore not accidental that, along with the incessantly growing
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number of passengers, the number of unlawful acts committed on board aircraft has also
increased. Although states applied developed punishment systems as early as at the beginning
of the 20th century, none of them could effectively respond to the challenges of international
air traffic. The acts committed on board the aircraft, their increasingly and obviously unique
situation and peculiar management coerced the rule-maker to take a different approach.
Undoubtedly, any minor, insignificant act occurring at various frequencies and committed
on board an aircraft in flight (e.g. smoking despite prohibition, fighting or verbal harassment)
has a great impact on flight safety, and so its gravity clearly differs from similar acts committed on
the ground. Moreover, at an altitude of 10 km (nearly 40,000 feet), unlawful acts committed
on board aircraft overflying the sovereign airspace of various countries raise several issues, the
solution of which on an international level became inevitable. For instance, during the enforce -
ment of the territorial principle, it was difficult to determine in which country’s airspace the
crime was committed and, due to this uncertainty, which country could be entitled to proceed
against the perpetrator of the crime. It also occurred that the country having jurisdiction did
not conduct the criminal proceedings, or did not request the extradition of the perpetrator.5
In the worst case, states could not proceed in the absence of jurisdiction, and therefore, the
perpetrator’s crime remained unpunished.
Although jurists had dealt with the criminal legal aspects of unlawful acts committed on
aircraft since the 1910s, the first comprehensive response was formulated in 1963 under the
first international treaty dealing with aviation security.6 The Convention on Offences and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, adopted in Tokyo7 under the auspices of the
ICAO, had been framed as a result of the ten-year concerted work by the international
community. In the Convention, the international community as a whole responded with
proper determination primarily to international terrorism as the gravest danger, threatening
civil aviation and damaging its interests.
The Tokyo Convention shall apply in respect of offences against penal law of the Contracting
States as well as acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardize the safety
of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which jeopardize good order and discipline
on board irrespective of whether the acts qualify as crime pursuant to the national rules of
substantive criminal law of the Contracting States [Article 1 (1) a)–b)]. The essence of the
Convention is contained in this provision, since the wide-scale extension of the substantive
scope of application facilitates holding anyone responsible for any act jeopardising flight safety
as an objective to be protected to the utmost by all Contracting States.
The Convention has fulfilled its most important objective, since it unified and
standardised the legal relationships that needed to be regulated at the international level. This
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In March 1784 Jean-Pierre Blanchard (1753–1809) aviatician was compelled by a young man named Dupont de
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5 R. H. Mankiewicz, ‘The 1970 Hague Convention’ (1971) 37 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 195–196.
6 Sami Shubber: Jurisdiction Over Crimes on Board Aircraft (The Hague 1973) 5.
7 ICAO Doc 8364 Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963).
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was absolutely urgent, since in the early days of commercial aviation there were several
examples of unlawful acts severely jeopardising flight safety on board the aircraft where the
perpetrator was not called to account under criminal law due to the deficiencies of relevant
national rules.
1 Jurisdiction
The law-makers of the Tokyo Convention settled the above deficiencies deriving from diverse
national rules and dealt with the issue of jurisdiction with high priority. The establishment of
the system of the institutions of jurisdiction was carried out along the principle that the
criminal liability of natural entities under international law due to an infringement of the rules
of international law could be prosecuted and punished, by the state in the territory of which
the crime was committed. With respect to the fact that national penal codes primarily apply the
territorial principle, its enforcement was not impeded by a legal obstacle.
As a main rule, the State of registration of the aircraft is competent to exercise jurisdiction
over offences and acts committed on board jeopardising flight safety [Article 3 (1)]. The law-
maker demands that each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction as the State of registration over offences committed on board aircraft
registered in that State [Article 3 (2)]. The purpose of the law-maker was to prevent the lack
of jurisdiction as a consequence of the lack of state sovereignty while flying over high seas (as
a territory to be freely used by all). Therefore, the Convention needs to be applied ‘in respect
of offences committed or acts done by a person on board any aircraft registered in a Contracting
State while that aircraft is in flight or on the surface of the high seas or of any other area outside
In the United States versus Cordova8 lawsuit, the defendant could not be prosecuted due to
the absence of jurisdiction. On 2 August 1948, a scuffle broke out on board a United States
registered DC-4 passenger plane travelling from the capital of Puerto Rico, San Juan (SJU),
to New York (LGA) between the heavily inebriated Mr. Cordova and the cabin crew in the
tail of the plane while it was flying above the (high seas of the) Atlantic Ocean. Due to the
weight of the cabin crew and passengers hastening to help to restrain Mr. Cordova, the tail
of the airplane became tail-heavy. Thanks to the rapid interference of the pilots, the
resulting loss of altitude and speed could be corrected and the unruly passenger, restricted
in his personal freedom, waited for landing and his transfer to the authorities. The accused,
whose culpability was beyond doubt, was committed for trial, but he could not be prosecuted
pursuant to the federal law then in force, since, in the event of a crime committed on the
high seas, a court of the United States only had jurisdiction if the crime was committed on
board a ship registered by US authorities, and the case had to be dismissed.9
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the territory of any state’. [Article 1 (2)]. This also entails that exclusive jurisdiction is only
applicable with respect to the registering state if the registered aircraft is flying over the high
seas or Antarctica. In this way, the law-maker created a situation in which the people on board
are subject to the jurisdiction of at least two states (the one securing its national airspace and
the state of registration) at the same time.10 Offences committed on aircraft registered in
a Contracting State shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition, as if they had been
committed not only in the place in which they have occurred but also in the territory of the
State of registration of the aircraft [Article 16 (1)].
However, it is not at all unlikely that not only ‘the state of the flag’ and the state of the national
airspace, but other states also have jurisdiction vis-à-vis the perpetrator of the crime. The
equitable interest of the states to avail themselves their rights is narrowly constructed and
guaranteed as an exception by the Convention. As such, a specific State may have jurisdiction if:
a) the offence has effect on the territory of such State;
b) the offence has been committed by or against a national or permanent resident of such
State;
c) the offence is against the security of such State;
d) the offence consists of a  breach of any rules or regulations relating to the flight or
manoeuvre of aircraft in force in such State;
e) the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the observance of any obligation of such
State under a multilateral international agreement (Article 4).
The law-maker also grants jurisdiction to the ‘state of the first landing’, provided that the
aircraft commander may disembark in the territory of any State in which the aircraft lands any
person who he has reasonable grounds to believe has committed, or is about to commit an
offence on board the aircraft (Article 8). At the same time,
the aircraft commander may deliver to the competent authorities of any Contracting State in the
territory of which the aircraft lands any person who he has reasonable grounds to believe has
committed on board the aircraft an act which, in his opinion, is a serious offence according to the
penal law of the State of registration of the aircraft.
About this fact the aircraft commander shall notify the authorities of such State of his
intention to deliver such person and shall furnish the authorities to whom any suspected
offender is delivered with evidence and information (which are lawfully in his possession)
under the law of the State of registration of the aircraft (Article 9).
While establishing a broad scale on the fora of jurisdiction, the law-makers were attentive
to the legal preferences represented by the major legal regimes:
– to the Anglo-Saxon (precedent) legal system, which favours the territorial principle,
according to which the proceedings should be conducted in the country where the act was
committed (over which the aircraft was flying), and
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– to the Continental legal system, which favours the personal principle (the jurisdiction of
the state of registration), according to which the close relation of citizenship between the
state and its citizen requires that the person (in the present case the passenger) has to observe
the law of their state, even in the territory of another state.
The resolution of the vast differences between the two basic systems of law under
international treaties and in debates presented a major challenge and frequently was a great
achievement. Beyond the reconciliation of differences, we need to consider the fact that
international law cannot and does not intend to regulate everything, but it grants frameworks,
and therefore national law has an indispensable role as expressly permitted by the law-maker.
The Tokyo Convention formulates clearly that it does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction
exercised in accordance with national law [Article 3 (3)].
The example vividly demonstrates that a combined system of jurisdiction was introduced.12
The objective is unambiguous: it is better that multiple jurisdictions need to be applied than
none. At the same time, it is important to highlight that although the law-maker itemises
taxatively the possibilities of the enforcement of jurisdiction (Articles 1, 3–4, 8–9), it omits
guidance as to which of the rivalling jurisdictions has priority. If several rivalling claims for
jurisdiction exist, it is essentially the circumstances that determine which of the authorised
parties is recog nised as the best and safest to adjudicate the case. The body proceeding in the
case is obliged to accept the support and intervention of the other parties authorised for
jurisdiction. In order to guarantee legal certainty, the proceeding authorities should be highly
Let’s presume that, on board an Austrian Airlines aircraft registered in Austria in flight
from Vienna (VIE) to Madrid (MAD), a Czech and a Dutch passenger commence to scuffle
in Swiss airspace. The Dutch passenger is severely injured and, following the entry of the
airplane into French airspace, the aggrieved party loses consciousness. The aircraft
commander decides to interrupt the flight and lands on French territory. Related to the
case, several rivalling jurisdictions emerge. According to the main rule, the registering state,
Austria, may have jurisdiction on the basis of the principle of the flag (quasi territorial
principle). Furthermore, a claim for jurisdiction may also be submitted on the basis of the
territorial principle (principium territoriale) by Switzerland and France; the latter may
invoke the principle of the first landing, but the intention of the Czech Republic and the
Netherlands to lodge a criminal action may be recognised on the basis of the personal
principle (principium personale) as well. Finally, Spain, as the place of destination, may also
request the recognition of its jurisdiction with reference to its national flight safety rules.11
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attentive to the non-commencement of parallel proceedings, because that would injure one
of the most important basic principles of criminal law, the prohibition of dual proceedings (ne
bis in idem).13
2 The Competence of the Aircraft Commander
In the interest of the uniform safeguarding of flight safety beyond the issues of jurisdiction,
the law-maker paid close attention to the rights and obligations of the aircraft commander.
The aircraft commander (captain) is the member of the specialised staff with special authorisation
appointed by the aircraft operator for the normal and safe attendance to the tasks of the flight
and operation. The aircraft commander (even if the co-pilot navigates the plane) is authorised
and simultaneously obliged to guarantee security on board the aircraft and make a final
decision on all issues related to operation. While in flight, the commander is entitled to deviate
from the rules, if that is unquestionably essential and reasonable in the interest of security.
The commander directs the (cockpit and cabin) crew of the aircraft in his person. The
Convention is to be applied in the event of crime or acts committed on board the aircraft in
flight.14 The aircraft commander may, when he has reasonable grounds to believe that
a person has committed, or is about to commit, an offence or other act on board the aircraft,
impose reasonable measures, including restraint, upon that person. The objective of such
measures is to protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons and property therein; to maintain
good order and discipline on board; or to enable the aircraft commander to deliver that person
to the competent authorities or to disembark him [Article 6 (1)].
In the interest of the earliest restoration of order and discipline on board, the resolute
intervention of the crew, and depending on the evolved situation, of the passengers may be
necessary vis-à-vis the acting unlawfully. The aircraft commander may require or authorise
the assistance of other crew members and may request or authorise, but not require, the
assistance of passengers to restrain any person he is entitled to restrain (by tying up, shackling
or holding down). Any crew member or passenger may also take reasonable preventive
measures without such authorisation when he has reasonable grounds to believe that such
action is immediately necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property
in it [Article 6 (2)].
The law-maker endeavours to encourage this frequently indispensable intervention by
guaranteeing exemption (from liability under criminal, civil and administrative law) for all
conduct aimed at the restitution of order that would qualify as unlawful conduct under
normal circumstances.
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For actions taken in accordance with the Convention, the aircraft commander, any other member
of the crew, any passenger, the owner or operator of the aircraft, nor the person on whose behalf
the flight was performed shall not be held responsible in any proceeding on account of the
treatment undergone by the person against whom the actions were taken (Article 10).
The aircraft commander is not only entitled to restrain personal freedom on board the
airplane via the application of measures, but he may also disembark the person having
committed or about to commit an unlawful act in the territory of any Contracting State. The
aircraft commander shall notify the authorities in advance, may deliver the offender and shall
provide evidence and information concerning the fact of and the reasons for the disruption
of the flight and disembarkation to the competent authorities of the Contracting State
(Articles 8–9). At the same time, any Contracting State shall allow the commander of an
aircraft registered in another Contracting State to disembark any person (Article 12). In taking
any measures for investigation or arrest or otherwise exercising jurisdiction in connection
with any offence committed on board an aircraft, the Contracting States shall pay due regard
to the safety and other interests of air navigation and shall so act as to avoid unnecessary delay
of the aircraft, passengers, crew or cargo (Article 17).
In practice, the commander has to fulfil numerous obligations related to security; he is thus
not only obliged to take all necessary measures if the persons aboard or the aircraft is endangered,
but also to help other endangered aircraft (or ocean-liner or ship) as necessary and practicable
in the given situation.
The popularity of the convention is indicated by its ratification by 186 states. This high
figure can be attributed to the fact that the Tokyo Convention only reformulated the already
existing international practice under an international treaty. However, the Tokyo Convention
after a while could not keep up with the changes surrounding air transport and previously
unknown criminal methods, all of which required the law-maker to provide more developed
and subtler international regulation.
II International Treaties Concerning Security: The Hague (1970), 
Montreal (1971), New York (1979) and Montreal (1991)
Conventions and Montreal Protocol (1988)
Mainly due to the strained political ambience because of the Cold War, the number of hijacks
rose dramatically from the late 60s onwards. According to statistics the pinnacle of hijacks was
between 1968 and 1972 (with regard to hijacked aircraft registered in the US alone, more
than 130 interventions were necessary). The most hijacks in the history of civil aviation
occurred in 1969, on 86 occasions.15 Although the objective of terrorists was not the
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annihilation of the aircraft, passengers or crew that jeopardised their escape, being granted
political asylum or their liberation or that of others, these terrorist acts left behind many
victims. By seizing the aircraft and becoming the focus of the attention of the international
public, (normally) armed terrorists manifested their will and endeavoured to achieve their
political objectives. These included requesting asylum in a country designated by the terrorists
or demanding the release of prisoners convicted for political or other reasons, taking hostages
and receiving financial or other benefits. Seizing or taking control of an in-flight aircraft is
always distressing since it endangers the safety of persons and property, seriously disrupts air
traffic and undermines the confidence of the public in the security of civil aviation. Therefore,
with a view to driving back the criminal practice of using aircraft as an instrument for unlawful
purposes, the international community held a  diplomatic conference in The Hague in
December 1970. The conference, organised by the ICAO, was concluded by the ratification
of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.16
Pursuant to The Hague Convention (1970) all contracting States assumed the obligation
to impose severe penalties against any person who, on board an aircraft in flight17 unlawfully,
by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation seizes, or exercises control of
that aircraft (Articles 1–2). The law-maker envisages severe penalties, while the lowest
penalties are subject to national jurisdiction and facilitate the exercise of criminal jurisdiction
in accordance with national law [Article 4 (3)].
The rules related to the exercise of jurisdiction basically complied with those of the Tokyo
Convention, whereas the law-maker secured a further forum besides the existing ones. The
Hague Convention extends jurisdiction to the state of the operator of the aircraft. Due to 
the features of the aviation industry, the state of registration is in many cases different from the
state of the operator. The main reasons for this include the increasingly extensive use of leased
airplanes, while the institution of forum shopping is popular with aircraft operators. Thus,
with respect to any act of violence committed by the alleged offender vis-à-vis the passengers
or the crew, when the offence is committed on board an aircraft leased without crew, that state
in which the lessee has his principal place of business has jurisdiction or, if the lessee has no
such place of business, his permanent residence [Article 4 (1) c)].
Apart from the introduction of the new forum of jurisdiction, the law-maker tightened
the freedom of the state with jurisdiction to proceed: if the contracting State in the territory
of which the alleged offender has been arrested does not extradite the alleged offender, it shall
take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offence, whether
or not the offence was committed in its territory, and to submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution (Article 7). Therefore, via the consistent observance
of the aut dedere, aut judicare principle, the perpetrator either needs to be extradited to
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a state that shall conduct the criminal proceedings or needs to be punished in the state in
which he is held; a third way is not applicable.18 The objective of the law-makers is explicit:
the states may not provide asylum to the perpetrators; their punishment, being the enemies
of mankind (hostis humani generis), is inevitable.
Because of the alarming proliferation of unlawful acts, in parallel with and almost copying
The Hague Convention, with the involvement of the ICAO, the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation was framed as the Montreal Convention,
adopted in 1971.19 The Convention prescribes the punishment of acts jeopardising the
soundness and safety of aircraft and the infrastructure of ground air navigation service
providers. Considering that unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation jeopardise the
safety of persons and property, seriously affect the operation of air services, and undermine
the confidence of the peoples of the world in the safety of civil aviation, the law-maker
enumerates taxatively the broad scope of the methods of terrorist acts infringing the safety
of air transport.
Pursuant to the Convention, any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and
intentionally:
a) performs an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if that act is likely
to endanger the safety of that aircraft; or
b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft which renders it
incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a device
or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which renders it
incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their operation, if any such
act is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight; or
e) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safety of
an aircraft in flight. [Article 1 (1) a)–e)].
In comparison with The Hague Convention, the basic difference was the shift of the
central element of the perpetrator’s conduct from seizing the aircraft to rendering it incapable
of flying.
The main provisions of the convention concerning civil airports were extended by the
Montreal Protocol (1988).20 The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, in comparison with the Montreal Convention,
extended the conducts to be criminalised by acts (probably) jeopardising the safety of airports
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serving international civil aviation. The Protocol was drawn up following the simultaneous
terrorist attacks against the airports of Rome and Vienna on 27 December 1985.21 This
Protocol supplements the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Civil Aviation; therefore, the Convention and the Protocol shall be read and interpreted
together as one single instrument (Article 1). [Remark: As between the States Parties, the
Beijing Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation
(2010) shall prevail over the previous international contracts, such as Montreal Convention
(1971) and its Protocol (1988), (Article 24)].
On 13 October 1977 the terrorists of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
hijacked the Boeing 737-200 operated by of Lufthansa, the German airline, as flight LH181
between Palma de Mallorca (PMI) and Frankfurt (FRA). The flight was over Marseilles, in
French airspace when two male and two female perpetrators armed with hand grenades
and pistols seized control. The airplane first landed in Rome, then over the next 5 days, for
the purpose of constant mobility, it touched down at several international airports such as
Larnaca, Ankara, Bahrein, Dubai and Aden. The leader of the hijackers, named Zohair
Youssif Akache, identified himself as ‘Captain Martyr Mahmud’ came to the fore with his
demands: the release of 10 imprisoned leaders of the far-left Red Army Fraction (RAF) and
their two other faithful comrades imprisoned in Turkey, furthermore, that they would be
given 15 million dollars. During their stay in South Yemen, the terrorists executed the
captain of the airplane.
Vis-à-vis the hijackers, the German government put its Bundesgrenzschutz GSG-9
commando unit into action, formed after the hostage drama terminated in bloodshed at the
1972 Olympics in Munich. The operation with the cover-name “Feuerzauber” (Fire Magic)
took place in Mogadishu in Somalia. The country’s President Sziad Barre, (1919-1995)
consented to the mission being carried out, while the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
(1918-2015) assumed complete responsibility for its outcome. While Somalian soldiers set
fire to the runway in front of the pilot’s cabin as a distraction, the German and British SAS
(Special Air Services) commando units simultaneously blew open the doors and threw
intoxicating and noise grenades into the passenger compartment, then after entering it they
opened fire. The special tactical operation met with complete success after 5 minutes and
all hostages were released physically unharmed.22
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The ink had not dried on the Montreal Convention pertaining to security when the trend
in the seizure of aircraft became incidental to taking hostages from among the civil aviation
passengers. Drawing on their experience, terrorists realised that it was simpler and less risky
to seize a passenger airplane and threaten the governments with exterminating the hostages
than kidnapping figures symbolising the given regime (for example a protected person or an
important businessman). The perpetrators, in return for the hostages, demanded the release
of convicts (frequently political prisoners) or, according to the citizenship of the hostages,
demanded the states concerned to fulfil political demands or several times to grant financial
or other benefits.
The international community, in the interest of the security of civil aviation, concluded
a new international treaty: the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, which
was adopted by the contracting States in New York in 1979.23 Anyone who seizes or detains
and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third
party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical
person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit
condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages [Article 1 (1)].
Any person who attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking, or participates as an accomplice
of anyone who commits or attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking likewise commits an
offence [Article 1 (2)].
Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction
over any of the offences committed:
– in its territory or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
– by any of its nationals or, if that State considers it appropriate, by those stateless persons
who have their habitual residence in its territory;
– in order to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act; or
– with respect to a hostage who is a national of that State, if that State considers it appropriate.
[Article 5 (1) a)–d)].
If the circumstances so warrant, any State Party in the territory of which the alleged
offender is present shall, in accordance with its laws, take him into custody or take other
measures to ensure his presence for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or
extradition proceedings to be instituted. That State Party shall immediately make a preliminary
inquiry into the facts. The custody or other measures shall be notified without delay directly
or through the Secretary General of the United Nations [Article 6 (1-2)].
As the 1980’s wore on, it seemed that the Tokyo Convention (1963), The Hague Convention
(1970), the Montreal (1971) and New York (1979) Conventions, joined by the Montreal
Protocol (1988) had encompassed the complete area of civil aviation from the viewpoint of
criminal law. Unfortunately, that was not the case. On 21 December 1988, above the Scottish
town of Lockerbie, Pan Am Flight 103 suddenly disappeared from the radar screen due to the
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explosion of 312 grammes of Semtex plastic explosive.24 The plastic explosive annihilating
the airplane had been placed by Libyan terrorists. Subsequently, the Libyan government
assumed responsibility for the manoeuvre and paid 10 million USD as compensation for each
victim.25 In response to the situation, namely, the significant increase in the number of sabotage
actions against airplanes during the 1980s,26 the Legal Committee of the ICAO drafted
a Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. The convention
was adopted by ICAO member states on 1 March 1991 in Montreal.27 The main objective of
the law-makers was that the member states banned and prevented the production and
distribution of unmarked explosives (without chemical fingerprints) so that unauthorised
persons could not have access to them. The technical supplement to the convention contains
a detailed description of plastic explosives, their marking material and molecular formulae as
well as the minimum concentration of markings, thereby assisting unified and concerted state
intervention for driving back the use of such explosives.28
III The Modernisation of the International Aviation Security Treaties
Following the adoption of the Explosives Convention, no convention was drawn up in the
area of criminal law related to international air traffic for nearly 20 years. However, the 21st
century offered new morals and shocks. Civil air transport had to face unprecedented acts of
mass violence: the tragic events of 11 September 2001 with the loss of 2977 lives in the USA
and the airplanes exploded by suicidal assassins on 24 August 2004 in Russia shattered the
world and its assumptions and revised our view of the safety of aviation for good reason. The
conventions adopted in the past became out-of-date since they were unable to rise to all 
the challenges affecting the security of air transport.
1 Convention on the Compensation of Unlawful Acts (2009)
A major challenge related to compensation for persons on the ground, especially if the aircraft
in flight caused damage to third persons due to unlawful conduct on board. As a modernisation
of the Rome Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the
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Washington Post Foreign Service, London, 23 March 1990, A15.
25 Gerard Seenan, ‘Lockerbie Deal to End Libya’s Isolation’ The Guardian, 15 August 2003.
26 In 1985, 13 sabotage actions caused the death of 473 people, while in 1989, 279 people fell victim to such offences.
<www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/Commonwealth_Chapter_11.pdf> accessed 5 July 2019.
27 ICAO Doc 9571 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. Montreal. 1 March,
1991.
28 Consequently, the Czech manufacturer currently produces Semtex, the plastic explosive so that its detection
should be easier and the duration of its usability should be shorter.
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Surface (1952)29 the member states of the ICAO adopted the Convention on Compensation
for Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties, the so-called General Risk Convention on 
2 May 2009,30 and, due to unlawful acts, the Convention on Compensation for Damage to
Third Parties, Resulting from Acts of Unlawful Interference Involving Aircraft, the so-called
Convention on the Compensation for Unlawful Acts.31 This latter convention establishes the
International Civil Aviation Compensation Fund, the objective of which is the provision of
a considerable amount by raising the liability limit of the aircraft operator with absolute
responsibility in cases subject to the Convention. During an international flight, the operator
is liable for the occurrence of death, physical injury, damage to property or the environment.
The liability of the operator is restricted on the basis of the weight of the aircraft. The payment
of compensation ensues via the Supplementary Compensation Mechanism. The absolute
liability and the heightened liability limitation encumbering the aircraft operator, as it was
determined under the Convention, guarantee that the aggrieved victims of terrorists are
granted higher compensation and can enforce their compensation claims more efficiently in
the future.
2 The Beijing Convention and Protocol (2010)
In 2010 at the Diplomatic Conference on Aviation Security organised in Beijing by the ICAO,
two new international treaties were adopted following several years’ legal and diplomatic
background work, for the purpose of the reform and modernisation of the system of rules
governing aviation security.
– The Beijing Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International
Civil Aviation,32 which replaces the Montreal Convention (1971) and its supplementary
Protocol (1988) with a much more detailed uniform regulation adjusted to the requirements
of the age; and
– the Beijing Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft,33 which supplements The Hague Convention (1970) by guaranteeing that
legal entities are called to account and that the accessory conduct of accomplices related to
the preparatory and the main act is punished.
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29 ICAO Doc 7364 Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface (1952). If the
General Risk Convention takes effect, it will replace the Rome Convention.
30 ICAO Doc 9919 Convention on Compensation for Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties, done at Montreal,
2 May 2009; Two New Treaties Adopted by International Conference on Air Law. ICAO News Release – PIO, 12
May, 2009. www.icao.int.
31 ICAO Doc 9920 Convention on Compensation for Damage to Third Parties, Resulting from Acts of Unlawful
Interference Involving Aircraft. Montreal on 2 May, 2009.
32 ICAO Doc 9960 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation. Beijing.
10 September, 2010; The Beijing Convention took effect on 1 July, 2018.
33 ICAO Doc 9959 Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.
Beijing, 10 September, 2010; The Beijing Protocol took effect on 1 January, 2018.
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Via these sources of law, the number of the international treaties regulating international
criminal air law has risen to seven.34
The principal innovation of the Beijing Convention is the criminalisation of conducts of
the modern age. Within the purview of the Beijing Convention, the acts to be punished
include:
– the use of a civil aircraft as a weapon for the purpose of causing death, serious personal
injury or considerable material damage;
– using a civil aircraft so that biological, chemical and nuclear (so-called BCN – Biological,
Chemical, Nuclear) weapons reach their destinations with the purpose of the extermination
of lives, causing injury or incurring damages;
– assault on civil aircraft using BCN weapons;
– unlawful delivery of BCN weapons using civil aircraft;
– unlawful delivery of explosives and fissionable materials by civil aircraft for terrorist
purposes; and
– attack against the IT infrastructure of airports or air navigational services (Article 1).
As a further novelty, the law-maker renders attempt at acts of commission punishable
and prescribes the punishment of conduct that hinders calling the perpetrator to account
[Article 1 (4) a)–d)]. One of the most significant changes regarding the former Conventions
consists in the increased efficiency of enforcement due to the demand to call perpetrators to
account. Pursuant to the Convention, the State of a national not only may but is obliged 
to establish its jurisdiction and enforce its due process against the perpetrator. Furthermore,
the jurisdiction of the State may also be established if the victim is a national (Article 8). The
Convention shall not apply to aircraft used by military, customs or police services; it solely
applies to aircraft used for international civil aviation (Article 5).
The Beijing Protocol was drafted with the intention of extending the system of community
requirements vis-à-vis international terrorism. The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001
made it abundantly clear that a  civil airliner with full fuel tanks is capable of causing
destruction comparable to that brought about by armed military aircraft. The States started
analysing the legal frame of the destruction of rogue civil aircraft under international law and
constitutional law.35
To prevent the unlawful seizure of aircraft more effectively, the law-maker amended and
supplemented The Hague Convention (1970). Its substantive scope of application was accordingly
extended; it now ordains the punishment of other forms of hijack, hence commission with the
use of modern technology:
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Constitutional Law’ in Halmai, Gábor (ed), Hungary: Human Rights in the Face of Terrorism (Vandeplas Publishing
2006, Lake Mary) 5–30.
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any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally seizes or exercises control
of an aircraft in service by force or threat thereof, or by coercion, or by any other form of
intimidation, or by any technological means [Article 1 (1)].
Furthermore, it extends criminal liability to accomplice and preparatory activities [Article 1
(3) c)–d)]. It prescribes that each State Party, in accordance with national law, holds legal
entities criminally liable for the crime they committed (2 bis): in accordance with its national
legal principles, each State Party may take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity
located in its territory or organized under its laws to be held liable when a person responsible
for management or control of that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed an offence.
Such liability may be criminal, civil or administrative.
The role of national law remains definitive further on in the Convention, so the law-
maker, as in the international conventions previously established, does not exclude any
criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law [Article 4 (4)].
3 The Montreal Protocol (2014)
The Montreal Protocol36 was designed to amend the Tokyo Convention (1963) in order to
offer a comprehensive response to the problems caused by the constantly growing number of
unruly passengers. The Protocol was not expressly drafted with the intention of intervention
against international terrorism, but basically with the objective of extending the possibilities
of criminal intervention against violent passengers not motivated by terrorism but who defy
the instructions of staff. Accordingly, the law-maker specified and supplemented the elements
in a case of delinquency.
According to the main rule, the Tokyo Convention grants the opportunity of the exercise
of jurisdiction for the state of registration over offences and acts committed on board. The
state of landing had not always been authorised to conduct proceedings; therefore, unruly
passengers had often gone unpunished. The Montreal Protocol was designed to end this
defect in law, since it guaranteed jurisdiction to the authorities of the state of landing to
conduct proceedings vis-à-vis the delivered passenger [Article 1 (1)]. The law-maker further
extended the choice of fora of jurisdiction by granting jurisdiction to the state of the operator
[Article 3 (2) bis b)].37
The Montreal Protocol extends the scope of application of the Tokyo Convention, so that the
effect of its provisions concerns offences and acts jeopardising flight safety on board an aircraft
in flight at any time from the moment when all its external doors are closed following embarkation
until the moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation [Article 1 (3) a)]. That is not
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37 The designation of articles follows the Consolidated text of the Tokyo Convention and Montreal Protocol. DCTC
Doc No. 33., 4 April, 2014.
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inadvertent, since the majority of unlawful acts are committed by unruly passengers during
taxiing before the commencement of take-off.
In order to lighten the tasks of the aircraft commander, the Protocol factually enumerates
instances of unruly behaviour, such as physical assault or a threat to commit such assault
against a crew member and as refusal to follow a lawful instruction given by the crew for the
purpose of protecting flight safety [Article 15 bis (1) a)–b)]. Each contracting State is
encouraged to take such measures as may be necessary to institute appropriate criminal,
administrative or any other forms of legal proceedings against any person who commits an
offence on board an aircraft. With regard to financial aspects, the Protocol expressly emphasises
the right of air to claim compensatuion from the offending passenger (Article 18 bis).
In the Montreal Protocol, the states extended the jurisdiction opportunities boldly, by
which they supported as many unlawful acts as possible would actually be adjudicated in
criminal proceedings. However, the law-maker took something of a risk38 when it dealt with
the other highlighted area of the Tokyo Convention and juxtaposed the scope for action of the
in-flight security officer (IFSO), that is, the Air Marshal, beside the rights and obligations of
the aircraft commander. The question immediately arises: if the aircraft commander is the
ultimate decision-maker, may the IFSO take over the competence of the aircraft commander
in preventing or handling unlawful activities ocurring on board the aircraft? To what extent
may the IFSO make decisions in such situations, thereby lightening the burden on the
commander pilot? Obviously, the highly trained specialist IFSO may take measures according
to his or her obligations proceeding from his or her sphere of activity with reasonable grounds
without special permission [Article 6 (3)], but may not surpass the competence of the aircraft
commander. The law-maker also stipulated that the
aircraft commander may require or authorize the assistance of other crew members and may
request or authorize, but not require, the assistance of in-flight security officers or passengers to
restrain any person whom he is entitled to restrain” [Article 6 (2)].39
Exemption is also granted to the IFSO from being held responsible for the consequences of
his lawful acts (Article 10).
With respect to the fact that the aircraft itself is considered quasi state territory, the
registering state thus has jurisdiction pertaining to the mobile terrritory,40 therefore, the activity
of the IFSO in the national system of rules can be construed as that of the protector of the
quasi territory of the state. Upon the definition of their situation besides the national regulation
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Aircraft: A Missed Opportunity or a Sufficient Modernization?’ (2016) 49 (703) Indiana Law Review 739–740.
39 Authority in Handling Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft. International Conference
on Air Law (Montreal, 26 March to 4 April, 2014) – Presented by Indonesia, DCTC Doc No. 24. 21 March, 2014. 3.  
40 The right of the flag does not mean territorial sovereignty (since in reality it is not the territory of the state), but
definite jurisdiction. Hargitai József, Nemzetközi jog a gyakorlatban (Libri 2008, Budapest) 295–296.
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and programs,41 the bilateral or multilateral agreements42 concluded among the states
concerned have significance due to the international character of aircraft [Article 6 (3)–(4)].
Conclusion
It is obvious that criminality will not be prevented by law in itself; unlawful acts will always
be committed by people. We may question whether the new conventions pertaining to
security drafted under the auspices of the ICAO and designed to renew the comprehensively
prevalent international system of treaties concerning security will be able to forestall these
transboundary crimes and impose legal consequences. To what extent will these rules prevail
in practice? The question is justified, because the renewal of treaties pertaining to security
ariseses not only because the world has changed considerably and new forms of commission
have emerged, or an increasing number of unlawful acts (mostly committed by unruly
passengers) occur, but simply because the content of basic conventions had not prevailed in
international practice, despite numerous ratifications. National law has retained a great scope
for action, which impeded unification,43 implying that the authorities of the competent state
did not always intend to exercise jurisdiction; they did not wish to become engaged in matters
in which furnishing evidence was problematic (the crime was committed in foreign airspace,
on board an aircraft registered in another state by a foreign citizen), the questions of liability
were ambiguous, while they imposed a financial burden on the proceeding state.
In the interest of the observance of security rules and following the model of flight safety
audits, the ICAO has established the Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP), which is
prescribed for the states as mandator. This controlling programme has been carried out in the
framework of the Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA) since 2015.44 The essence is that,
during the audit, the ICAO examines the extent to which the member state is party to the
international treaty, and whether the rights and obligations stipulated therein have been
incorporated into and harmonised with national law; furthermore, to what extent these rules
and procedures prevail in practice and in the course of operation. The examined state
regularly reports on the implementation of the measure plan designed to rectify the revealed
deficiencies, in which it presents the current circumstances. Via the implementation of the
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41 More than forty States have IFSO programs. International Conference on Air Law, Authority and Protections for
In-Flight Security Officers, at 1, DCTC Doc. No. 7., 23 January, 2014. 2.3, 1.
42 For example: Act XXXIX of 2011 on the proclamation of the Agreement on the employment of Air Marshals
concluded between the Republic of Hungary and the United States of America.
43 The Tokyo Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law
[Article 3 (3)]. The rule that criminal jurisdiction should be exercised in accordance with national law hindered
the achievement of the objective of uniformity. Gutierrez (n 12) 13.
44 ICAO Doc 9807 Universal Security Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Manual. Second Edition, 2016.;
ICAO Assebbly Resolution A37-17, Appendix E refers.; ICAO Doc 10010-C/1172 Council Decision, 197th
Session. C.MIN 197/1, Subject No. 52.1. 2013. 11–12.
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activity, all member states are under continuous surveillance, which supports the enforcement
of the rules of international conventions and of the Standard and Recommended Practices
(SARPs) adopted by the Council of the ICAO.
This much is certain: via the Beijing Convention and Protocol (2010) as well as via the
Montreal Protocol (2014), the ICAO and its member states regulating international air transport
convey an unequivocal message to the world: all acts related to or jeopardising aviation
security, wherever committed, will have criminal legal consequences under all circumstances.
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Introduction: The New Digital Services Act
In June 2020 the Commission launched a public consultation on the Digital Services Act. The
consultation seeks to gather views, evidence and data from the general public, businesses,
online platforms, academics, civil society and all stakeholders to draw on their help in shaping
the future rulebook for digital services.2 As the Digital Services Act webpage notes, the new
Digital Services Act package aims to modernise the current legal framework for digital
services based on two main pillars:
First, the Commission would propose clear rules framing the responsibilities of digital services to
address the risks faced by their users and to protect their rights. (…) Second, the Digital Services
Act package would propose ex ante rules covering large online platforms acting as gatekeepers,
which now set the rules of the game for their users and their competitors. The initiative should
ensure that those platforms behave fairly and can be challenged by new entrants and existing
competitors, so that consumers have the widest choice and the Single Market remains competitive
and open to innovations.3
The consultation closed on 8 September 2020. On 16 September 2020, the European
Commission announced in the letter of intent, which accompanied President von der Leyen’s
State of the Union speech, to publish an Action plan on how to better use synergies between
civil, defence and space industries.4
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Already in May 2016, the Commission had identified the key areas of interest in its
Communication on Online Platforms; the fourth guiding policy principle5 was to ‘[k]eep
markets open and non-discriminatory to foster a  data-driven economy’. Although the
Commission did propose some valuable considerations (e.g., ‘large parts of the public remain
apprehensive about data collection and consider that more transparency is needed’),6 the road
ahead is likely to be long and difficult, and the objective will not be achieved overnight. In our
opinion, the competition, data protection and consumer protection laws need to take centre
stage in this plan. That is why the European Commission’s approval of the Facebook/WhatsApp
merger in 2014 and the EUR 110 million fine in 2017 deserve our attention as milestones in
the history of competition law and the data-driven economy.
Facebook was subject to a huge fine – this news created a splash throughout the media
in May 2017. The European Commission’s decision to levy a EUR 110 million fine against the
company for furnishing the European body with misleading information concerning its
acquisition of WhatsApp in 2014 was big news. The story of this ‘mega fine’ reaches back to
Commission Decision No M.7217, in which the European Commission had originally
approved the aforementioned transaction (i.e. the merger). Looking at the acquisition with the
hindsight of six years, it appears that the underlying violation of competition law did not stem
solely from the misleading information provided by Facebook but may have also arisen from
technical mistakes on the part of the Commission. We were at a ‘crossroads’, as Zingales puts
it:7 it was a case at the intersection of competition, data protection and consumer protection
laws and, by looking at it exclusively from a competition law perspective, the Commission
may have failed to consider vital issues involving the other areas of law that were implicated
in this merger. What are the lessons to be learned from this case about competition law, data
protection and data-driven companies?
I The Players: Facebook Inc. and WhatsApp Inc.
The notion that Facebook is the most important player in the area of online interpersonal
communication is an axiom of sorts:8 In the barely more than a decade that has gone by since
the company was founded in 2004, Facebook has completely conquered and dominated online
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communication. In a public Facebook post9 from 27 June 2017,10 the company’s founder and
CEO Mark Zuckerberg announced that the Facebook community had surpassed 2bn users.
Zuckerberg put it as follows:
‘As of this morning the Facebook community is now officially 2 billion people!’ Then he went on to
add the company’s new slogan which had been unveiled four days earlier: ‘Bring[ing] the world
closer together’.
Even if we keep the possibility in mind that the figure of 2 billion users still includes a fair
number of fake profiles – despite the massive efforts launched in 2017 to identify and
eliminate them – these cannot possibly be large enough in number to make up a significant
slice of the 2 billion user profiles overall. And if we consider that, based on current estimates,
there are roughly 7.5 billion people in the world today, we can assert that, statistically speaking,
every fourth person on earth is part of the Facebook community. Moreover, if we narrow the
statistic further and do not look at the population overall but only at the groups that are
relevant from an advertising market perspective, as well as those people who live in geographical
areas that are relevant especially for marketing, then we can also assert that any person within
that group is very likely to be a Facebook user.11 Broadly speaking, therefore, Facebook has
a continuously updated database comprising 2 billion people. The data at the company’s
disposal stem in part from information voluntarily shared by users, and in another part from
profiling their behaviour. Even the major secret services across the world cannot attain such
figures (all the more so since no-one shares personal information with them voluntarily).
What’s more, unless some earthshattering crisis were to rock Facebook in the near future, no
other company in the social media market can come even close to such figures. And in any
case, if any competitor were to approximate the breadth of its data collection, Facebook would
buy it, just as it did with WhatsApp.
The application called WhatsApp was created by two former Yahoo employees, Brian Acton
and Jan Koum, in 2009. This application, which is designed as a forum for communication
between consumers, quickly became popular with the public; from the very start, its operations
were based on a ‘no ads policy’12. The WhatsApp application was bought by Facebook Inc. in
October 2014 for a  price of USD 19 billion, thereby turning WhatsApp into a  Facebook
subsidiary. At the time, WhatsApp boasted 600 million active users and it was adding news
users at a rate of 25 million a month. The first figure was announced by Jan Koum on Twitter,13
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stressing that ‘active and registered are very different types of numbers...’14 In mathematical
terms, this means that 10% of the global population were active WhatsApp users at the time,
but the share of registered users as a percentage of the earth’s population was even higher.
II A Personal Data — Dominant Company
Today, however, this user database is also owned by Facebook – the company now disposes
over an amount and quality of data that the human mind cannot fully fathom.15 In a 2016
publication Orsolya Bánki, who is a partner at the Budapest office of the global law firm Taylor
Wessing, referred to companies that are in a  position of dominance in terms of data
management as ‘data dominant companies’16. For the purposes of the present study, however,
this category is too broad in its focus; we need to narrow it down. There are several areas – and
not only in the online realm – where certain companies wield sufficient data to give them
a position of dominance. However, when it comes to the companies at issue in the present
discussion, we are not talking about entities that are data-dominant or data-led in a general
sense of the term;17 instead, their dominance stems specifically from their control of personal
data, so the right term to describe them is ‘personal data-dominant company’. The data assets
of such a company are a relevant factor that shapes its business activities, its market position
and, ultimately, also the assessment of its position in terms of competition law. Still, the issue
is whether the Facebook-WhatsApp merger qualifies as a competition law case, in which the
data wealth is tangentially relevant as one aspect of a classical merger assessment, or whether
the fusion of the two companies is in fact a clear-cut case of a data protection legal issue. Some
critics of the Commission’s decision have argued that the Commission had – erroneously –
decided on a data protection issue in a competition law procedure.18
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That there are certain instances when these two legal areas cannot be neatly separated
was also manifest in two conferences organised by the OECD. The first, held in 2016, touched
on the relationship between the Big Data phenomenon and competition law,19 while the
second conference, which was held in 2017, was about the relationship between algorithms
and competition law.20 Another factor that supports the idea that these issues are closely
intertwined is that the Italian competition authority21 issued a EUR 3 million fine against
Facebook on 12 May 2017 because the latter had violated consumer protection rules when it
obliged WhatsApp users to share their personal data with WhatsApp’s California-based
parent company.22 In its decision No 2017/C 286/06 of 17 May 2017, the European
Commission issued a fine of EUR 55 million for a violation of Article 14 (1) a) of the Merger
Regulation,23 along with another EUR 55 million fine for a violation of the same Regulation’s
Article 14 (1) b).24 Thus, within the span of five days, Facebook was subject to two judgments
that it had engaged in legal violations – one concerned consumer protection and the other
competition law – with fines totalling EUR 113 million. In both cases, however, one of the
crucial factors was data protection. The merger between Facebook and WhatsApp has
become one of the most hotly debated merger cases in the case-laws of both the European
Commission and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC),25 ever since both organisations
greenlit the transaction in 2014.26 The merger definitely marked a milestone in terms of EU
competition law, in the sense that it was the first case in which the Commission had to look
at the linking of the databases27 of social media networks as one of the factors in assessing the
anticipated market impact of the merger.28
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19 See <http://www.oecd.org/competition/big-data-bringing-competition-policy-to-the-digital-era.htm> accessed
6 July 2020.
20 See <http://www.oecd.org/competition/algorithms-and-collusion.htm> accessed 6 July 2020.
21 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, AGCM.
22 See <http://www.agcm.it/en/newsroom/press-releases/2380-whatsapp-fined-for-3-million-euro-for-having-
forced-its-users-to-share-their-personal-data-with-facebook.html> accessed 6 July 2020.
23 Council Regulation No 139/2004/EC (20 January 2004) on the control of concentrations between undertakings
(the EC Merger Regulation) OJ L 24, 29/1/2004, 1–22.
24 Article 14(1) The Commission may by decision impose undertakings where, intentionally or negligently:
a) they supply incorrect or misleading information in a submission, certification, notification or supplement
thereto, pursuant to Article 4 [Prior notification of concentration]
b) they supply incorrect or misleading information in response to a request made pursuant to Article 11(2)
[Requests for information – the Commission may require the persons to provide all necessary information].
25 The present study does not look at the implications of the merger in the United States. For more details on that
subject see: <https://www.epic.org/privacy/ftc/whatsapp/EPIC-CDD-FTC-WhatsApp-Complaint-2016.pdf>
accessed 6 July 2020.
26 Clemens, Özcan (n 18) 2.
27 It is worth pointing out, however, that the linking and integration of online databases [or “datasets, to use the
terminology proposed by Pál Belényesi] had been previously examined by the Commission, for example in 
the Microsoft/Yahoo! case in 2010. What makes the case at hand in this paper special is that those involved are
social media service providers.
28 Belényesi Pál, ‘Digitális platformok és a Big Data’ (2016) (1) Verseny és Szabályozás 147.
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III The Relevant Markets
The story of this ‘mega fine’ reaches back to Commission Decision No M.7217, in which the
European Commission had originally approved the aforementioned transaction. To analyse
this case in depth and to better understand the Commission’s logic in making its decision, we
draw on the fundamental principles laid out in the Commission’s 2014 approval of the
merger29 with respect to its definition of who the parties are and what services they provide:
– Facebook: social networking platform;
– Facebook Messenger: consumer communications app;
– Instagram: photo and video-sharing platform;
– Operated by: Facebook Inc., which operates in the framework of the subsidiary Facebook
Ireland Limited, which is registered in the European Economic Area and is 100% owned by
Facebook Inc.;
– WhatsApp: consumer communications services via mobile app;
– Operated by: WhatsApp Inc., which has been a  subsidiary of Facebook Inc. since 
6 October 2014.
The Commission identified three relevant markets: the market for consumer communica -
tions services, the market for social networking services and the market for online advertising
services. In the following, we only present the Commission’s own considerations with regard
to these services; our own analysis will follow in a later chapter of the present study.
The Commission defined the market of consumer communications services by taking
account of the following:
(A) WhatsApp is offered only for smartphones and it does not have any plan to expand its
offering to other platforms.30
(B) Although the two types of services are used for the same general purpose (communication),
the overall experience of the user is richer in terms of functionalities in consumer communica -
tions apps.31
(C) There is a competitive interaction between Facebook and WhatsApp, but it goes only
one way (i.e. consumer communications apps constrain traditional electronic communications
services but not the other way around).32
Conclusion: The Commission limited its assessment of the impact of the merger to the
context of the narrowest relevant product market, namely the market for smartphone-based
consumer communications apps.33
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29 Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 Merger Procedure, Case No COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, paragraphs
(2)–(3) [hereinafter: M.7217].
30 M.7217, Paragraph (21).
31 M.7217, Paragraph (30).
32 M.7217, Paragraph (32).
33 M.7217, Paragraph (34).
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Since competition concerns do not arise in this case, regardless of the alternative market
definition used, the Commission left it open whether the market for social networking
services should be segmented further on the basis of the following considerations:
(A) The Commission highlighted a number of important differences between social
networking services and consumer communications services.34
(B) On a general level, social networking services tend to offer a richer social experience
than consumer communications apps.35
(C) The Commission concludes that while consumer communications apps such as
Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp offer certain services that are typical of social networking
services, in particular the possibility of sharing messages and photos, there are important
differences between WhatsApp and social networking services.36
The Commission’s conclusions were based on a very narrow definition of the market for
online advertising services, which left several issues open, while the analysis focused on the
following considerations:
(A) The market investigation conducted for the purposes of reviewing the Transaction
clearly confirmed the Commission’s earlier findings, in which it distinguished between online
and offline advertising services.37
(B) The majority of competitors that took part in the market investigation submitted that,
from an advertiser’s point of view, search and non-search ads are not substitutable services.38
(C) Under a narrower definition of the product market, the Transaction would not give
rise to serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market.39
IV A Transaction without a ‘Union dimension’, even though It Was 
Deemed to Have One
The merger character of the transaction was established beyond doubt because it met the
conditions set out in Article 3 (1) of the Regulation, according to which a merger of corpora -
tions was being performed with Facebook Inc. acquiring WhatsApp Inc. for a price of USD
19 billion.40 The transaction qualified as a concentration within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b)
of the Merger Regulation.41
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34 M.7217, Paragraph (53).
35 M.7217, Paragraph (54).
36 M.7217, Paragraph (61).
37 M.7217, Paragraph (75).
38 M.7217, Paragraph (76).
39 M.7217, Paragraph (79).
40 Facebook Inc. acquired WhatsApp Inc. for USD 19 billion, of which 12 billion were paid in the form of Facebook
shares, a further 3 billion were paid in the form of restricted stock units in Facebook, and a final 4 billion of the
purchase price were paid in cash.
41 M.7217, Paragraph (5).
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In the next step, the Commission had to assess whether the merger had a  ‘Union
dimension’42, as this qualification determines the scope of the merger procedure.43 The definition
includes two criteria that must be examined to assess whether they apply to the situation at hand.
The respective turnovers of Facebook and WhatsApp were not revealed by the Commission;44
this information is published by the companies. However, although in 2013 Facebook’s worldwide
turnover was in excess of EUR 5,000 million,45 the transaction did not have a Union dimension
within the meaning of Article 1(2)46 or Article 1(3)47 of the Merger Regulation, since the intra-
EU turnover of WhatsApp amounted to only EUR 7.7 million48 in 2013.
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42 Article 1(2) While the Commission’s decision referred to a ‘Union dimension’, the text of the underlying Regulation
refers to a ‘Community dimension’. For the sake of greater clarity and consistency, we decided to use the term
which the Commission had used in its decision, since our study focuses on the latter. Nevertheless, the two are
understood to be synonymous here.
43 Concentration has a Community dimension where: (a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the
undertakings concerned is more than EUR 5000 million; and (b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of
at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 250 million, unless each of the undertakings concerned
achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State.
(3) A concentration that does not meet the thresholds laid down in paragraph 2 has a Community dimension
where: (a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 2500
million; (b) in each of at least three Member States, the combined aggregate turnover of all the undertakings
concerned is more than EUR 100 million; (c) in each of at least three Member States included for the purpose of
point (b), the aggregate turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 25
million; and (d) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned
is more than EUR 100 million, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its
aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State.
44 While the Commission’s decision referred to a ‘Union dimension’, the text of the underlying Regulation refers to
a ‘Community dimension’. For the sake of greater clarity and consistency, we decided to use the term which the
Commission had used in its decision, since our study focuses on the latter. Nevertheless, the two are understood
to be synonymous here: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/412794/euro-to-u-s-dollar-annual-average-
exchange-rate/> accessed 6 July 2020.
45 According to Facebook Reports, the revenue was 7872 million U.S. dollars, which means 5920 million converted
to EUR (exchange rate: 1,33 USD = 1 EUR). Facebook Reports Fourth Quarteer and Full Year 2013 Result:
<https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_news/2014/FB_News_2014_1_29_Financial_Releases.pdf>
(6 July 2020); Exchange Rate: See <https://www.statista.com/statistics/412794/euro-to-u-s-dollar-annual-average-
exchange-rate/> accesed 6 July 2020.
46 A concentration has a Community dimension where the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the
undertakings concerned is more than EUR 5000 million and the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of
at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 250 million, unless each of the undertakings
concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same
Member State.
47 A concentration also has a Community dimension where the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the
undertakings concerned is more than EUR 2,500 million; in each of at least three Member States, the combined
aggregate turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 100 million; in each of at least three Member
States included for the purpose of point (b), the aggregate turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings
concerned is more than EUR 25 million; and the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the
undertakings concerned is more than EUR 100 million, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more
than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State.
48 USD 10.21 million according to Statista.com <https://www.statista.com/statistics/346269/whatsapp-annual-
revenue/, 6 July 2020) and techcrunch.com> accessed 6 July 2020.
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Even so, the transaction was deemed to have a Union dimension:
...the acquisition fulfilled the two conditions set out in Article 4(5) of the Merger Regulation since
it was a concentration within the meaning of Article 3 of the Merger Regulation and it is capable
of being reviewed under the national competition laws of three Member States.49 On 19 May 2014,
the Notifying Party informed the Commission by means of a  reasoned submission that the
Transaction should be examined by the Commission pursuant to Article 4(5) of the Merger
Regulation. A copy of that submission was transmitted to the Member States on 19 May 2014. 
As none of the Member States competent to review the Transaction expressed its disagreement as
regards the request to refer the case, the Transaction was deemed to have a Union dimension
pursuant to Article 4(5) of the Merger Regulation.50
V The Notification of the Merger, the Review and its Results
The European Commission published the notification of the planned merger between
Facebook Inc. and WhatsApp Inc. on 4 September 2014, as part of its procedure in Case No
M.7217.51 Its preliminary examination stated that the ‘Commission finds that the notified
transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision
on this point is reserved’52.
The Commission began its review on the basis of Article 6, and as part of the procedure
it asked Facebook Inc whether
[p]ost-acquisition, [Facebook was] planning to link/match in any way customers’ profiles on
WhatsApp with these customers’ profiles on Facebook (e.g. by linking customers’ mobile numbers
from WhatsApp to these customers’ Facebook accounts)?53
In the meanwhile, another submission was filed by a complainant third party, which essentially
reiterated the Commission’s assumption above, namely that Facebook Inc. would be able to
link user profiles even without any active behaviour expressing consent by the given user. In
its response dated 23 September 2014, Facebook rebutted the complainant’s claims and
answered the Commission’s pertinent question in the negative by asserting that, since there
was no way of automatically ‘matching’ Facebook User IDs with the mobile phone numbers
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49 The Commission didn’t name the three Member States, see M.7217, Paragraph (10).
50 M.7217, Paragraph (10)–(12).
51 See <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HU/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:C2014/297/04&from=HU> accessed
6 July 2020.
52 Prior notification of a concentration (Case M.7217 – Facebook / WhatsApp) Text with EEA relevance, OJ C 297,
4.9.2014, 13–13.
53 Question 5 of the questions sent by the Commission on 25 August 2014. (see Regulation (EC) No 139/2004
Merger Procedure, Case No COMP/M.8228 – Facebook/WhatsApp, Paragraph (60) [hereinafter: M.8228]).
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associated with each WhatsApp user, ‘matching of WhatsApp profiles with Facebook profiles
would most likely have to be done manually by users’54.
The European Commission decided on 3 October 2014 not to oppose the Transaction
and declared that it was in compliance with the internal market and with the EEA Agreement.55
The decision signed by Commission Vice President Joaquín Almunia posits that the
Transaction does not give rise to serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market
with respect to the market for the provision of online advertising services, including its
potential sub-segments.56 The Commission arrived at this assessment based on the following:
(1) The Commission defined the market affected as the narrowest relevant product market for
consumer communications services, that is the market for consumer communications apps for smart -
phones.57
(2) The fact that WhatsApp and Facebook are not close substitutes is further evidenced by Facebook’s
data showing that a considerable number of users of one service also use the other service. This
suggests that the needs fulfilled by each service are different. Therefore, given the considerable
differences between the functionalities and focus of WhatsApp and Facebook, the Commission
concluded that these providers are not close competitors in the potential market for social
networking services.58
(3) Since only Facebook, and not WhatsApp, is active in the provision of online advertising services,
the Transaction does not give rise to any horizontal overlaps in the market for online advertising
or in any sub-segment thereof.59
(4) Even if Facebook were to introduce advertising on WhatsApp, the Transaction would only raise
competition concerns if post-Transaction there would not be a sufficient number of effective
alternatives to Facebook for purchasing online advertising space.60 Therefore, the Commission
notes that regardless of whether the merged entity will introduce advertising on WhatsApp, there
will continue to be a sufficient number of other actual and potential competitors who are equally
well placed as Facebook to offer targeted advertising.61
(5) The Commission declared that it did not find it necessary to review the data protection
implications of the merger, and that it had ‘analysed potential data concentration only to the extent
that it is likely to strengthen Facebook’s position in the online advertising market or in any sub-
segments thereof ’. The Commission assessed namely that any ‘privacy-related concerns flowing
from the increased concentration of data within the control of Facebook as a  result of the
Transaction do not fall within the scope of the EU competition law rules but within the scope of
the EU data protection rules’62.
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54 M.7217, Paragraph (138).
55 M.7217, Paragraph (191).
56 M.7217, Paragraph (190).
57 M.7217, Paragraph (34).
58 M.7217, Paragraph (157)–(158).
59 M.7217, Paragraph (165).
60 M.7217, Paragraph (170).
61 M.7217, Paragraph (179).
62 M.7217, Paragraph (164).
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(6) In any event, even if the merged entity were to start collecting and using data from WhatsApp
users, the transaction would only raise competition concerns if the concentration of data within
Facebook’s control were to allow it to strengthen its position in advertising.63
However, as has since became apparent, these claims are open to dispute on several grounds.
We will analyse these further below, but only after concluding our comprehensive review of
the entire process.
VI The Sharing of WhatsApp Data with Facebook
WhatsApp informed users of the acquisition and the planned changes in a blogpost:
19 February 2014:
Here’s what will change for you, our users: nothing. (blogpost entitled Facebook).64
17 March 2014:
If partnering with Facebook meant that we had to change our values, we wouldn’t have done it.
Instead, we are forming a partnership that would allow us to continue operating independently
and autonomously. (…) Speculation to the contrary isn’t just baseless and unfounded, it’s
irresponsible. It has the effect of scaring people into thinking we’re suddenly collecting all kinds of
new data. That’s just not true, and it’s important to us that you know that. (Blogpost entitled Setting
the record straight)65
18 January 2016:
That’s why we’re happy to announce that WhatsApp will no longer charge subscription fees.
(Blogpost entitled Making WhatsApp free and more useful)66
25 August 2016:
Today, we’re updating WhatsApp’s terms and privacy policy for the first time in four years (…) [B]y
coordinating more with Facebook, we’ll be able to do things like track basic metrics about how
often people use our services and better fight spam on WhatsApp. And by connecting your phone
number with Facebook’s systems, Facebook can offer better friend suggestions and show you more
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63 M.7217, Paragraph (187).
64 See <https://blog.whatsapp.com/499/Facebook> accessed 6 July 2020.
65 See <https://blog.whatsapp.com/529/A-f%C3%A9lre%C3%A9rt%C3%A9sek-elker%C3%BCl%C3%A9se-v%C3%
A9gett> accessed 6 July 2020.
66 See <https://blog.whatsapp.com/615/A-WhatsApp-ingyeness%C3%A9-%C3%A9s-m%C3%A9g-hasznosabb%
C3%A1-v%C3%A1lik> accessed 6 July 2020.
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relevant ads if you have an account with them. For example, you might see an ad from a company
you already work with, rather than one from someone you’ve never heard of. (Blogpost entitled
Looking ahead for WhatsApp)67
It took Facebook Inc. and WhatsApp Inc. slightly over two years to get to the point when
they transferred the user data of WhatsApp users into the database of ‘Corporations that are
part of the Facebook family’. The Terms of Service as well as the Privacy Policy were updated:
WhatsApp Inc., which had become a Facebook subsidiary by this time, informed its users of
this in a blogpost as well as in the form of a so-called FAQ (frequently asked questions) page,
in which the company addressed typical issues that users tend to raise in such a context.68 At
the same time, WhatsApp Inc. shared user data not only with Facebook but also with other
companies that are part of the Facebook corporate group69 in order to ‘coordinate more and
improve experiences across our services and those of Facebook and the Facebook family’70.
It needs to be stressed, however, that when the terms and policies in question were updated,
WhatsApp users had the option of withholding their data from Facebook, but they had to
make a distinct statement to this effect. In consenting to the updated terms, users were informed
that ‘[i]f you do not want your account information shared with Facebook to improve your
Facebook ads and products experiences, you can uncheck the box’71. In fact, users even had
the option of changing their mind for a period of 30 days after their statement – this was the
timeframe provided for retracting72 the previously given consent.73
Thus, it was only as late as August 2016 that users had the chance to learn that, despite
all previous information to this effect, Facebook did in fact have access to their personal data.
In other words, despite previous assurances to the contrary, the user profiles created in the
two apps could be linked. However, the European Commission had found out about this
already a month before – it was informed by Facebook Inc. itself.
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67 See <https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000627/El%C5%91retekint%C3%A9s-a-WhatsApp-n%C3%A1l> accessed 6
July 2020.
68 The number of users had reached the one-billion mark on 1 February 2016. <https://blog.whatsapp.com/616/Egy-
milli%C3%A1rd> accessed 6 July 2020.
69 The most widely known among European users is Instagram LLC, but there are also seven other companies in this
group (The Facebook Companies) <https://www.facebook.com/help/111814505650678> accessed 6 July 2020.
70 See <https://faq.whatsapp.com/general/28030012?lang=hu> accessed 6 July 2020.
71 We do not wish to perform a legal analysis of the statement of consent in our competition law study, but it still
needs to be stressed that the consent to share one’s data was based on an opt-out rather than an opt-in basis,
which was a violation of the European Union’s effective regulations on the subject.
72 This is also a data protection issue, but European data protection law (which was governed by Directive 95/46/EC
at the time) does not feature the institution of imposing a deadline on the possibility of retracting consent. The
individual has the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time, and any limitation of this right by imposing
a deadline on its exercise constitutes a violation of EU regulations.
73 See <https://faq.whatsapp.com/hu/general/26000016> accessed 6 July 2020.
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VII Providing Incorrect or Misleading Information
On 30 June 2016 Facebook Inc. filed a submission with the Commission in which it referred
to product improvements involving ‘a form of user matching between Facebook and
WhatsApp that was not widely available in 2014’74. Practically, therefore, Facebook reported
itself to the Commission, thereby pre-empting the Commission from launching its own
investigation, which would likely have occurred if the Commission had found out about the
changes from the internet as users had done. It is worth emphasising, however, that although
Facebook did cooperate with the Commission in this context, the actual data integration had
been implemented already before the Commission had had the opportunity to arrive at its
own assessment.
On 28 July, the Commission asked Facebook whether the method of identification that
would be used to identify the mutual users of Facebook and WhatsApp, on which the planned
product update was based, had already been available when the merger was approved and
whether this development had already been planned by that time. Facebook Inc. submitted that
the so-called telephone identification/matching solution (‘Phone ID Matching Solution’) had
been available already in 2014, but its actual form varied depending on the operation system of
the given smartphone (Android, iOS, Windows OS or other OS used by Blackberry, Nokia S40
and Nokia Symbian S60).75 Facebook Inc. further explained that at the time of the merger it had
not been clear whether the Phone ID Matching Solution would be sufficient to support such
functions, because it had not been designed with the goal of sending cross-platform messages.76
In its Statement of Objection dated 20 December 2016, the Commission explained its
preliminary view. It posited that, in the M.7217 Facebook/WhatsApp case, Facebook Inc. had
‘intentionally, or negligently, submitted incorrect or misleading information’ in the notification
filed in compliance with Article 4 of the Merger Regulation, as well as in its response to the
Commission’s request for information (RFI) dated 18 September 2014, which Facebook was
obliged to provide pursuant to the Merger Regulation’s Article 11 (2).77
The preliminary view expressed in the Statement of Objection already foreshadowed that
the case could mark a  milestone in the history of European competition law. If the
Commission were to make a binding decision that a violation had occurred then that would
be a first since the adoption of the Merger Regulation in 2004.78 Since 2004, the Commission
had never before ruled against any company for a violation of having provided ‘incorrect or
misleading information’ – as the Commission mentions in the press release.79
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74 M.8228, Paragraph (30).
75 M.8228, Paragraph (49)–(50).
76 M.8228, Paragraph (51).
77 M.8228, Paragraph (38).
78 Past Commission decisions in this regard were adopted under the 1989 Merger Regulation in accordance with
different fine-setting rules. See e.g.: from 1999 Sanofi/Synthélabo, KLM/Martinair, Deutsche Post, from 2002:
BP/Erdölchemie (M.2624), from 2004 Tetra Laval/Sidel (M.3255).
79 See <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_1369> accessed 6 July 2020.
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Facebook Inc. also acknowledged the Commission’s preliminary assessment and
confirmed that it had provided incorrect or misleading information in the context of case
M.7217 and had engaged in negligent behaviour. In its written comments, Facebook also
indicated that it did not request that oral hearings be held and it did not request to review the
Commission’s files on the case.80
VIII The Commission’s Decision, the Amount of the Monetary Fine
In determining the amount of the fine, the Commission assessed that Facebook Inc.’s
cooperative attitude was a mitigating circumstance. According to Article 14 (1) of the Merger
Regulation, the Commission is entitled to issue a fine up to the amount of 1% of the total
turnover of the company. In its determination of the amount, the Commission considered
whether a fine would be an appropriate penalty and whether it would also have sufficient
deterrent effect.81 These were the considerations that informed its decision to issue a fine of
EUR 55 million for a violation of Article 14 (1) a) of the Merger Regulation, that is the
provision of incorrect or misleading information by Facebook in its prior notification of the
merger, and another EUR 55 million fine for the violation specified in Article 14 (1) b), that
is for the incorrect or misleading information provided by Facebook in response to the
Commission’s request for information.
The Commission pointed out in its decision that it had determined the maximum amount
of the fine that it could potentially levy based on Facebook’s annual report,82 which said that the
company’s total turnover in 2016 was EUR 24,968.83 million.83 According to Article 5 of the
Merger Regulation, the fine could have totalled EUR 249.7 million84 per violation. Nevertheless,
the Commission set the actual amount of the fine at only 22% of the maximum possible amount.85
In the Commission’s press release on the subject, Competition Commissioner Margrethe
Vestager said that the Commission had imposed a  ‘proportionate and deterrent’86 fine on
Facebook. The authors of the present study assess that it is difficult to take an unequivocal position
on the amount of the fine because there is no precedent. This was the first case of its kind, which
means there is no basis for comparison. Nevertheless, the amount does raise whether, in the case
of a company with such an annual turnover as well as in light of the value of the underlying
acquisition deal, the figure decided upon by the Commission will have an actual deterrent effect.
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • GÁBOR POLYÁK – GÁBOR PATAKI
n 180
80 M.8228, Paragraph (41).
81 M.8228, Paragraph (107).
82 See <http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001326801/80a179c9-2dea-49a7-a710-2f3e0f45663a.pdf> 
p. 31. accessed 6 July 2020.
83 USD 27,638 million.
84 USD 276.38 million.
85 The text of the regulation says that the maximum fine that can be assessed does not apply cumulatively for all
violations but per violation found. Thus the amount was not a single fine of EUR 100 million but two concurrently
levied fines of EUR 55 million each.
86 See <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1369_en.htm> accessed 6 July 2020.
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As we wrote above, Facebook Inc. acquired WhatsApp Inc. for USD 19 billion and the
Commission had already been fully apprised of this when they approved the transaction.87
Even the maximum amount of the fine that could have been levied per violation (USD 276.38
million) would have amounted to a mere 1.45% of the total acquisition price, but the fine that
actually ended up being levied was just 0.32% of the total merger value. (True enough, it was
issued twice, once for each of the violations, but it still amounted to less than 1% of the price
Facebook had paid for WhatsApp).
It would have also made sense for the Commission to review how Facebook’s business
performance and market position were influenced by fusing the user databases in question.
Moreover, in addition to the monetary fine, the Commission had the additional option
of retracting its previous decision based on the Merger Regulation’s Article 6. According to
the Regulation, this option is expressly available in cases when the approval was granted based
on incorrect information and the responsibility for this information can be clearly attributed
to one of the companies involved. Ultimately, in its decision No M.8228 the Commission
decided to forgo this option, presumably on two grounds. First, three years after the
implementation of the decision, restoring the status quo ante was a theoretical possibility at
best. Second, in approving the merger the Commission itself had been responsible for what
appear with hindsight to be very obvious mistakes.
IX Criticisms of the Commission’s Decision
The Commission made its first mistake in the identification of the relevant market. For one,
Facebook rolled out its own messaging service, Messenger, in 2011 for the iOS and Android
platforms. Messenger provides for the possibility of direct communication between two users,
which is why it clearly seems like a WhatsApp substitute product. The Commission saw this
differently, however.
In its decision No M.7217, the Commission declared that it had examined the merger with
respect to its impact on the “narrowest relevant product market for consumer communications
services, that is the market for consumer communications apps for smart phones,88 also noting
that it had relied on the previously used definition in the Microsoft/ Skype case.89 As Yasar
points out,90 several authors have criticised this approach.91 In its decision-making process,
the Commission essentially treated Facebook and its Messenger service as two distinct units.
It viewed the first as a social media service, while it classified Messenger as a consumer
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communications service.92 Despite this, it even chose not to classify Facebook Messenger as
a close competitor of WhatsApp.93 It based this assessment on the observation that the parties’
offerings differ from one another in numerous respects,94 although, in our assessment, these
differences are far less significant than they would seem based on the Commission’s opinion.
First of all, in the Commission’s view, the most obvious difference is the user ID that is used
to access the service, which is a username in the case of Messenger while for WhatsApp it is
a phone number. Today we know this was not a real impediment to linking the distinct user
accounts across the two services. At the same time, all the other distinctions they draw are also
debatable. They posit,95 for instance, that the source of the interaction between users is
different: while in Messenger it is based on Facebook user accounts, WhatsApp relies on the
address list in the user’s mobile phone. At the same time, however, in situations when
Facebook has the user’s phone number there is once again an area where the contacts
immediately overlap. Indeed, while the Commission could not have known this back in 2014,
on 24 June 2015 Facebook announced that it was launching a new service: From that day on
Messenger was also available without a Facebook account. For using the service without
a Facebook account, all the user had to do was to provide a phone number.96 This took place
slightly more than eight months after the Commission submitted its decision No M.7217. In
hindsight, this casts the Commission’s interpretation in a different light – this is true regardless
of whether Facebook was already aware at the time that it would soon launch such a service
or whether it decided to do so subsequently, in the awareness of and as a  result of the
Commission’s decision.
The third difference that the Commission saw was the user experience. It argued that it
is richer in Messenger. However, the question that arises with respect to this assessment is
whether any given relative levels of user experience can shift in the future by WhatsApp
improving its services. The Commission also pointed to the two services’ respective data
protection policies: While Messenger allowed for the collection of user activity data on behalf
of Facebook to support corporate advertising sales, that was not the case with WhatsApp. In
light of the steps taken after the acquisition, it is readily apparent that data protection policies
are not immutable.
The Commission further pointed out97 that, in practice, WhatsApp and Messenger are
complementary products, as is also evidenced by the fact that the majority of EEA users
installed both services on their devices and used them in parallel. That is why in reality the two
applications are more complementary than rival products in the narrowest sense – the
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Commission’s assessment was that, in a narrower sense, WhatsApp’s competitor is Viber, while
Messenger is in close competition with Google Hangouts or Twitter.98 The Commission was
definitely right in its assessment that the logic underlying Google Hangouts and Messenger is
the same: they are services that allow for exchanging direct messages and keeping in touch
with those persons in a user’s network of contacts who use the given social media service 
(to whit, Google+ and Facebook). At the same time, it is a mystery why the Commission saw
an intense competition between Messenger and Twitter, even though the latter provides
a service that is completely different from the former.
The Commission’s conclusions concerning the differences in the data protection
regulations are very controversial. In their analysis of the case, Clemens and Özcan looked
specifically at consumer habits with respect to messaging services. The researchers divided
potential users into two groups: one group does not care that data is being collected about
them while the other will forgo the connection if it involves data being collected about them.
This is why they concluded that if the provider does not collect data about its users from the
very outset, it can continuously increase the number of users who thus become committed
– and then, if there is a change in the data collection policy, users may be outraged but only
a small percentage will actually quit the community.99 There is no information available as to
whether Facebook had such research insights at its disposal at the time when it acquired
WhatsApp, which would have informed its decision going forward; what is certain, however,
is that a knowledge of these insights renders the Commission’s observation in 2014, that there
are major differences between the respective data protection policies of the two platforms,
irrelevant.
Clemens and Özcan also conclude that the problem of data integration is not a competition
law issue, and the authors are staunchly opposed to the notion of assessing data management
issues in the framework of competition law.100 On this point, however, we disagree with them
– although data integration in and of itself is indeed a data protection rather than a competi -
tion law issue, the unification, augmentation and linking of databases can serve as a competitive
advantage that benefits certain service providers, and they can affect the business activities
of enterprises so massively that their impact must be considered in competition law
procedures as well.101 And although the Commission did weigh this aspect, ultimately it did
not take it sufficiently into consideration.102
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X The Competition Law Assessment of the Databases
As we already mentioned, at the end of 2013, WhatsApp had recorded an annual revenue of
USD 10.2 million – along with a net loss of USD 138 million: ten times more loss than revenue.
Is it a good investment to buy an unprofitable company? Or maybe we should ask why this
was good investment. WhatsApp was Facebook’s largest acquisition by far, 20 times larger
than Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram in 2012. Why did Facebook break the bank to buy
WhatsApp?103 As economic analyses have shown, the answer is user growth.104 Overall,
Facebook broke down the money it spent on WhatsApp as USD 2.026 billion for the user
base.105
In 2014, over 500 million people used WhatsApp monthly and the service added more than 
1 million users per day. 70% of WhatsApp users were active daily, compared to Facebook’s 62%.
Additionally, WhatsApp users sent 500 million pictures back and forth per day, about 150 million
more than Facebook users. The app launched in 2009 and as of 2020 it has 1.5 billion users. As of
2019, Facebook has 2.59 billion monthly active users. With a shared mission of enhancing global
connectivity via internet services, the merging of forces will likely accelerate growth for both
companies. For Facebook, user growth comes first and monetization later. WhatsApp has helped
fuel Facebook’s growth in developing markets where internet connectivity is sparse but where
WhatsApp is widely used. Facebook then gains access to these mobile user bases.106
It is no exaggeration to say that once the two databases have been linked, the data in them
become significantly more valuable than they would be if the same data were kept in separate
databases with two distinct providers. If we divide the users that Facebook Inc. won by its
acquisition of WhatsApp into two groups, then we find that Facebook could have generated
a surplus value from both groups in the database. With respect to the WhatsApp users who are
at the same time also Facebook users, the parent corporation received additional information
concerning their user behaviour, which will allow it to sell its advertising spaces to advertisers
by arguing that they offer even more accurate and individually customised user profiles. But
the database of users who are only WhatsApp users or who declined to have their user data
linked is by no means worthless for the company, either: their personal data can be used to
yield a surplus either by using them as a control group or by using them to render the general
user profiles more accurate.
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Although the Commission tangentially touched on this aspect of the underlying issue, it
still concluded that the size of the database would not be a cause for concern, even in the
event that Facebook would ultimately find a way to match and link the WhatsApp and
Facebook user accounts since ‘the Transaction would only raise competition concerns if the
concentration of data within Facebook’s control were to allow it to strengthen its position in
advertising’107. In the market identified by the Commission, however, this could not actually
happen because it includes a ‘sufficient number of alternative providers’ other than Facebook
that also collect personal data (e.g. Google, Yahoo, AOL, Microsoft, Yelp or even Adobe), which
means that even after this transaction there would be a sufficient number of online advertising
service providers left in the market.108 At the same time several commentaries criticised109 the
Commission’s failure to take into account that the databases at the disposal of these various
corporations are not the same, and that they shield these from one another as confidential
business information. For our part, we would like to add that, in our opinion – because the
actual underlying market at issue in this case has been inadequately defined – Facebook’s
database should not have been compared to the those of Yahoo, AOL, Microsoft, Yelp or
Adobe, since they are the fruits of services that operate completely differently from Facebook.
It is further worth noting that in 2014 the Commission – despite the fact that a third
party also filed a complaint – only submitted a request for information to Facebook Inc. Based
on the information at our disposal, it did not substantially – from an IT perspective – examine
whether Facebook Inc. might have had the technology – or might have at least had the
capacity to attain it – that it could use to match and link the users in the databases of the two
platforms. It is of course a  question whether the scope of its authority to review such
transactions, as it is defined in Article 13 of the Merger Regulation, can be interpreted
expansively enough to extend to an information technology issue that is impacted by the
merger in question. Still, one may legitimately ask why the Commission failed to obtain an IT
assessment by independent experts and instead chose to decide a technical IT issue with
a crucial impact on the merger exclusively based on the relevant statement by the organisation
that was the subject of the review.
This is also relevant with respect to the process whereby the sanctions applied in this
case were determined. As we previously noted, pursuant to Article 6 (3) of the Merger
Regulation, the Commission may retract is decision approving the merger if said decision
was rendered based on incorrect information and the corporation in question is deemed to
be responsible for providing misinformation. Terminating the merger and restoring the status
quo ante would presumably have been impossible three years after the merger. Based on the
publicly available documents, the Commission did not even seriously entertain the possibility.
Moreover, this was the first time since the entry into effect of the Merger Regulation in 2004
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that the Commission had levied a  fine in connection with the provision of incorrect or
misleading information, which meant that this was the first time that Article 14 (1) a) of the
Regulation had been applied in practice. An important element of that provision is that the
corporation in question provided the incorrect information deliberately or negligently. That
is why, in its decision concerning the fine, the Commission consistently referred to ‘at least
negligently’ when writing about the provision of incorrect information by Facebook Inc.
From a competition law angle, the Commission found that it was sufficient to show, based
on three criteria, that Facebook had acted ‘at least negligently’110. In determining the fine, the
Commission only investigated whether Facebook Inc. had cooperated during the 2017
investigation. The Merger Regulation does not in fact provide that the Commission has to
ascertain in its investigation whether it was intentional or negligent behaviour on the part of
the company that resulted in the dissemination of incorrect or misleading information. In its
assessment of the underlying behaviour, the Commission ultimately chose a sanction that did
not affect the approval of the merger and was thus milder than a withdrawal of its previously
issued approval. Nor did the Commission discuss in its decision on the fine how it would
have adjudicated the merger application in 2014 if Facebook had not listed, among its promises
at the time, that it had no intention of linking the two databases either at then or at any time
in the future.
The Commission noted that, ‘albeit relevant, the incorrect or misleading information
provided by Facebook, Inc. did not have any impact on the outcome of the Article 6(1)(b)
Decision’.111 In our opinion, this statement is a wrong decision: As we already noted, once the
two databases have been linked, the data in them hold a significantly greater value than they
would if the same data were kept in separate databases with two distinct providers. The
formula works: more data, more information, more accuracy, greater impact on the users 
(or consumers or data subjects).
And as of 2020 we have learned – despite the difficulties in precisely estimating WhatsApp’s
revenues, since Facebook does not release separate financial revenue information for its
various business segments and subsidiaries – that the WhatsApp business model has never
yielded high returns.112 However, Facebook’s annual revenue was USD 70,697 million in 2019
– compared to USD 12,466 million in 2014 (the year of the acquisition).113
We do not claim that WhatsApp is the only reason behind the surge in Facebook’s revenue,
but let us take a look at the most recent statistics (updated June 23, 2020) about WhatsApp:
– 1.5 billion users in 180 countries make WhatsApp the most-popular messaging app in the
world (0.2 billion more than its peer in the market, Facebook Messenger);
– 1 billion daily active WhatsApp users;
– 3 million users of WhatsApp Business;
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– 65 billion WhatsApp messages sent per day, or 29 million per minute;
– 3 million users of WhatsApp Business;
– 55 million WhatsApp video calls made per day, lasting 340 million minutes in total.114
In our opinion, the incorrect or misleading information provided by Facebook, Inc., had
an impact on the outcome of the Article 6(1)(b) Decision.
In 2017, the EU Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, who is in charge of competition
policy, announced that the European Commission has fined Facebook:
Today’s decision sends a clear signal to companies that they must comply with all aspects of EU
merger rules, including the obligation to provide correct information. And it imposes a proportionate
and deterrent fine on Facebook. The Commission must be able to take decisions about mergers’
effects on competition in full knowledge of accurate facts.115
We should note again in this context that Facebook had acquired WhatsApp for USD 19
billion in 2014. The European Commission imposed a fine on Facebook in the amount of
EUR 0.11 billion. The Commission declared that it did not find it necessary to review the data
protection implications of the merger, and that it had ‘analysed potential data concentration
only to the extent that it is likely to strengthen Facebook’s position in the online advertising
market or in any sub-segments thereof ’. The Commission assessed specifically that any
‘privacy-related concerns flowing from the increased concentration of data within the control
of Facebook as a result of the Transaction do not fall within the scope of the EU competition
law rules but within the scope of the EU data protection rules’116.
Conclusion
The Facebook/WhatsApp case has demonstrated that, in the event that data protection and
competition law intersect, it does not appear sufficient to look at the merger solely from the
angle of competition. The reason is that if we look at a  merger only and exclusively as
a transaction aimed at reducing competitive pressure in the market by buying up a competitor,
the Commission’s decision can only be subject to potential criticism with respect to its
definition of the market in question. However, if we also look at the competitive advantaged
gained by linking the databases then the Commission’s decision can be disputed on the merits,
too. The reason is that although the Commission declared that, from a data protection
perspective, it did not see grounds for reviewing the transaction, the controversial question
at issue in the context of the merger does not concern data protection but data assets. And
the Commission should definitely have incorporated the issue of data asset management
among the competition law considerations reviewed in the decision, because the question of
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how Facebook handles the personal data it accumulates in the performance of its service is
indeed a data protection law issue; nevertheless, the question of what type of competitive
market advantage the linked databases generate – personal information as a data asset and
a non-material good – could have been examined from a competition law angle.
The big question is whether the new Digital Services Act package will make the issue of
data asset management subject to the scope of competition law.
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Introduction
The topic of this paper is the drag along right in Hungarian venture capital contracts. In this
paper, I aim to answer whether it is possible to apply valid drag along clauses with their
original purpose in venture capital contracts under Hungarian law.
This study seems to be timely, since there are more and more venture capital deals under
Hungarian law, and at same time, many new legal vehicles have come from the United States,
which we are expected to use in domestic venture capital contracts, and it is not clear if they
are able to produce the desired legal effect in Hungary. One of these new legal vehicles is the
drag along right.
What is the drag along right; what is its definition, how does it work and, in particular,
how can we use it in Hungarian contracts? There is no doubt that the drag along right works
under the US or UK common law excellently, but it is not clear whether we can use it in
Hungary in the same way. By the end of this study, I will give my answer to all these questions.
First of all, I examine the definition of the drag along right, using the United States,
German and Hungarian venture capital institutes’ statements regarding the term. It is necessary
to study the regulation and daily practice of other legal systems’ drag along right, as it is a quite
new legal vehicle in the Hungarian contractual practice; there are no specific legal regulations
and no court decision is known in connection with the drag along right.
Later, I introduce nine different contractual terms and conditions in connection with the
drag along right. In each examined legal system, i.e. the legal system of the United States,
Germany and Hungary, I studied three venture capital deals concluded in the last two years,
so we can get a relatively complete picture of the terms and conditions applied in this context.
Finally, I analyse in detail how the drag along right can work under Hungarian law.
I introduce the different approaches taken by different legal experts in the examined contracts
or stated in the daily practice. I then reveal my own opinion of how we should explain the drag
along right according to Hungarian law, but I also give room for the reader to choose from the
possible legal solutions.
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I Definition of the Drag Along Right
The drag along right serves the purpose in the venture capital transactions, the holder of the
drag along right has the right to force all of the other investors and founders to do a sale of
the company without the consent of the other shareholders of the company.1 The drag along
right secures that, in the event of a favourable bid for the shares of the company made by
a third person but the minority of the shareholders being opposed to the bid and do not
wishing to sell their shares, then the holder of the drag along right can force all other shareholders
in the company to sell their shares to an (outside) buyer at the same price at which the right
holder(s) sells their shares (a so-called hold-up problem).2 As the buyer usually would like to
buy the whole company, whereas the minority shareholders, who have shares in the company
of only a couple of percent each, can prevent the transaction, the drag along right can ensure
that the majority of the shareholders can sell their shares if the buyer would like to buy the
whole company or more shares than the right-holder has. In reality, in venture capital deals,
the drag along right belongs to the investor, and the investor usually has only a minority share
in the company. As such, in venture capital deals, the drag along right transforms shareholders’
majority rights into a minority right, in favour of the principle of venture capital deals, namely
that the investor exits first from the company. From another aspect, the drag along right is an
obligation for the founders and the other parties as shareholders, regarding venture capital
transactions; if the investor gets a bid for the shares of the company that exceeds investor’s
shareholding in the company, the founders and other shareholders are obliged to sell their
shares in in it according to the terms and conditions stated by the investor.3 To balance the
rights and obligations of the parties, the drag along right always works pari passu, i.e. the investor
cannot sell the shares of the obligors of the drag along right under worse conditions than
those under which the investor will sell his own shares.
Although I examined the legal systems of the United States, Germany and Hungary, I have
not found any expressis verbis law that defines the drag along right. Moreover, I also did not
find any legal vehicle that properly describes the mechanism I characterised above. I therefore
studied the standpoints of the most significant national venture capital institutes in the
examined legal systems.
The drag along right has been defined in the term sheet template of the American
National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) as follows.
Holders of Preferred Stock and the Founders [and all future holders of greater than [1]% of Common
Stock (assuming conversion of Preferred Stock and whether then held or subject to the exercise of 
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options)] shall be required to enter into an agreement with the Investors that provides that such
stockholders will vote their shares in favor of a Deemed Liquidation Event or transaction in which
50% or more of the voting power of the Company is transferred and which is approved by [the
Board of Directors] [and the holders of ____% of the outstanding shares of Preferred Stock, on an
as-converted basis (the “Electing Holders”)], so long as the liability of each stockholder in such
transaction is several (and not joint) and does not exceed the stockholder’s pro rata portion of any
claim and the consideration to be paid to the stockholders in such transaction will be allocated as
if the consideration were the proceeds to be distributed to the Company’s stockholders in
a liquidation under the Company’s then-current Certificate of Incorporation.4
On the website of the German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (GVCA), I did not
find a definition of the drag along right.5 In the German legal literature, Ernst and Häcker analysed
management rights and obligations in venture capital deals, and described the drag along right
as the obligation of the management when the investor would like to sell the whole company:
In the event that the Investor intends to sell shares in the Company in an Exit Transaction
(“Transaction”), the investor shall have the right to require the Manager to sell and transfer all
Manager Shares or, at the Investor’s discretion, the Pro-Rata-Share Portion either to the purchaser
in the Transaction (the “Purchaser”) or to the Investor or any other entity as determined by the
Investor. (…) The sale of Manager Shares under the Drag-Along Right will be substantially under
the same terms and conditions (in particular, but not limited to pro rata the purchase price, the
representations and warranties, arrangements on payments and adjustments of the purchase price,
payments into escrow) applicable to the sale of Investor Shares sold in the Transaction.6
According to Orrick’s Guide, in the German practice, we also can describe the drag along
right as follows.
A drag-along (also called bring-along) is a contractual arrangement that gives one or more shareholders,
who hold either alone or together a certain percentage of the entire share capital of the company
(usually more than 50%) and who wish(es) to sell her (their) shares or a portion thereof to a third
party, the right to request all other shareholders to sell a pro-rata portion of their shares to such
third party. Sometimes, especially in early rounds, drag-along rights can only be enforced with the
consent of an investor majority. The drag-along is appealing to acquirers as it allows a 100% exit,
leaving behind no minority shareholders. Buyers will often want to acquire 100% in a company in
order to gain more flexibility and freedom to run the company as they see fit without having to pay
attention to minority shareholders with certain unalienable minority protection rights.7
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Compared to the definitions above, the Hungarian Private Equity and Venture Capital
Association (HVCA) uses a very simple definition:
If the venture capitalist sells his shareholding, he can require other shareholders to sell their shares
to the same purchaser.8
As we see from the above-mentioned descriptions, drag along does not have a universal
definition and almost every quotation emphasised different elements of the drag along right.
At the same time, we can highlight some constant attributes of the drag along right’s
definition, as follows
a) the drag along right is a right of the investors, and at the same time,
b) the drag along right is an obligation on the founders and other shareholders,
c) upon the drag along right, the dragging investor can force the dragged shareholders to sell
that their shares in the company shall be sold to one or more third person(s) (buyer), because
d) the buyer wants to buy more shares than the investor has, and
e) the dragged shareholders’ share shall be sold on the basis of pari passu and pro-rata
compared to the investor’s shares.
II Contractual Practice
I examined three law firms’ daily practice from the US, Germany and Hungary. During my
research, I studied more than one hundred venture capital contracts, but finally, I chose nine
contracts, three from each examined legal system, and analysed them in detail. I found that
each examined venture capital contract has a drag along clause. Although the drag along
clauses in the examined contracts were similar in their main points, there were however many
important differences in the detailed rules. Therefore, in the following, I will present the main
elements of the drag along right separately and highlight the different provisions of the
contracts.
1 Main Elements in Each Examined Contract
In each examined contract, the main elements listed in the previous chapter were very similar.
The definition I gave in the previous chapter therefore corresponds not only to the legal
literature but to the daily practice, too. I posit that this definition can be acceptable as the
general definition of the drag along right.
I must note that, in each examined Hungarian contract, the company in which the
investor performed the investment, was established as a Hungarian limited liability company
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(korlátolt felelősségű társaság, hereinafter Kft.). For this reason, I will introduce only the law
regarding Kfts and analyse the drag along right in the venture capital deals where the company
is a Kft.
Now, let us see the different terms and conditions of the drag along right clauses.
2 Holders of the Drag Along Right
In the examined contracts, the parties of the contracts were the selling investors and the other
shareholders. The selling investors had the drag along right (‘dragging investors’, or ‘obligee of
the drag along right’) and the other shareholders were the obligors of the drag along right
(‘dragged shareholders’ or ‘obligor of the drag along right’).
In each examined US contract, the investors had a significant majority in the company,
so the drag along right was the right of the majority. In the German and Hungarian contracts,
the dragging investors had only a minority share in the company, so the drag along right was the
right of the minority.
3 Time Conditions
I did not find time conditions in the US contracts.
In the examined German contracts, the dragging investors could not use their drag along
right within a certain period after the investment contract was signed. This period varied
between 1 and 3 years.
Among the Hungarian contracts, I found only one contract in which the dragging
investors could use their drag along right immediately after signing of the investment contract.
In this contract, the investors’ drag along right would be open if the purchase price in the bid
was not less than a certain minimum price, which was defined in the investment contract, and
it was also the investors’ minimum expected return. The investors do not have a drag along
right if the purchase price is less than the predetermined amount.
In other two Hungarian contracts, a three-stage timing system was established as follows:
– In the first period it was not allowed to exercise the drag along right. This period was 1
year in one contract and 2 years in the other contract.
– In the second period, the investors can exercise their drag along right, but they cannot sell
the drag along obligors’ business shares under a certain purchase price.
– In the last period, which started from the end of the 5th year after the signing of the
investment contract, the investors can exercise their drag along right without any other
restriction but with respect to pari passu and pro rata rules.
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4 Trigger Events9
The events that trigger the investors’ drag along right are called trigger events. It is a key
question what conditions should be present to allow for the investors to have the right to
exercise their drag along right. Drag along exists so that if an investor receives a bid for his or
her shares then he or she will be able to sell them, even if he or she does not have enough
shares to satisfy the bid. Usually, the buyer wants to buy the whole company (one hundred
percent of the shares) or the majority of the shares (fifty percent of the shares and one more
vote) and it is very rare that the investor has exactly enough shares to satisfy the bid, so in this
case, the investor uses his drag along right and enforces that enough shares will be sold from
the dragged shareholders’ shares for the required transaction to take place. Moreover, there are
other events that can trigger the drag along right not only the selling transactions. Moreover,
the selling transactions can also be different. Trigger events were defined in different ways in
the examined contracts. The different solutions of the contracts are presented as follows.
I. Trigger events in the US contracts
– a transaction or series of related transactions in which a person, or a group of related
persons, acquires from stockholders of the company shares representing more than fifty
percent (50%) of the outstanding voting power of the company (a ‘Stock Sale’); or
– a transaction that qualifies as a ‘Deemed Liquidation Event’. In the contract, the Deemed
Liquidation Event means the following:
I) a merger or consolidation of the company or the subsidiary of the company, or
II) the sale, lease, transfer, exclusive license or other disposition, in a single transaction or
series of related transactions, by the company or any subsidiary of the company of all 
or substantially all the assets of the company and its subsidiaries taken as a whole, or 
(2) the sale or disposition (whether by merger, consolidation or otherwise, and whether
in a single transaction or a series of related transactions) of one or more subsidiaries of
the company if substantially all of the assets of the company and its subsidiaries taken as
a whole are held by such subsidiary or subsidiaries, except where such sale, lease, transfer,
exclusive license or other disposition is to a wholly owned subsidiary of the company.
II. Trigger events in the German contracts
– any transaction in which any person or a group of persons acquires more than 50% of
the outstanding shares of the company, or
– more than 50% of the moveable and immoveable property of the company is sold,
regarding their real market value, and all and any transactions have to be counted together,
regardless of whether the transaction is a stock, asset deal, merger or acquisition or it is
fulfilled upon any other legal title.
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III. Trigger events in the Hungarian contracts
In two Hungarian contracts there was no special trigger event. As soon as the investor receives
a bid that he cannot satisfy with his own business shares, he can force the other members of
the company to sell, in whole or in part, their business shares.
In the third Hungarian contract
a) the drag along right was not exercised in the first 2 years after the investment,
b) between the end of the 2nd year after the investment and before the end of the 5th year after
the investment, the investor could exercise its drag-along right if the company’s net sales or
EBITDA (‘earnings before interest and taxes’) for a given financial year are at least 50% below
the net sales or EBITDA projected in the current or the subsequent year’s business plan,
c) after the end of the 5th year after the investment, the investor could exercise his drag
along right without any conditions.
The financial conditions in point b) are usually considered as bad news and we can
conclude that, based on these financial data, the company is in a downside period. In these
cases, it is unlikely that the investor will want to keep its shares since these companies usually
do not provide a good return; moreover, it is more likely that it will end in a bankruptcy
procedure. So, in these cases, the investor would prefer to get rid of the company at any price
and not be involved in the forthcoming and very expensive liquidation process of the
company. I assume that this drag along right term could be used as an escape opportunity for
the investor in case of a financial difficulty of the company.
5 Minimum Purchase Price
I did not find a minimum purchase price either in the American or German contracts,
however, in two of the Hungarian contracts there were purchase price conditions. In both
contracts, the limitation only applied until the end of the first 5 years following the investment;
thereafter the condition ceased, and the investor could exercise its drag-along right.
The minimum purchase price protects the founders against the investor’s unrestricted
drag-along right. Upon the terms and conditions of the minimum purchase price, the parties
agree on a purchase price stated in the investment contract under which it is not possible to
sell the company without the consent of each party. Since the drag along right is a selling
transaction, the minimum purchase price must therefore be an objective obstacle to the
exercise of the drag along right. I must note that, it is very difficult to find a correct future
purchase price during the investment negotiation, because usually there is no reliable data
regarding the future market value of the company and whilst the founders are interested in
the highest purchase price possible, as the investor may not find a buyer at a higher purchase
price, the investor is interested in the possibly lowest purchase price in order to exercise its
drag along right as easily as it is possible.
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6 Mandates, Power of Attorney
I have found explicit mandates and powers in each US contract and two Hungarian contracts.
These mandates and powers are for the case where the dragged shareholders fail to fulfil
their obligations related to the drag along right; then someone else can act for and on their
behalf to perform their obligations under the investment contracts.
In the US contracts, the mandates and powers were established for the investors’
attorneys, who could act on behalf of the dragging shareholders in the event of exercising the
drag along right. In the Hungarian contracts, the mandates and powers were directly delegated
to the investors, who could act upon the drag along terms and conditions of the investment
agreements.
7 Other Rights, Obligations and Warranties
In the US contracts, not only the purchase offer had to be complete and eligible, but those
entitled to do so had to vote to perform the transaction. On the one hand, this meant the
company’s board, on the other hand, this meant the company’s general meeting. In the board;
the investors’ delegated member of the board had a veto right, upon which the investors’
delegate could block the board members’ decision to restrict the drag along transaction. In the
general meeting, the investors had the necessary majority to vote through the drag along
right, even if the other shareholders wanted to reject the transaction.
Each contract contained detailed procedural and implementing rules with special regard
to making legal statements, carrying out the necessary voting and signing other documents
(e.g. outstanding process of shares in US law or the company registration process in Hungarian
law).
Finally, the US contracts contained a  very detailed list of applicable warranties and
statements, which was so that each shareholder was only required to take responsibility for
his own shares; however, those shares had to be free and clear of all liens, claims and
encumbrances and be capable of fulfilling the drag along obligations at the time of the transfer.
III Drag Along Right under the Hungarian Law
In the chapters above, I have introduced the contractual practice and legal theory of the drag
along right under the US, German and Hungarian law. No doubt, there are more and more
venture capital contracts under the Hungarian law in which the parties agree on the drag
along clause. In this chapter, I summarise the legal characteristics of the drag along right and
analyse the different legal aspects of the examined legal vehicle. Throughout the analysis, I am
looking for the answer to whether drag along right is a valid clause under the Hungarian law.
In my view, the drag along right is a legal vehicle for the protection of the investors, based
on the contractual agreement of the parties, which restricts the property right and render it
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possible to transfer the ownership. It is worth going through all the elements of this statement
so that I can outline the legal problem.
The drag along right is a legal institution for the protection of the investors, since it
protects the investor’s interest in a way that if the investor would like to sell all the business
shares in the company, it cannot be prevented or restricted by the other owners or founders.
This is so, even if the investor does not want to sell all the business shares of the company, but
wishes to transfer more than the amount of its own business shares (typically 50% + 1 vote)
and also if the investor has a majority itself but the minority shareholders’ business shares
are forced to be transferred.
The drag along right is a contract-based legal institution, which is important from the
aspect that it is not a corporate legal vehicle, so a ‘cogens or dispositive’ dispute cannot arise;
the drag along clause is based on the contractual freedom of the parties. However, we cannot
omit the consideration that the drag along right necessarily has consequences related to
corporate law. It is beyond dispute that, in the event of exercising the drag along right, the
contract has to allow for transferring the ‘ownership’10 of the business shares.
It is still debated whether drag along restricts ownership of the business shares. I have to
make a very strong point in this question: is it better to restrict someone’s ownership than to
sell the thing at any time, regardless of the owner’s contractual intention? This is such
a limitation that there is no longer anything remaining to limit anymore.
It seems to be a similarly evident statement that drag along is a legal vehicle that makes
the transfer the ownership. In terms of the economic substance of the transaction, we can hardly
draw any other conclusion: the holder of the drag along right is entitled to sell the business
shares of other members to a subsequent buyer. However, this statement cannot be easily
overlooked in a legal study, so it is worth examining now from a legal point of view whether
the drag along right can transfer the ownership of a business share, or the drag along right is
able to trigger the legal effect, under which the shareholders will obliged to sell their business
shares to third persons.
The Hungarian law requires a valid legal title to transfer the ownership of any things, so
if we stated that the drag along right can transfer the ownership at all, by itself, then we should
find a valid legal title in the drag along contract.11 The invalidity of the title excludes the
transfer of ownership under the Hungarian law.12
Let us look at the possible legal titles of the Hungarian law that are capable of producing
the economic effects we discussed in detail above.
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1 Sale and Purchase Contract
The first and very logical answer, given by the members of the conservative drag along school,
is the sale and purchase contract13, since the dragging investor would like to sell the shares of
the other shareholders to a third person. This third person should be the purchaser; the
dragged shareholders could be the seller party and the share could be the subject of the contract.
However, we have a significant legal problem because we do not know the purchaser
party at the time of signing the drag along contract. The purchaser party will be known later
when the dragging investor named it. So, we have to put the question: will it be a valid sale
and purchase contract with the parties’ agreement if the purchaser person is not known at the
time of signing the sale and purchase contract?
In my view, we have to refer the ingatlan-átruházási szerződés érvényességéről szóló XXV.
számú Polgári Elvi Döntés (Civil Principle Decision by the Supreme Court of Hungary, No.
XXV., on the validity of the contract for the transfer of real estate, hereinafter referred to as
PED). We are interested in point number I. of the PED, and its statement of reasons, as follows:
For the purposes of the existence of a valid real property sale and purchase agreement, it is necessary
and sufficient that the deed, made from the contract of the intent of the parties, contains the parties’
persons, their will to transfer the ownership of the real property, and also the deed has data about
the real property and consideration, or if the transfer is free then it is stated from the content of the
deed. (…)
It follows from these statutory provisions that it is essential for the validity of a sale and purchase
contract for a real property that the written contract contains (a) the parties, (b) the subject matter
of the purchase, (c) the purchase price, and (d) the statement that the contract is a sale and purchase
contract.
Neither the law nor the implication thereof requires the contracting parties to be designated in
the text of the contract. It is sufficient, therefore, that the identity of the contracting parties and the
quality of their seller or purchaser (contractual status) can be clearly established from the signatures
or other contents of the deed.
First of all, I have to explain why the analogy is not too remote, e.g. why I refer to PED in
connection with the transfer of the real property, although a business share of a Kft is not
a real property, but it is also not a thing, since it means the whole of rights and obligations
arising in connection with the core deposit.14
First, it must be sufficient explanation as an a contrario argument that it would be a very
brave statement that the referred part of the PED is not valid in the case of sale and purchase
contracts that have subjects other than real property. Perhaps we can accept, as a sort of axiom,
that a sale and purchase contract is not validly able to be concluded for a movable thing unless
it specifies the subject of the purchase, the person of the parties and the purchase price.
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The corporate aspects of our examination pose a more difficult question.
Nowadays, it is widely accepted that the business share of a Kft is not a thing; as a result,
the rules regulating sale and purchase contracts do not apply to it.15 If the business share is
not a thing, then why would the referred PED be relevant in our case?
The Hungarian Code Civil (Ptk.) uses the expression ‘transfer of business share for
consideration in money’ in two sections when providing for the transfer of business share 
for con sideration.16
No more details of the regulation are revealed by the lawmaker about this legal instrument
leaving hereby those applying the law alone and forcing them to draw conclusions.
The law provides assistance by associating the ‘transfer of business share for consideration
in money’ with ‘acquisition of business share in priority’ to which analogia legis the underlying
provisions of the pre-emption right shall be applied.17
As the pre-emption right is a legal instrument closely connected with sale and purchase
contracts,18 those applying the law may be right when they conclude that if the pre-emption
right can govern the ‘acquisition of business share in priority’, the provisions on sale and
purchase contracts can govern the ‘transfer of business share for consideration in money’,
too. This view is supported by the Expert Proposal, which the lawmaker did not ascend to the
level of statute.19
However, it must be noted that I am of the opinion that it would have been expressly
written in the law if the lawmaker had wanted to apply the rules of the sale and purchase
contract to the transfer of business shares in exchange for money. It did not happen; moreover,
a new legal title was created and there is no cross-reference to the application of the rules
governing sale and purchase contracts; hence I tend to share the opinion that the legal
principles do not allow us to conclude that we have to apply the rules governing sale and
purchase contracts for the transfer of business shares in exchange for money.
From a practical point of view, the previous statement appears to be nonsense. If it did
operate like this, several legal affairs would be unmanageable, for example lien rights 
(a business share can hardly be defined as a thing, a right or a claim20), although company law
does not exclude the possibility of registering a lien right, 21 and it would also be impossible
to exercise call option, put option or repurchase rights regarding the business share if it is
taken into consideration that, per definitionem, all of them are entitlements to things.22
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This situation is not made easier even if we accept the view of the Commentary, according
to which
the transfer of business share covers the transfer of all the membership, membership rights and
membership obligations of a Kft; the legal title of that transfer is not to be regarded as a designated
transfer of title ownership, as its statutory scope does not extend to business membership;, rather,
it is a contract for transfer of business share governed by a special company law regulation.23
All in all, I take the standpoint that the legal title of a transfer of business share poses a legal
problem without a solution, the root of which is the dogmatic diffidence of legally determining
a business share. In this sense, this legal instrument is not congruent with the basically well-
structured and precisely established system of the Hungarian Civil Code. Depriving the
business share of its in rem nature and separating its transfer in exchange for money from 
the traditional principles of the law of obligations have led to the emergence of an unmanage -
able legal problem, which can only be settled by using generous interpretation of the law.
I understand and accept the view that, based on the Hungarian legal history, we cannot
regard a business share as a thing; however, our daily practice would be made significantly
easier if the lawmaker considered the sale and purchase contract as an underlying regulation
for the transfer of a business share in exchange for money, rather than forcing the use of the
pre-emption right as a collateral means for the right of acquisition of a business share in
priority. In this way, the right of acquisition of a business share in priority could become
intrinsically manageable, too.
Let me set aside this problem and regard share as a thing to allow for the application of
the general Hungarian Civil Code regulating sale and purchase contracts and options and
turn our attention to the statements of the conservative drag along school.
After finding the answers to these questions, we can accept now that the above-cited PED
regulations govern drag along law; that is, the buyer must be identified in drag along contracts.
However, the identification of the buyer is not possible at the time of signing the drag
along contract. As a result, we seem to have ended up in a dead-end street and we cannot
argue that the drag along is basically a sale and purchase contract capable of transferring the
legal title of the business share per se.
I do not even accept the view that the obligee of a drag along right is a representative or
an agent who enters into a contract in the name of the future buyer, as we do not know upon
concluding the contract whose representative or agent this person is; as such, the identity of
the buyer is not disclosed, resulting in the invalidity of the contract even if the buyer can be
identified at the time of the hypothetical perfection of the legal relationship. In my view, the
subjects of the legal relationship must be clearly identified at the time of entering into the
contract, rather than at the time of performing it.24
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In my opinion, based on the above argument, the supporters of the conservative
perception seem to be under a misapprehension and, under the Hungarian regulations relating
to sale and purchase contracts, drag along cannot be regarded as a simple sale and purchase
contract.
2 Call Option
In practice, several lawyers try to settle this problem by treating drag along as a call option,
taking into consideration that it cannot be a sale and purchase agreement. They can also be
grouped into two schools as follows
i. some of them state that the obligee of the drag along right has the right to exercise a call
option to acquire the business share that is encumbered with the drag along and he can
acquire the obligor’s business shares by his unilateral declaration in accordance with the other
rules of the drag along,
ii. the members of the radical call option school however think that the obligee of the drag
along has a call option right, but he also has the right to transfer this call option right to a third
person. Finally, the third person, using the call option right to the drag along obligor’s business
share, will be the owner of the business share.
As for the standpoint of the simple call option school’s approach, it is necessary to note
that it is another legal transaction; the obligee of the drag along right has no intention of
acquiring the drag along obligor’s business share: he would like to get rid of his own share
instead.
It can be seen that the drag along right is far from being a linear series of transactions, by
which the obligee of the drag along right first acquires the drag along obligor’s business share
and subsequently transfers it to the future buyer. It is important to note that such a transaction
could not be disputed as two legal documents, that can legally be drafted perfectly, transfer the
title of the ownership; however, the title is not the drag along. Furthermore, it is essential to pay
attention to the fact that the obligee of the drag along does not aspire to exercise membership
rights or fulfil obligations concerning newly-acquired business shares, and, in particular, the
obligee does not wish to pay tax on acquiring or transferring a business share, etc.
The legal solution, when the drag along obligee shall be entitled to transfer his call option
right to a third person, should be handled as a different legal question to a simple business
share sale and purchase agreement. We will discuss this problem in the next chapter.
3 Drag Along Right as a Call Option Involving the Right 
to the Designation of a Buyer (vevôkijelölés)
In this view, the drag along right always involves a call option, upon which the obligee of the
drag along right is able to acquire the business shares that are encumbered with the drag
along right. The radical call option school goes further and states that this call option right is
transferable, and the obligee of the drag along right has the right to transfer the call option
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right to any third person that will be able to acquire the drag along obligor’s business shares
by his unilateral declaration based on his call option right. Hence, they state that, during the
enforcement of the drag along right, the obligee of the drag along right transfers a call option
to the buyer; the buyer purchases the drag along obligor’s business shares and pays money to
the obligor. The purchase price and other purchase conditions have been determined by the
sales and purchase agreement’s terms and conditions concluded to the drag along obligee’s
own business shares by and between the obligee of the drag along right and the buyer (pari
passu and pro rata). The transfer of the call option between the drag along obligee and the
buyer is free from any fee or charge.
It looks like the real contractual intention of the parties, but we have to examine whether
the legal framework is given by the mandatory law.
On the first hand, according to the Hungarian Civil Code, the sale and purchase contracts
are defined as follows:
Sales contract means any contract under which the seller undertakes to transfer the ownership of
a thing to the buyer, and the buyer undertakes to pay the price thereof, and to take possession of
the thing.25
Although we cannot handle the call option right as a thing, since ownership is possible only
on tangible things,26 so that a right is not transferable via a sale or purchase contract, but we
can use the rules of the sale and purchase contract to the transfer of the rights, based on the
subsidiary rule of the sale and purchase contract.27
On the other hand, the Hungarian Civil Code expressly allows the transfer of the rights:
The entitled person may transfer his right to another person, provided that the right is declared
non-transferable by law, or unless non-transferability follows unambiguously from the nature of the
right.28
Analysing the text of the law, we must state the follows:
i. First of all, the law allows generally the transferability of rights. It comes from the general
rule of the Hungarian Code Civil:29
This Act governs the property and personal relations of persons under the principle of interdepend -
ence and the principle of equality.30
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25 Ptk. 6:215. § (1).
26 Ptk. 5:14. § (1).
27 Ptk. 6:215. § (3).
28 Ptk. 6:202. § (1).
29 Osztovits András (ed), A  Polgári Törvénykönyvről szóló 2013. évi V. Törvény és a  Kapcsolódó Jogszabályok
Nagykommentárja. Book no. III., (Opten Kft. 2014, Budapest) 482.
30 Ptk. 1:1. §.
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The law does not make a difference between subjective rights such as pre-emption right, call
and put options) or the rights with an absolute structure.31 Rights with an absolute structure
are transferable by the mandatory law, like the IP rights based on the Hungarian IP Law,32 or
the call option right on the capital market, based on the Hungarian Capital Market Law.33
ii. The rights are also transferable if
– the right based on the contract is transferable by law, or
– the transferability of the right based on the contract comes unambiguously from the
nature of the right.
A right is transferable unless the transferability is forbidden by law. Generally, the transfer -
ability of the call option right is not forbidden by the Hungarian Civil Code; moreover, the
transferability of the call option right on the capital markets has us conclude that the ‘general’
call option right should also be transferable.
We also have to review the transferability of a call option on a business share, as the nature
(or real content) of the right. No doubt, the business share is transferable, since it is declared
by the law; even so, the members of the company, the company and the person designated by
the company have a pre-emption right in cases of the transfer of a business share to the
‘outsider person’.34
Summarising the above analysis, we have to conclude that the transfer of a call option
right on a business share is legally possible under Hungarian law. Factually, the contractual
intention of the parties, based on the terms and conditions of the drag along agreement, is that
the obligee of the drag along right should have the right to transfer his call option right on the
obligor’s business shares, which is part of the drag along agreement. Hence, we have finally
found that the radical call option school’s solution can be one of the legitimate interpretations
of drag along right transactions.
4 Drag Along Right as a Transfer of Contract (szerzôdésátruházás)
Supporters of the neoliberal wing of the radical perception intend to solve this problem by
referring to the legal instrument of transfer of contract35 in the Hungarian Civil Code and
regard drag along as something incorporating the call option of the drag along obligee to
acquire the business share of the drag along obligor who, upon entering into the contract36
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31 Petrik Ferenc (ed), Polgári Jog I–IV. – Új Ptk. – Kommentár a Gyakorlat Számára. Commentary for the Ptk. 6:215. §,
online version, 2020.
32 Act No. LXXVI of 1999 on Copyright, 42. §.
33 Act No. CXX of 2001 on the Capital Market, 323. §.
34 Ptk. 3:166. § (1) and 3:167. § (1)–(2).
35 Ptk. 6:208. § – 6:211. §.
36 In my view, there is no legal basis for the remaining party to the contract (in this case the drag along obligor) to
give its prior consent to the assignment only if the person entering the contract is already known at the time of
the conclusion of the contract. Thus, in my opinion, the drag along obligor is validly making a contractual
statement in which the drag along rightholder is entitled to transfer his contractual position to an unknown buyer
at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Cf. Fazekas Judit, Menyhárt Ádám, Kőhidi Ákos, Kötelmi Jog, 
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consents to altering the person of the drag along obligee (meaning every right and
obligation)37 upon the unilateral statement of the drag along obligee. The new position will
be taken over by the future buyer, who can buy the business share of the obligor of the drag
along by exercising his or her newly acquired call option.
Well, it cannot be disputed that the future buyer has no intention of acquiring
a contractual position in any drag along contract, taking into consideration that his or her
single wish is to acquire the business share of the drag along obligor. At the same time, we have
to accept that the transfer of contract can be a perfect theoretical legal option to model the
legal content of the transaction, but I suppose this is not a position that is really wanted by
the buyer. In the drag along contract, there are many obligations that are not based on the
parties’ (the later buyer and the obligor of the drag along) contractual will. I refer here only
to the conditions, how it is possible to sell the drag along obligor’s business share, although it
would just be acquired by the buyer. The buyer’s only will be to acquire the ownership of the
business shares. He does not want to keep in the original position of the drag along obligee;
he would like to be a simple owner of the business shares.
With that, I think the transfer of contract as the description of the legal content of the drag
along right is just a theoretical and legally perfect solution but it is not able to present the
real economic content of the parties.
5 Considering Drag Along as an Agency Contract Service
We also have to mention the approach of the ultra-liberal school. They argue that drag along
should not be overthought and it is needless to crack drag along ‘nuts’ with sales contracts,
or call option right ‘sledgehammers’, as drag along is not more than a simple transaction in
which the obligor of the drag along mandates the obligee of the drag along to enter into
a contract with the buyer for transferring business shares in his place and in his name.
Moreover, it is supported with a power of attorney meeting the mandatory formal requirements;
as a result, the obligor of the drag along does not have to take any action when the buyer
emerges and the contract must be concluded.
However, there are two problems with this seemingly perfect solution.
If we regard the drag along as an agency contract, it is beyond any dispute that the obligor
of the drag along is the principal. As such, the principal has the right to instruct, which makes
it uncertain to whom and under what circumstances the obligee of the drag along (who is the
obligor of the agency contract at the same time) is able to transfer the business share. The answer
of the ultra-liberal school to this question is that there are no impediments to setting forth in
the agency contract (which is also a drag along contract in this case) what kind of instructions
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Általános rész (2. átdolgozott kiadás, Gondolat Kiadó 2018) 228; Benke József, Nochta Tibor, Magyar Polgári Jog,
Kötelmi Jog I., (Dialóg Campus Kiadó 2017, Budapest–Pécs) 261.
37 Wellman György (ed), Polgári Jog, Első és Második Rész (3. átdolgozott, bővített kiadás, Az új Ptk. magyarázata
V/VI., (HVG-ORAC 2018, Budapest) 510.
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the principal can give to the agent, and it is also possible to exclude some instructions
concerning the subject, the merit and the purpose of the contract (i.e. transfer of business
share).
On the other hand, the restriction or exclusion of the right to terminate with regard to
contracts for services is rendered null and void.38  However, the obligee of the drag along could
hardly sleep well if he or she tried to sell the business share of the obligor of the drag along
without the consent of this person, based on a contract which can be terminated at any time.
Here comes the argument of the supporters of the ultra-liberal school; that the lawmakers give
us assistance in this matter as, in the case of a long-term agency contract, the parties may
agree on the restriction of the right to terminate; furthermore, they can also preclude the
exercise of the right to terminate within a prescribed term.39 Thus, we have nothing else to
do but to exclude the right to terminate for the obligor of the drag along, or make it fall on
the closest day, which will obviously be the day succeeding the day on which the obligee of the
drag along acting in place and in the name of the obligor of the drag along transferred 
the business share of the obligor of the drag along to the buyer.
Naturally, this argument also has some weaknesses. On the one hand, the contracts can
be terminated, not to mention whether the termination was lawful or not. Hence, upon
delivery of the termination notice, the legal effects of the termination are produced, making
it impossible for the obligee of the drag along to transfer the business shares. Of course, later
there could be a suit for unlawful termination and a judgment could restore the effect of the
agency contract, after which the obligee of the drag-along right can legally sell the business
shares, but factually, the buyers usually do not want to wait for the end of legal proceedings
that could last for years, and they withdraw their offer. On the other hand, an agency contract
is a  complex set of obligations and so it can easily happen that a  contractual breach is
committed, and although it does not affect the main contractual obligation it can give the
legal basis for the termination of the contract.
Taking every factor into consideration, the solution provided by the ultra-liberal
perception cannot be regarded as a bad one. Although the principal-agent perception is
definitely far away from the drag along approach and is not capable of handling the issue
perfectly, it does offer a way that is operable even under Hungarian law.
Summary
In this study I summarized my experience with US, German and Hungarian contractual
practices related to the drag along provision of venture capital transactions. I have presented
some of the relevant legal literature of the examined legal systems. After outlining the practical
and theoretical background, I tried to give a general definition of drag along.
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I did all this work to address whether drag along clauses are valid under Hungarian law.
The first related hypothesis was the conservative perception that drag along is a simple sale
and purchase contract. I demonstrated that drag along cannot be considered as a simple sale and
purchase contract or a special type of sale and purchase contract.
I found that, one of the special types of call options or an unusual perception of an agency
contract can be the legal solution to the required legal content of the drag along right.
Drag along is one of the American legal instruments that, under Hungarian law entails
potential violations; it leaves several contractual gaps in the agreements of the parties and
violate the contractual intention of the parties. However, I do not think that an urgent law-
making procedure is needed, as the drag along rules may have not reached their final form; we
cannot anticipate their future changes and it is also possible that the whole legal instrument
ab ovo will cease to exist in order to provide room for more innovative, creative and contractu -
ally well-founded solutions.
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